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“Occupying Memory: Rhetorical Studies for the 99%” revitalizes rhetorical 
memory by emphasizing memory’s rhetorical production and non-declinable relationship 
to forgetting, the persuasive force of local genealogy, and the capacity of memory to spur 
invention and civic intervention. “Occupying Memory” performs its revival of memory 
through theorization of the contemporary Occupy Movement. 
 The first chapter, “Becoming Activist,” argues that memories are rhetorically 
produced, and supports this supposition by analyzing various activist practices, icons, and 
experiences. I consider the discursive production of memory through Occupy’s practice 
of the “human microphone,” and the imagistic production of memory through images 
such as the Guy Fawkes Mask. I also consider forgetting in the production of memory, 
and analyze how subjects are compelled to action through “forgotten” affects and traumas 
that drive one to compose self-narratives. 
 “Giving an Account of One’s Wealth,” strives to develop a strategy for teaching 
writing called “im-personal writing,” and employs Percentile Narratives from the Occupy 
Movement throughout its implementation. I analyze existing narratives from multiple 
 ix 
theoretical perspectives, and focus on how students can consider the rhetorical production 
of their memories while avoiding the pitfalls associated with “personal writing” such as 
the quest for authenticity. 
“The Infinite Archive,” considers how the binary opposition between so-called 
“live” and “technological” memory deconstructs, and avers that the digitization of 
memory is an instance of “hyper-extension” rather than “externalization.” I consider 
multiple cases of such extension in the form of social media archives including Twitter, 
live streaming video, and viral memes. The problem of digital forgetting and networked 
multitudes is likewise engaged. 
“Stiller than Still” contends that (singular) bodies and specific living structures 
can function as monuments oriented toward the future. I argue that the type of memory 
such monuments produce is a “common” rather than “public” memory, one that entails 
resistance to state control, participatory democracy, and the preservation of difference. I 
also consider the nature of “common” forgetting in relation to affirmation. 
 The text culminates with “Beginning(s),” as I consider how rhetorical memory 
and the Occupy Movement open onto the future, as well as the relation between memory, 
social movements, nostalgia, and hope. 
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Don't you remember when you were young 
And you wanted to set the world on fire? 
Somewhere deep down I know you do  
Don't you remember when we were young 
And we wanted to set the world on fire  
Because I still am and I still do 
 
-- Rise Against, Architects (2011) 
 
If we just took a step back 
A bigger picture we might view 
Perhaps the man in the gutter 
Is not so different from you 
 
Come in, out of the cold 
Forget all that you know 
Because there's always been room 
By the fire for you, oh 
Come in, out of the cold 
 
-- Rise Against, Disparity by Design (2011)
  1 
A Call to Remember, A Call to Occupy: Memory and the Movement 
The art of memory is a clear case of a marginal subject, not recognized as 
belonging to any of the normal disciplines, having been omitted because it was no 
one’s business. And yet it has turned out to be, in a sense, everyone’s business. 
-- Francis Yates, The Art of Memory 
 
Cheerfulness, the good conscience, the joyful deed, confidence in the future – all 
of them depend . . .  on one’s being just as able to forget at the right time as to 
remember at the right time; on the possession of a powerful instinct for sensing 
when it is necessary to feel historically and when unhistorically. 
-- Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations 
 
The Occupy Movement, as it has come to be called, named the source of the 
crises of our time: Wall Street banks, big corporations, and others among the 1% 
are claiming the world’s wealth for themselves at the expense of the 99% and 
having their way with our governments. 
-- Sarah van Gelder, This Changes Everything: Occupy Wall Street and the 99% 
Movement 
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THE MEMORY THAT OCCUPIES 
Memory will occupy the following investigation, and in return, the investigation 
will Occupy memory. In rhetorical studies, memory has an extensive and vibrant 
genealogy that stretches back to the very beginnings of the discipline, though the value 
afforded to memory within rhetoric has waxed and waned throughout its history. For 
example, Francis Yates points out how “the Greeks, . . . invented an art of memory 
which, like their other arts, was passed on to Rome whence it descended in the European 
tradition” (xi). This venerable “art of memory” is exemplified for rhetoricians in the 
classic works of Cicero, Quintilian, and the anonymous writer of the Ad Herennium.1 
These texts strive to develop an art for producing memories, for example, “through a 
technique of impressing ‘places’ and ‘images’ on memory” (xi), where rhetoricians 
would imagine vacant streets filled with memorable items to remind them of the contents 
and sequences of speeches; it is an “agrarian” practice where a tract of space is called to 
yield forth a mnemonic harvest. In short, then, memory was of great importance for 
classical rhetoricians, not only regarding the memorization of speech materials, but in 
relation to the improvement of memory, techniques for “making memorable” the contents 
of speeches, speed of memory-retrieval, the production of communal memory, and so on. 
However, although memory was held in high esteem throughout the classical 
period and beyond, modernity would strike memory a blow from which it has yet to 
                                                 
1 For what is likely the best exposition and analysis of the Latinate art of memory and its 
connection to the ancient rhetorical tradition, see Yates’ The Art of Memory 1-26. Therein, one finds an 
understanding of memory as loci that one occupies with various topoi. 
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recover due to an “industrialization” of its processes. For instance, as Sharon Crowley 
explains in The Methodical Memory, “[m]ethod was touted throughout the seventeenth 
century as an efficient way to learn almost any subject, since it relieved the burden placed 
on memory by calling on the assistance of reason” (35). Championed by rhetoricians such 
as Peter Ramus and philosophers like Rene Descartes, “method,” whether understood as a 
strategy for composing texts or conducting scientific research, was understood to entail a 
devaluation of memory via its mechanization, as it involved following a rote series of 
procedures that one could employ without making recourse to memory’s inventive 
powers (and, as Crowley notes, is still evident today in the pedagogy of Current-
Traditional Rhetoric2) (85, 134). For example, consider that when following the standard 
five-paragraph (“fifty star”) strategy for composing, one can simply follow a memorized 
formula rather than inventively recombining and experimenting with various writing 
strategies that one has previously encountered. 
 
                                                 
2 In The Methodical Memory, Crowley takes to task the persistent employment of “method” as 
found centuries later in Current-Traditional Rhetoric. She does this not only because she argues that CTR is 
essentially not a rhetoric because its’ processes stifle invention (155), but because this (problematic) stifling 
of invention is “complicit with the professional hierarchy that currently obtains in the American academy” 
(139). That is, it teaches students to become mindless drones who can reproduce a five-paragraph essay or 
other technical or business-oriented texts without having to think. 
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Fig. 1. Robert Fludd’s Modernist Depiction of Memory. 
 
Today, the on-going devaluation of memory inaugurated by Ramus, Descartes, 
and others is exemplified in a passage from Edward P.J. Corbett, who in his Classical 
Rhetoric for the Modern Student casually and reductively dismisses rhetorical memory as 
follows: 
[In the ancient world,] [t]he fourth part of rhetoric was memoria (Greek, 
mneme), concerned with the memorizing of speeches. Of all the five parts 
of rhetoric, memoria was the one that received the least attention in the 
rhetoric books. The reason for the neglect of this aspect of rhetoric is 
probably that not much can be said, in a theoretical way, about the 
process of memorizing; and after rhetoric came to be concerned mainly 
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with written discourse, there was no further need to deal with memorizing 
. . . [Thus,] [t]here will be no consideration in this book of this aspect of 
rhetoric. (38 emphasis mine) 
Corbett’s narrative here is a commonplace one, basically, that memory died within 
rhetorical studies when writing (historically) began to take precedence over speech, and 
memorization was no longer a necessity in daily life and civic engagement. Corbett’s is 
not only an over-simplified story, one that overlooks the importance of memory’s 
industrial commodification in its modern devaluation, but it practically erases the 
possibility that memory might have an entirely new role to play in rhetoric today, 
especially as paradigms of production shift from memory’s industrialization to what 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri would call its informatization (Empire 284). Corbett’s 
dismissal of memory has not gone unnoticed or unchallenged, though, for as Collin 
Gifford Brooke notes, “we are no less beholden to memory for the fact that we may no 
longer memorize speeches” (Lingua 35). And as Brooke notes as well, given the fact that 
memory has (for the most part) fallen into disrepute or disuse in rhetorical studies, 
“[p]erhaps more than any of the other four canons, memory is the one canon whose status 
as practice is in need of rehabilitation” (144). 
 What would it entail, though, to rehabilitate the practice of memory, or better 
still, to develop memory as a multifaceted strategy or series of tactics for approaching the 
rhetoric of events, artifacts, texts, and so on? In the words of Victor Villanueva, how does 
one recognize memory as a friend, answer memory’s call, and invite “her” into one’s 
scholarship and classroom (“Memoria” 19)? That is, in (and out of) the tradition of the 
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classical art of memory, the “method” of Ramus, Inc., as well as other historical memory 
practices, what strategies might one deploy in order to re-occupy memory today? In order 
to provisionally answer these questions, in the text that follows I approach memory along 
the following lines (of flight), arguing that it is: 1) produced rhetorically, both 
hermeneutically and non-hermeneutically, signaling that it is produced “in common” with 
others socially, both consciously and non-consciously; 2) memory is bound up in an 
inescapable relation with forgetting that means that one must think these two forces 
together (though irreducibly), 3) memory exerts an incredible persuasive force when it is 
linked to genealogies of local memory and struggle, and finally; 4) memory is intimately 
tied to action as its spur, especially as a source of rhetorical invention and civic 
in(ter)vention.3 
 In terms of strategy, therefore, throughout the text that follows I take as my first 
point of departure that memory is rhetorically produced. This is likely the most important 
supposition that I make throughout the course of the entire investigation, not only 
because it reveals memory’s fabricated(ness), dynamism, and historical-material 
contingency, but because it emphasizes the shared or “common” nature of memory, the 
notion that one’s seemingly “individual” memories and the thoughts, actions, and 
                                                 
3 In understanding memory as rhetorically produced, bound up with forgetting and local struggle, 
and rhetorically productive of action, it is clear that I agree with John Reynolds when he argues that 
“[r]ethinking memory, . . . requires that one first correct the record and challenge the firmly entrenched and 
faulty assumption that memory issues are limited to ‘memorizing the speech,’ and therefore [are] without 
written or electronic equivalents” (4). 
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accomplishments connected to them are produced through (and in relation to) the vast 
archive of languages, knowledge(s), codes, affects, images, and so on, shared and 
exchanged by the global multitude of humanity and beyond (Marx’s “general intellect”). 
To clarify, memories (and lived experiences, too) are always framed in accordance with 
specific rhetorics/dispositifs, that is, according to informatically shared languages, shared 
logics, shared feelings, and so on, that are embedded within specific historical moments, 
cultural situations, or economic conditions, and provided a new series of rhetorical 
articulations, one can utterly metamorphose memory (and future experience). When this 
happens, one’s “world,” and likewise, the “worlds” of others, is made anew; memory 
now operates “counter” to how it once did. Where a population once perceived-
remembered an activist demonstration confusedly or with hostility, after rhetorical 
reproduction, it may recall a band of heroes. 
The potential for making memory anew is precisely why Michel Foucault argues 
that his primary task as an intellectual is “to show people that they are much freer than 
they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up 
at a certain time during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and 
destroyed” (10). In other words, when subjects come to view their ways of perceiving-
recollecting as ways of perceiving-recollecting that are alterable, given that they derive 
from historically- and culturally- contingent rhetorics, those subjects are freed to 
experiment with new and different ways of perceiving-recollecting, and new and different 
modes of existence (forms of life). It is therefore no exaggeration to claim that one of the 
most important contemporary theoretical insights into memory is its contingent, 
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rhetorical quality, given that memory is a rhetorical battleground composed of a dynamic 
series of pragmatic truths—truths that become especially important to defend in struggles 
where groups must assert the veracity of their experiences before judiciaries, tribunals, 
and the world at-large. Moreover, when one recognizes that the truths of one’s 
perception-recollection are irreducibly shared and social, that there are no “private 
memories,” as a Wittgensteinian might say, then one is more apt to work together with 
others in order to produce ways of perceiving and recollecting that are collectively 
productive, affirmative, joyful, and just. 
Diane Davis emphasizes the above point concerning the rhetoricity of memory by 
avering that “all intelligibility, including self-intelligibility, is a tropological product” 
(Inessential 40), which is to say that making-sense as such is rhetorically derived. One 
can therefore transmute the ways by which one makes sense of (and articulates) life itself 
after being persuaded by, or being produced through, for example, a new vocabulary and 
its accompanying logics. A memory of one’s tenth birthday party with its bright colors 
and sounds is radically different ten years later, and more so twenty years later, not only 
due to forgetting, but given one’s way of rhetorically articulating/producing the truth of 
the event. 
However, memories are not always rhetorically produced in ways that one is 
consciously aware of, or that one can interpret, for just as there is an interpretable 
(hermeneutic) dimension to rhetoric, as Davis points out, “there is also a 
nonhermeneutical dimension of rhetoric not reducible to meaning making, to offering up 
signs and symbols for comprehension” (67). For the purposes of “Occupying Memory,” 
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what this means is that memories are rhetorically produced not only in ways that one can 
remember and therefore interpret, but also in opaque ways that one has “forgotten” and 
therefore cannot interpret. Thus, the notion that memories are produced through 
memorable, interpretable means, as well as “forgotten,” nonhermeneutical means is one 
that I will continually emphasize throughout the following text. 
The “forgetting” entailed in the nonhermeneutical production of memory 
dovetails into another one of my major methodological strategies, that is, the notion that 
memory and forgetting are inexorable, yet irreducible, forces. This is an extremely 
important point, for as Bradford Vivian succinctly explains, “[f]orgetting has a bad 
reputation” (Public 168), and it has this reputation because throughout histories of 
western rhetorics and philosophies, forgetting almost always signifies “loss, absence, or 
lack” (5), “oblivion, liquidation, or amnesia” (16), or worst of all, death (38). Vivian 
points out as well how: 
[f]orgetting in these figurations, is not merely the opposite of memory; it 
parasitically haunts the act of recollection, thriving by virtue of a stealthy 
but lethal attachment to its host. Forgetting is [quite often figured as] 
memory’s unshakable other, a ghostly counterpart shadowing luminous 
representations of former experiences. (3) 
Indeed, in the reductive/reactive binary machine that is often set up between memory and 
forgetting, memory is the privileged term, and forgetting is typically the dangerous and 
marginal other. Unfortunately, such is the case not only historically, but in many cases, 
contemporarily, when scholars regard forgetting suspiciously rather than as an integral, 
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productive, and affirmative force, preferring instead to “pitch a tent” for memory alone in 
a manner akin to the unforgettable “hero” of  Jorge-Luis Borges’ “Funes the 
Memorious.” Throughout the following text, then, I will continually emphasize how the 
power of forgetting not only vaporizes any possibility for conceptualizing memory as an 
accurate or inaccurate representation of events, but I will emphasize how forgetting is 
integral in producing memories and aiding rhetorical communities in their efforts to live 
on in the wake of traumatic disasters. 
 Regarding the point that forgetting troubles the notion of memory as 
representation, Vivian explains how “[m]emory does not repeat an ideal and original 
impression of the same ‘unrepeatable’ event ad infinitum; it repeats a series of 
performative differences and transformations that supply the mere semblances of such an 
‘unrepeatable’ origin” (125-126). In other words, from the outset, there is already an 
ontological difference or fold between the becoming of any material event and so-called 
“immediate experience,” which indicates that this “experience” is already a memory of 
the “forgotten” event; thus, every recollection of this memory in the future is a return, not 
to any original event itself, but to its “image” (Bergson). Any averred memory of a pure 
event is a phantasm. However, this is not to say that memories are somehow “unreal.” To 
the contrary, memories involve the production of realities and their truths rather than 
representations separate from the Truth of some ultimate Reality. Moreover, this is not to 
deny the supposition of a “purely” differentiated plane of immanent materiality, because 
memories are born of this plane and thoroughly embedded in it. Memories operate as 
breaks or folds in immanence that are incessantly reproduced each time new memories or 
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new rhetorics rearticulate them. This is why Vivian argues that “[a]cts of recollection 
invariably transform the nature of memory because the changing incitements and 
purposes of recollection ensure that we remember in different ways, even if we remember 
the same event” (115). 
Furthermore, memories are best understood as non-representational images 
because they are always-already “contracted,” as Henri Bergson would say, cleaving 
away what they cannot (or have no need to) contain; forgetting is already at work in the 
formation of memory. This is why Vivian argues that “forgetting comprises an essentially 
productive aspect of memory rather than its unfortunate repression or erosion” (126). 
Indeed, Vivian’s complex observations about representation and reproduction are 
certainly of great importance, and worth carrying along for the duration of the following 
investigation. 
 Another key observation regarding forgetting that will serve as a point of 
departure for “Occupying Memory” follows on the heels of Nietzsche’s contention that 
“the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an 
individual, of a people and of a culture” (Untimely 63). In other words, with regard to 
any given event, sometimes it is best for a society or a subject to remember, and 
sometimes it is best for them to forget. For instance, in the course of so-called “personal 
writing,” an instructor might encourage students to consider an event from their lives 
that, even though they will not literally forget it, they might wish to take steps to prevent 
from exerting a damaging influence on their lives. Or, on a “global” level, Vivian points 
out that “arguments to communally forget could produce socially, politically, and 
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ethically attractive outcomes” (Public 10). Granted, it is not always so that forgetting 
serves as a better guide to communal action than remembering, but it is often a question 
worth asking. 
However, neither Nietzsche nor Vivian is suggesting that a culture become 
oblivious toward events from its past, only that there is often a way of “forgetfully” 
rhetorically articulating such events that is increasingly just. For example, in the wake of 
the attacks of September 11
th, 2011, many Americans issued a call to “Never Forget,” a 
non-forgetting that resulted in increased hatred of and brutality toward innocent Muslim-
Americans by having citizens incessantly (pathologically) recall an event carried out by a 
tiny number of Muslim religious fundamentalists. In this instance, Nietzsche would ask 
whether there is a way to “affirmatively forget” aspects of September 11th, 2011, or at 
least remember them differently, such that one can overcome one’s hatred or fears 
without forgetting the details of the tragedy itself, for instance, “forgetting” that the 
violence of September 11
th
, 2011, was carried out by Muslims, remembering instead that 
it was the work of religious extremists. Through this strategy, one can thus see how 
“forgetting” often simultaneously means “remembering differently” or counter-
remembering in ways that oppose commonly accepted narratives. 
 
  13 
 
 
Fig. 2. “Never Forget” 9/11. 
 
 The question of counter-memorial narratives leads nicely into my third point of 
departure for approaching memory, that is, via counter-memorial genealogy. As Foucault 
notes in “Society Must Be Defended,” genealogy is characterized, at least in one 
particular sense, by scholarly encounters with “local memories” (8), or more specifically, 
with writing a “memory of combats” through the “rediscovery of struggles and the raw 
memory of fights” (8). Thus, throughout this text, I want to unearth memories related to 
local struggle while revealing their rhetorical force, and even weave a short counter-
history from them. For as Howard Zinn notes, there is a real persuasive power in writing 
history as it is based on local memory and struggle, and great inspiration in “disclosing 
those hidden episodes of the past when, even if in brief flashes, people showed their 
ability to resist, to join together, occasionally to win” (x). 
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 More specifically, the history that I am interested in disrupting through writing a 
counter-memorial genealogy is none other than what Victor Vitanza calls The History of 
Rhetoric. For just as official political or military history, for instance, tends to focus on 
Great Men and Great Events, excluding much in the process, The History of Rhetoric 
tends to do the same. Hence, in revitalizing rhetorical memory by connecting it to local 
memory and struggle, I want to launch a preemptive strike against any History of 
Rhetoric that would exclude particular activist narratives as unimportant or marginal in 
contrast to mainstream political discourse. Like Vitanza, through my recourse to marginal 
memory, I want to reclaim against The History of Rhetoric “that which is under 
suppression, repression, political oppression” (4), and struggle against the dominant 
rhetorical discourse before that discourse is even fully articulated. My aim in what 
follows, therefore, is to begin Occupying The History of Rhetoric. 
Following the above observations, it is perhaps no surprise, then, that the last of 
my four over-arching strategies for approaching memory throughout the following text 
involves action, which is appropriate given that the other “forgotten” rhetorical canon 
alongside memory (memoria) is delivery (actio). Indeed, memory (and forgetting) 
deliver(s) one forward, not merely as a “storehouse” for presenting speeches, but as spurs 
to movement as such. In fact, the main point in studying the rhetorical production of 
memories is to try and understand how subjects are compelled to action by having their 
memories produced in different ways. Bergson reinforces this point by observing that 
“we must never forget the utilitarian character of our mental functions, which are 
essentially turned toward action” (xvii); in fact, for him, memory functions by constantly 
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issuing an “invitation to act” (2). Nowhere is this call to action more visible than in 
activism itself, Occupy or otherwise, where one is constantly reminded of an ethically 
problematic state of affairs, and through that reminder one is compelled to enact change. 
For example, as this text progresses, I will show how activists from the Occupy 
Movement employ slogans, images, narratives, performances, demonstrations, marches, 
social media, and more—all of which assemble to produce a “common” (though not 
universally shared) memory of struggle that not only persuades activists to engage in 
direct action, but serves as an archive for argument whereby activists can defend their 
efforts and call others to their cause. I therefore conceive memory as functioning not only 
as the well-spring of invention (as did the ancients), I understand the production of 
memory as the provisional plateau of the so-called “rhetorical situation,” or in relation to 
this project specifically, the production of what I call, following Hardt and Negri, 
“biopolitical memory,” a form of memory that leads one to resist control (“being-
against”), while “striv[ing] toward an alternative existence” (Commonwealth 57). 
THE OCCUPATION OF MEMORY 
After introducing this project’s theoretical orientation and laying out its 
methodological strategies, it is now time to take a look at the artifact(s) that will provide 
the project’s material “ground” for analysis: the Occupy Movement (or perhaps more 
accurately, the Occupy Movements). Granted, producing a succinct genealogy of Occupy 
is no easy thing, especially because it recalls such a long cycle of past struggles, but if 
one forsakes finding Occupy’s origin and begins in the middle, then surely the task is 
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feasible. Responding to a challenge issued by the Canadian magazine Adbusters, activists 
meeting at 16 Beaver Street in New York City formed Occupy’s first rhizomatic node 
and began to develop the ground-game for Occupy Wall Street (#OWS), a series of direct 
actions whose name not only evokes the practice of “sit-ins” as a form of dissent and 
protest, for instance, during race struggles for civil rights, but one that entails the co-
option and reversal of traditional military imagery. Thus, from the outset, Occupy 
connected not only to a rich genealogy of activist practice, but the movement employed 
that memory of struggle as a spur to action in the name of socio-economic justice. 
Moreover, the Occupy Movement has (rhetorically, “practically”) metamorphosed 
“occupying” from a terrifying, violent prospect fraught with death, theft, and imperial 
dominance into one that signals the building of progressive communities based on mutual 
love, respect, and care—one mode of political action was thus “forgotten,” and another 
remembered. 
“Occupy” as a term therefore signals nothing less than a Nietzschean revaluation 
of values and the coming of a collective assemblage of subjects intent on actualizing 
those values, establishing them in counter-memorial fashion through the production of 
new subjectivities as/and new memories. Indeed, “to Occupy” now signals engaging in a 
rigorous and energetic “being-against” contemporary regimes of power (Capital and 
Empire), as well as a refreshingly audacious, optimistic “being-toward-the-future,” as the 
voice of a millennial generation come of age begins to speak, calling those from all 
generations to its cause. Therefore, as I will strive to demonstrate throughout, to 
“Occupy” memory will mean, among other things, to dwell within and upon memory, 
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such that one might deploy it as a force to resist as well as “affirmatively forget” the 
hegemony of neoliberal capitalism and military-industrial adventurism, accomplishing 
this feat not only through theoretical analysis, but by reinvigorating the seemingly 
“forgotten” energy of past generations in their struggles for justice and peace. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Occupy Wall Street Inaugural Poster. 
 
On September 17
th
, 2011, the first Occupy activists, inspired by memories of the 
so-called Arab Spring, uprisings in Europe, labor protests in Wisconsin, and more, set up 
camp in Zuccotti Park (aka “Liberty Plaza”) and began the non-violent occupation of the 
figural heart of global capitalism and neoliberal economic policy. Gathered together to 
take a stand against the rapacious ethical negligence of multinational corporations and 
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banks, the usurpation of American democracy by the financial elite, and the forgetting of 
the needs of 99% of Americans/the global multitude in favor of the plutocratic 1%, they 
would have never guessed that their actions would spark a national, and ultimately 
international, progressive movement—while invigorating a newly coalesced  American 
Left—one directly intertwined with, and continuing the work of, previous struggles such 
as the women’s movements, civil rights movements, GBLT movements, and more.4 
Indeed, through the efforts of the first Occupiers, those waves of anti-hegemonic counter-
memory echoing throughout the globe would find a focal point, and then explode 
outward to transform the subjectivities of entire coalitions, not only within the US, but 
invigorate subjects throughout the world as they remembered the living potential for 
resistance, action, and change. 
Furthermore, with breathtaking speed activists in New York City succeeding in 
creating a fully-functioning community based on an ethos5 of mutual responsibility and 
                                                 
4 Although Occupying Memory will focus primarily on the Occupy movement as it has unfolded 
in the United States, as Sarah Gelder notes, the movement quickly “spread worldwide, to over 1,500 cities, 
from Madrid to Cape Town and from Buenos Aires to Hong Kong, involving hundreds of thousands of 
people” (2). This proliferation is due, in large part, to the structure of Occupy as “a movement of 
movements,” that is, as a “big tent” that draws together activists from divergent causes and sets them to 
work on shared goals. 
5 Significantly, according to Michael Halloran, “[t]he most concrete meaning given for the term 
[ethos] in the Greek lexicon is ‘a habitual gathering place,’ and [Halloran] suspect[s] that it is upon this 
image of people gathering together in a public place, sharing experiences and ideas, that its meaning of 
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care for others (a “twenty-four-hour-a-day experiment in egalitarian living”) (Gelder 8), 
or a “remembering of the other” standing in stark contrast to the neoliberal ideology of 
staunch individualism and untrammeled capitalist accumulation. The community in 
Liberty Plaza not only organized itself in a non-hierarchical (“horizontal” or “leaderless”) 
manner where everyone had a voice and could contribute (often with an emphasis on 
marginalized groups such as the “OccuQueers” and “OccuKrips”), but they also fed the 
hungry, amassed an impressive library, created multiple projects, classes, and working 
groups, produced the booming song and dance of a festival, maintained an extensive 
campgrounds, and held endless conversations about how they might build a better world, 
one that served everyone rather than merely the wealthy and the powerful. Indeed, it was 
through these efforts that a particular “common” (shared, non-universal) memory of 
struggle began to be produced, one that, although permeated with deep differences, 
produced a network of subjects engaged in action in order to overcome those economic 
difficulties “burned in” to the memory of occupying subjects. 
Moreover, the “direct democratic” decision-making at Occupy Wall Street took 
(and still takes) place in a forum called the General Assembly (GA), where an ideal of 
“consensus”6 drives participants to not only remember everyone and take their thoughts 
                                                                                                                                                 
[‘]character[’] rests” (60). In other words, with regard to the current project, it seems that having ethos is 
closely linked to occupying. 
6 Though “consensus” decision-making is a laudable ideal, it is important to remember the 
warnings regarding it issued by philosophers like Jean-Francois Lyotard and rhetoricians like Diane Davis. 
As Davis points out, “[c]onsensus, . . . always leaves a ‘residue beyond its control’” (Breaking 182), which 
  20 
into consideration (which is a painstaking and messy process), but requires that 
practically the entire assembly agree with or consent to all group actions and statements. 
Equally impressive, and driven by the wide-spread use of archival, participatory social 
media such as Facebook and Twitter, was that within only a few days of the inauguration 
of Occupy Wall Street, similar sites began to bloom across the country, taking root and 
calling citizens to action in cities from Seattle and Austin to Philadelphia and Atlanta in 
such rapid fashion that the renowned philosopher Cornell West was “spiritually break-
dancing” with excitement (and I, like Felix Guattari during the sixties, felt as though I 
was walking on the ceiling). 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Occupy Wall Street in Zuccotti Park (“Liberty Plaza”). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
means that in the attempt to achieve it, someone’s voice is typically silenced and forgotten. For more on 
consensus and forgetting, see Lyotard’s Community at Loose Ends. 
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 Granted, it is impossible to recall/outline all the reasons why activists were driven 
to participate in the Occupy Movement, and this multiplicity of motives is one reason 
why the movement as such issued no unified statement of demands. Yet as Judith Butler 
explains, “any list of demands would not exhaust the ideal of justice that is being 
enacted” through the movement itself (“Precarity” 12). However, there are over-arching 
grievances and desires of those in the movement, a “common” (shared, non-universal) 
memory of struggle, and subjectivities/memories that have been produced in a specific 
way, that at the risk of being reductive are important to explain, especially given the 
suspicious “amnesia”—the “unproblematic forgetting”—expressed in the ever-returning 
question: “But what does Occupy want?” (which, repeated by corporate media as an 
obfuscating mantra, has become an all-too-common topos). 
To take up this question (genealogically), though, one of the primary reasons why 
the Occupy Movement is taking place is due to inequitable wealth distribution in the US 
and around the globe brought about by the systemic effects of global finance capitalism, a 
state of affairs made all-the-more problematic given that it is combined with class 
exploitation and a “forgetting” of the needs of the multitude. Along these lines, Sarah 
Gelder explains how: 
the wealthiest among us have rigged the system to enhance their own 
power and wealth at the expense of everyone else. . . . the government 
actively facilitates this concentration of wealth through tax breaks for 
corporations and the wealthy, and bailouts for giant banks and 
corporations. (3) 
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With the above observations in mind, it is quite apparent that in the US Occupy entails a 
backlash against multiple decades of neoliberal (deregulated capitalist) hegemony, a 
“being-against” characterized by palpable anger at the fact that the richest, most 
powerful, country on earth is falling far short of its potential to care for its citizenry, and 
moreover, that the election of seemingly transformative figures such as Barack Obama 
could do little to remedy the problem (since both the Democratic and Republican parties 
have essentially been “purchased” by the financial elite). This supposition becomes 
increasingly clear as well when one turns to a genealogy of Capital in the US and 
globally, considering the shift from what David Harvey calls “embedded liberalism” to 
neoliberalism, or the move to systematically destroy Keynesian economic measures that 
provided for far greater numbers of the populace. Or as Harvey himself summarizes, 
drawing out the genealogy: 
the whole history of embedded liberalism and the subsequent turn to 
neoliberalization indicates the crucial role played by class struggle in 
either checking or restoring elite class power. Though it has been 
effectively disguised, we have lived through a whole generation of 
sophisticated strategizing on the part of ruling elites to restore, enhance, or 
. . . to construct an overwhelming class power. (201) 
Indeed, standing in contrast to the memory of an “embedded liberal” or post-New Deal 
era where public education, infrastructure, environmental stewardship, healthcare, and 
various programs founded upon a notion of shared social responsibility at least made 
some noteworthy inroads, today the wealthy elite have fought to almost entirely eliminate 
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any sort of financial safety net, environmental regulation, opportunity for upward 
mobility, and so on, predicated upon the spurious valorization of “personal 
responsibility” and Randian individualism. Moreover, as the plutocratic elite continue to 
persuade a significant portion of the US population to adopt its values, and as Spinoza 
would say, “fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation” 
(Anti-Oedipus 29), the middle class is eroding, homes are being foreclosed on every 
corner, and American and global ecologies are in peril. Moreover, America and those 
countries swimming in its hegemonic wake are increasingly developing ethoi of me rather 
than we, and the Occupy Movement stands in opposition to this trend, contending that the 
hyper-masculine, honor-bound ethoi of such cultures is neither desirable nor inevitable, 
given that the self-interested forgetting of others is nowhere entrenched in human nature 
(or human behavior is just as inclined toward cooperation as it is competition and 
cooperation itself is the most beneficial strategy for “individuals”). In a word, the 
provisional plateau at stake involves recalling the historical and economic factors that 
have produced the present state of capitalist crisis through genealogical analysis, so as to 
resist inscribing that crisis into an unchanging (“fallen”) human essence—a move which 
produces counter-remembering subjects who oppose their exploitation. 
 Indeed, one reason why the Occupy Movement stands in opposition to neoliberal 
hegemony and the absence of measures to return wealth to those who have produced it, 
are the outcomes that these unregulated capitalist practices entail (and Occupy’s often 
overt opposition to capitalism is striking, recalling rhetorical pitches not seen since the 
earliest decades of the twentieth century). For in contrast to a country where the 
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American Dream is considered the highest ideal, made possible through shared social and 
economic responsibility, today fewer and fewer Americans remember/believe that 
Dream, or that its facilitation by so-called “free markets” and “trickle-down” economics, 
has any resonance for them. In short, many Americans no longer believe that working 
hard and playing by the rules, or the success of those in power, will ensure their success, 
and they are prepared to rhetorically “forget” those who would continue to feed them 
such narratives. As Gelder explains, 
“[t]alk to people at any of the Occupy sites and you’ll hear stories of 
people who play by the rules, work long hours, study hard, and then find 
only low-wage jobs, often without health care coverage or prospects for a 
secure future . . . [a]nd many can find no job at all. (4) 
Moreover, many Occupiers remember a time when the above state of affairs was less 
extreme, and they recall watching as measures to regulate Capital and return wealth to its 
producers were eroded. In other words, thanks to memories of better times along with 
memories of increasing hardships despite increasingly hard work, most participants in the 
movement understand the dismissal economic situation facing most Americans as 
something besides a personal failure. The shame and guilt once felt in the face of 
unemployment, debt, and foreclosure has been replaced, or counter-remembered (thanks 
to oppositional rhetorics), by a capacity to think systemically rather than individually—a 
counter-remembering that entails a shift from the neoliberal discourses of “austerity” and 
“belt-tightening” to those of “economic justice.” As Gelder explains, 
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[m]illions now recognize that we are not to blame for a weak economy, for 
a subprime mortgage meltdown, or for a tax system that favors the 
wealthy but bankrupts the government. The 99% are coming to see that we 
are collateral damage in an all-out effort by the super-rich to get even 
richer. (2) 
In other words, through rhetorics coming from Occupy and elsewhere, many from the 
multitude are counter-remembering, and thus becoming aware that they are the victims 
of, as Noam Chomsky puts it, “about thirty years of a really quite bitter class war that has 
led to social, economic and political arrangements in which the system of democracy has 
been shredded” (54). And it is a war that has been enacted rather stealthily, whereby Wall 
Street and the American plutocracy have occupied the US so as to vampirize its wealth as 
though it were another nation.7 And in relation to the military term “Occupy,” one might 
                                                 
7 The image of Wall Street occupying America recalls another important meaning of the term 
“Occupy,” namely, military occupation of foreign territories. Indeed, one of the underlying messages 
implicit in the slogan “Occupy Wall Street” is the call to not occupy other countries, to not engage in brutal 
imperial occupations in the name of freedom and liberation. This theme is also prevalent in calls within the 
movement to, as Angela Davis puts it, “(Un)Occupy” or (de)colonize. As Davis herself explains,  
We must be aware when we say ‘Occupy Wall Street’ or ‘Occupy Washington Square’ 
that occupations in other countries are violent and brutal. Palestine remains occupied 
territory, and we have to learn how to say ‘no’ to military occupations. (Occupy! 133) 
I predict that if the US continues its escalation of military intervention into Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, or 
elsewhere in the coming months or years, this underlying significance of the term “Occupy” will come 
increasingly to the fore, especially as the costs of war in both economic and ethical terms are illuminated. 
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venture to understand the movement as a great “No!” to war as such, its joyous and 
affirmative forgetting, along with a search for alternatives, whether that war is an 
imperial one waged in the name of peace and freedom, or a class war waged against the 
general populace. 
 Of course, given that the slogan of Occupy is “We are the 99%,” another critical 
question regarding the movement is who the 99% are (becoming). On the one hand, the 
99% are tantamount to basically what is claimed—the 99% percent of Americans who 
control a shockingly small portion of the country’s wealth and power (despite the fact 
that they produced that wealth), in contrast to the 1% of Americans who control over 
40% of the country’s wealth and have more direct access to financial and political power. 
In short, the 99% share a “common” memory of socio-economic struggle, based 
particularly on indebtedness and failures of representative politics to alleviate such unjust 
arrangements. 
On the other hand, although very high numbers support the Occupy Movement 
and its aims, far fewer take to the streets to identify as the 99% themselves, despite the 
fact 98% of Americans reside outside the highest income bracket. For some, this presents 
an opportunity to ridicule the movement for its incapacity to count or its pretense to 
represent anyone, though this is a hasty claim to lodge against a movement that enacts a 
direct critique of political representation,8 and contends that most citizens are either 
misinformed by corporate media or simply too exhausted or frightened to speak out. 
                                                 
8 For more on Occupy and the failure of political representation, see Hardt and Negri’s “The Fight 
for ‘Real Democracy’ at the Heart of Occupy Wall Street” in Foreign Affairs. 
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Regardless, it is safe to say that activists and participants in the movement, if they are not 
representatives of the 99%, are at least a significant sample of those Americans who are 
bearing the burdens of the current American (and global) financial crisis, and who have 
come to dis-identify their interests from the interests of the plutocracy. For example, as 
Gelder points out: 
Among the 99% are recent graduates and veterans who can’t find work, 
elderly who fear losing their pensions, the long term unemployed, the 
homeless, peace activists, people with a day job in a corporate office who 
show up after work, members of the military, and off-duty police. Those 
involved cannot be pigeonholed. They are as diverse as the people of this 
country and world. (6) 
As Gelder explains, the members of the 99% are incredibly diverse, as are the “members” 
of Occupy who directly participate in the movement. They come from innumerable 
social, cultural, and political backgrounds, and fight for a vast number of causes woven 
together by a critique of socio-economic injustice. But attempting to list these 
backgrounds and causes is therefore an undertaking nearly equivalent to counting stars, 
so I will not attempt to do so. Instead, I will direct readers to the archival 
“wearethe99percent.tumblr.com” blogsite, where so many have shared their compelling 
and heartbreaking stories, and reveal that although the 99% come from divergent 
backgrounds, they are pulled together not only by memories of struggle, but also a 
specific way of rhetorically framing that struggle. 
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Fig. 5. “We are the 99%” Tumblr. Blog. 
 
Regardless of the impossibility of finally doing justice to the complexity of the 
movement and its participants, though, in many ways, the following text is an attempt to 
remember the class struggles of the 99% (reproducing subjectivities through said counter-
remembering), as I wrestle to develop rhetorical theses by reading Occupy through the 
theoretical frames of memory and forgetting. Before I can engage in this task any farther, 
however, it is important that I discuss the audience and goals of my work, as well as my 
targets for critique and the limitations therein. 
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AUDIENCE AND GOALS, TARGETS AND LIMITS 
To begin, I do not presume that this is a work for everyone. In fact, it is targeted 
at some very specific audiences which include readers interested in rhetoric, rhetorical 
and cultural theory, as well as contemporary European philosophy; readers interested in 
theoretical approaches to memory, pedagogy, technology, and social movements; and, of 
course, activists themselves, Occupy or otherwise. And although I certainly feel the 
tension involved in claiming to write a text for the 99% when that text targets (quite 
often) an academic audience, I hope that this is not perceived as a performative 
contradiction. The reason why, is that I conceive the for in for the 99% in the sense of a 
gift or contribution, and thus as a site for taking up the particularly difficult questions that 
present themselves at the intersections of the work and the gift (Shershow). Given that 
the Occupy Movement has captured my imagination and earned my solidarity and 
participation, however, I want to give back in a way that few can, that is, by theorizing 
the movement, understanding its rhetorical power and promise, and conveying those 
potentialities (or “virtualities”) to others. But although the artifact that serves to ground 
this text is the Occupy Movement, it is important to note up front that it is, at its heart, a 
text that concerns the rhetoric of memory and forgetting. My recourse to the movement 
and desire to further its aims, although not secondary, are inexorably bound up with 
academic arguments concerning the rhetorical canon of memory, memorials, technology, 
writing pedagogy, and so on. In other words, the text that follows is written from the 
perspective of a rhetorician, or more specifically, a rhetorical theorist of memory and 
forgetting. 
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 Of course, given that I write this text from the perspective of a rhetorical theorist, 
many of my goals for it are formulated with this particular frame in mind. For instance, 
one series of goals are related to radically revitalizing rhetorical memory, and it would 
greatly please me if academic and other readers came away from this text with a renewed 
sense of the promise of memory for rhetorical studies and other related fields. And it 
would please me as well if academic readers, especially those in rhetoric, came away 
from the text with the realization that memory already (latently) pervades many areas of 
the discipline, and serves as a bridge to other disciplines such as philosophy and cultural 
studies. Of course, alongside my distinctly academic goals, I also have activist-oriented 
goals for this project. I hope that my analysis of the Occupy Movement is of academic 
interest, and I hope that it sparks an increased fascination in the movement among certain 
academic circles, but perhaps more importantly, I hope (rather audaciously) that this text 
furthers the dreams and desires of the Occupy Movement in helping to create an America 
and world where the 99% can find release from socio-economic precariousness in order 
to breathe freely, live joyously and productively, and increasingly flourish. My aim is not 
a utopian one, but as Judith Butler proclaims, “[i]f hope is an impossible demand, then 
we demand the impossible” (Occupy! 193). 
 Given my over-arching goals are to rethink and rekindle rhetorical memory and to 
further the aims of the Occupy Movement, it follows that my analysis critiques those 
forces that would prevent the fulfillment of these goals. For instance, regarding the 
rhetoric of memory, I critique the notion that memory has “emancipatory” potential, as 
though memory might free one from the processes of subjectivity-production in order to 
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establish identity. I critique the method of overlooking the power of image and affect in 
the production of memory by focusing solely on discourse, as well as the ideological 
refusal to see forgetting as an affirmative and productive force. I critique overreliance on 
the concept of “public memory” that unfortunately can blind one to the power of what I 
call “common memory,” along with the Platonism that regards technology as a danger to 
memory and personal identity. I critique reducing the efficacy of contemporary social 
movements to either social media or revolutionary solidarity (recognition-memory), and 
the problematic belief in memory as representation or “presence.” I critique the 
denunciation of remix culture or remixed memory as facile and ineffective, the 
contention that students should no longer write about themselves, and much else relevant 
to the discipline of rhetorical studies. 
Not surprisingly, my critique also extends to those forces against which the 
Occupy Movement struggles, the forces of unfettered neoliberal/Capital accumulation, 
the concept of a sovereign, Enlightenment subject who can think and act without the 
influence or assistance of others (that is, a subject who can supposedly get rich on their 
own), ideological refusals to see the value of labor and the importance of wealth and 
material conditions in creating or preventing opportunity, the violent destruction of 
freedom of speech and assembly, the refusal to recognize the suffering of the 99% or the 
audacious claim that they are solely responsible for their own suffering, caricatures of the 
movement’s participants, as well as political pessimism and academic nihilism more 
generally. 
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 However, both my goals and my critiques run up against limits. First and 
foremost, the limit of which I speak is my own immanent material nature, my own 
incapacities. I do not know what this body can do, as Spinoza would say, but I certainly 
know it cannot do/know everything. Likewise, as Blanchot explains, memory and 
forgetting are forces that ruin one’s power to dispose of them; they destroy any pretense 
to have completely understood them. Indeed, memory and forgetting are singular forces, 
radical multiplicities, and as such will thwart any attempt at mastery. One can say the 
same about the Occupy Movement, for as cultural theorist George Shulman explains, 
“[this] fluid cacophonous, and polyvalent assemblage . . . will necessarily, thankfully, 
elude our grasp” (N.p.). Moreover, with regard to theorizing Occupy specifically, I 
should state up front that I rely heavily on post-structuralist theories that some may find 
too divorced from analyses of economics or capitalist dynamics,9 or too dismissive of 
Modern conceptions of a “free” subject, though I will continually evoke the historical and 
speculative materialisms of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, as well as the 
revolutionary theories of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Regardless of my specific 
strategies and pet philosophers, however, as the ethos of the Occupy Movement itself 
                                                 
9 By point out that this text focuses less on capitalist dynamics than it might, I am noting up-front 
a near-absence of overt references to Marx and classical materialism. However, readers can rest assured 
that Marx haunts every corner of this text, and that I agree with Jacques Derrida when he writes that: 
“[t]here will be no future without this. Not without Marx, no future without Marx, without the memory and 
the inheritance of Marx: in any case of a certain Marx, of his genius, of at least one of his spirits” (Specters 
14). 
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operates, I hope that those who recognize my limitations or have potential disagreements 
with me can still find a way to achieve a provisional (perhaps “inessential”) solidarity in 
order to move forward to achieve common goals. This is the especially the case given 
that I see the following text as a performance of political advocacy through theory, which 
entails the pragmatic contention that what a philosophy can do is more important than 
what it means. The point is changing the world. 
OUTLINES OF AN OCCUPATION 
 In my efforts to further revitalize rhetorical memory through an analysis of the 
Occupy Movement, the trajectory of my text is as follows, employing a four-chapter 
structure. 
The dissertation’s first chapter, “Becoming-Activist: On the Production of 
Memory as a Rhetorical Problem,” seeks to demonstrate how memory is rhetorically 
produced through language, images, affect, and trauma, and argues that such productions 
of memory are bound to productions of subjectivity. I begin by showing how memories 
are produced through discourse, or more specifically, how discourses come to frame and 
articulate the truths of memory, especially when discursive phrases are repeated by 
subjects in concert with (and transmitted via) other subjects. I then show how memories 
are produced by images, looking carefully at how the contexts in which visual icons are 
deployed can reshape their historically remembered meanings, and at the power of 
images to compel action by producing “counter-memories” in opposition to official 
narratives. I conclude the chapter with an examination of the generative role that 
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forgetting plays in the production of memory through a careful analysis of affect and 
trauma. 
The second chapter, “Giving an Account of One’s Wealth: Percentile Narratives 
and Memory Analysis in Contemporary Composition,” strives to develop a strategy for 
teaching composition called “im-personal writing.” As an example of im-personal 
writing, I discuss assigning “Percentile Narratives” such as those from the Occupy 
Movement and its detractors, wherein students discuss the material conditions of their 
lives and the memories connected to them. However, rather than having students interpret 
the memories of their Percentile Narratives, or having an instructor decide whether or not 
they are “authentic,” students investigate how their memories have been rhetorically 
produced by images, discourse, affect, and so on. In this way, the strategy escapes 
criticisms that are typically leveled against so-called “personal writing” by viewing the 
activity not as emancipatory, but as an experiment within different modes of rhetorical 
subjection. After analyzing sample Percentile Narratives from Bergsonian, Foucauldian, 
and Freudian perspectives, I conclude the chapter by discussing how students can engage 
in a Nietzschean experiment, putting their memories (or forgettings) into the service of 
their lives, and argue that by theoretically shifting from Foucault's early work to his late, 
one can view having students write about themselves as a liberatory act even as it 
simultaneously makes them visible before power. 
 In the dissertation’s third chapter, “The Infinite Archive: Social Media and the 
Revolutionary Extension of Memory,” I begin by arguing that the binary opposition 
between so-called “live” and “technological” memory deconstructs, which means that the 
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digitization of memory entails a “hyper-extension” rather than “externalization” of 
memory. Furthermore, I contend that such hyper-extension leads to radical 
metamorphoses in memory’s structure along with multitudinous reproductions of 
subjectivity. In support of these various contentions, I analyze three significant cases 
wherein subjects hyper-extended memory onto a digital plane via social media. The first 
of these is Twitter, which I argue not only transforms memory through short-term, 
rhizomatic bursts, but also facilitates the production of revolutionary “swarm memory” 
formations. Next, I look at narrated live streaming video, contending that it scrambles the 
distinction between recording and human memory, revealing them both as machinic and 
prosthetic. Turning to viral memes and the productive processes of rip/mix/burn, I argue 
that all memory, so-called “live” and “technological,” makes recourse to a similar 
inventive process, and that through repetition, memes can facilitate a cultural “working 
through” of trauma. The chapter concludes by analyzing digital an-archivization or 
“forgetting,” particularly as it regards information overload and surveillance, and I 
consider the power of forgetting as a strategy for resistance. 
Chapter Four, “Stiller than Still: Monumental Bodies and the Challenge of 
Common Memory,” contains the two-fold contention that (singular) bodies and specific 
vernacular living structures can function as monuments, and that the form of memory 
these monuments produce is a “common” as opposed to “public” memory. I begin by 
arguing that because bodies posed in particular configurations and certain living 
structures possess an aesthetic quality, this not only gives them a monumental force, but 
inverts the relationship between monuments and time (as well as leads to re-
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conceptualization of their destruction). The argument then takes up the question of what 
type of memory such monuments produce, contrasting against it a “public” memory 
linked to state control, political representation, and the effacement of difference. 
Conversely, I posit that monumental bodies and their adjoining structures produce a 
“common” memory linked to autonomous self-management, participatory democracy, 
and the preservation of radical difference. The chapter concludes by taking up the 
question concerning “common” forgetting, an idea I conceive as closely linked to 
affirmative forgetting and counter-memory. 
 “Occupying Memory” culminates, not with a traditional conclusion, but with 
“(Beginnings) Memories of the Future,” as I consider what further potential rhetorical 
memory might have in store, as well as the relationship between memory and the future. 
To accomplish these ends, I call others to join the conversation regarding the significance 
of memory in rhetorical studies, consider other strategies for rhetorical analysis that 
might serve to maximize memory’s force, and argue that memory is transformative when 
it is understood as future-directed. Likewise, I challenge readers to take up the vital task 
of valuing forgetting as much as memory, as well as viewing memory and forgetting as 
inextricable forces, and contend that doing so will have significant effects, not only 
politically, but ethically, economically, and more. I contend that forgetting promotes the 
event of “beginning again,” and therefore enacts an escape from the repetition of the 
same by directing one toward the future. Finally, I discuss what recalling specific social 
justice movements might be able to teach rhetoricians about memory and forgetting, 
especially as they regard the relationship between these intertwined forces and hope. My 
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speculations remain tentative, however, as I do not wish to diminish the capacity of such 
movements to enact revolutionary change.  
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Chapter #1 -- Becoming-Activist: On the Production of Memory as a 
Rhetorical Problem 
There’s no subject, but a production of subjectivity: subjectivity has to be produced, 
when its time arrives, precisely because there is no subject. 
 -- Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 
 
 But time as subject, or rather subjectivation, is called memory. 
 -- Gilles Deleuze, Foucault 
 
Contending there is no subjectivity prior to its production, and that one can 
conceive of the subject as memory, Gilles Deleuze provides a lever with which to begin 
prying rhetorical conceptions of memory away from their historical beginnings. In the 
ancient world, memory is a gift of the Muses to the skilled rhetor, one capable of 
prodigious feats of memorization thanks to an art (technê) of archiving/organizing not 
only seemingly unmediated experiences, but a treasure-trove of commonplaces (topoi) 
for reactivation in opportune moments. Since Greco-Roman rhetors understood memory 
as an art or craft, the story usually has it (however oversimplified10) that when Modern 
rhetoricians gained the power of print-technologies, memory no longer required 
                                                 
10 Sharon Crowley demonstrates how the decline of memory in the Modern era is due not only to 
technological factors, but several ideological, methodological, and philosophical shifts (The Methodical 
Memory). 
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cultivation as a skill and thereby lost its importance. Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that 
when rhetoricians attempt to revitalize memory today, this endeavor is usually taken up 
in relation to teaching proficiency with navigating/deploying digital media-archives. So 
regardless of historical era, due to its “canonical” status as an intellectual capacity, the 
rhetorical conception of memory typically assumes a foundational humanist subject that 
exists prior to forming its memories and accumulating argumentative topoi from others. 
However, what Deleuze suggests in the epigraphs above is that not only is memory 
rhetorically produced and therefore never unmediated, but this is so because “the subject” 
is largely an effect of an archive of productive forces that constitute its very existence. 
Thus, in contrast to conceptions of rhetorical memory that posit a “pre-existing” subject 
with the power to remember (or is proficient with remembering technologies), in what 
follows, I submit that subjectivity’s existence is to a significant degree predicated upon 
the rhetorical production of memory/forgetting. So like Jeff Pruchnic and Kim Lacey, I 
am interested in “recuperating the connections between rhetoric and memory . . . as 
forces that are co-implicated generally in everyday subjective experience” (473), while 
extending such an analysis to encompass a broad conception of subjectivity that exceeds 
lived experience.11 
My exploration into the rhetorical production of memory/forgetting and its 
effectuations of subjectivity covers four different types, including discursive, imagistic, 
                                                 
11 As Grant David Bollmer notes, when considering rhetorical memory/forgetting, it is critical 
that “[w]e . . . stop thinking of ‘subjective’ as referring to the human psyche. The subject is not strictly 
psychological” (462). 
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affective and traumatic production, and these investigations reveal how memory is an 
assemblage or matrix constitutive of subjectivity rather than the stored representations of 
a (transcendent) subject of his or her “immediate” lived experience. The first form of 
memory-production that I explore is discursive production, or more broadly, the 
production of memory through language. I deploy Michel Foucault’s theory regarding 
subjectivity as an archive of discursive “memory,” one that posits the subject as a locus 
of subjectivation by language that is inescapably shared with others. I then examine the 
production of memory via images, both in general terms regarding the manifold of 
perception-recollection as a flowing series of memory-images, and in terms of how 
specific images are productive of politically-charged “counter-memory.” Throughout, I 
rely on Henri Bergson’s theories of memory, specifically his contentions that so-called 
“immediate” experience is already memory (and is saturated by memories), and that 
memory is a non-representational force connected to the incitement of action. 
The third and fourth types of memory-production that I examine involve a shift in 
focus from memory to forgetting, or to highlighting memory and forgetting’s 
interconnected operations. Affect involves “forgetting” because it concerns the 
“rhetorical” force that (singular) bodies exert upon one another without conscious 
awareness, yet produce subjectivity and movement nonetheless. Following Diane Davis, I 
argue that this “forgotten” sharing of affect between (singular) bodies constitutes a non-
declinable “rhetoricity,” one that challenges the notion of an atomized, self-sufficient 
“individual,” and reveals itself, for example, in the course of events such as protest rallies 
where hundreds or thousands of “singularities” non-consciously compel one another’s 
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actions. Finally, I deploy the theories of Jenny Edkins and Maurice Blanchot to explore 
the traumatic production of memory, more specifically, the ways in which traumatic 
events affect (singular) bodies through violence, betrayal, and “world-loss,” while 
producing subjects that compose narratives of their “forgotten,” yet troubling encounters. 
But my argument is not only that the subject is an effect of rhetorical productions 
of memory; it is also that these rhetorical productions are the very condition of possibility 
for effective ethical and socio-political action. I turn throughout to specific examples 
from the Occupy Movement as evidence of this latter contention, and to instances where 
subjects underwent a “becoming-activist,” a metamorphic transformation of subjectivity 
that spurred them to strive for socio-political change. In other words, I focus on cases 
where the production of memory is not only rhetorical, but biopolitical (Commonwealth 
119-128). For Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, biopolitics entails the birth of subjects 
who resist domination and control by particular regimes of power, “being-against” those 
regimes via their own productive powers in order to invent/experiment with alternative 
modes of existence.12 Regardless, I maintain that subjects are inescapably produced by 
rhetorics, for there is no subject that can transcend the material and historical processes of 
its production in archival form. I therefore close the chapter with a brief consideration of 
memory’s biopolitical production, analyzing the biopolitical subject’s capacity to resist 
                                                 
12 The subject whose memory is produced biopolitically is a subject who, Michel Foucault would 
say, “counter-remembers,” not merely in the sense of a reaction against dominant forms of remembrance, 
but as the active, non-dialectical invention of alternative ways of perceiving, remembering, and living. 
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control and open up avenues to alternative forms of life, as well as this subject’s 
“forward-looking gaze,” its relationship to freedom, the future, and “new worlds.” 
MIC-CHECK! THE DISCURSIVE PRODUCTION OF MEMORY 
 “Discursive memory,” or in classical terms, “the memory of words,” is the 
memory about which Michel Foucault writes at length—the archive.13 The archive is 
constituted by the discourses that frame/articulate the perceived and recollected truths of 
a subject’s world, and moreover, it is the language by which the subject conceives of 
itself. In fact, for Foucault, the terms “memory” and “the archive” are synonymous with 
subjectivity (since he focuses on subjectivity as a discursive event). Thus, Foucault 
suggests that subjects do not experience life in an unmediated or spontaneous fashion, but 
rather, “belatedly.” For indeed, whatever subjects experience or remember, they always-
already frame it with regard to the discourses to which they have been subject (whether 
subjectivated by their parents, school, church, workplace, and so on). Subjects therefore 
carry their discursive “memory” or “archive” wherever they go, and their experiences and 
recollections are produced and articulated through it such that Foucault infamously 
contends that “the subject (and its substitutes) must be stripped of its creative role and 
analyzed as a complex and variable function of discourse” (Language 138). For one can 
only think or “see,” remember or invent, through the vocabularies that one has been 
subjectivated by—which is why Victor Vitanza says “we are . . . , a function of rhetoric” 
(170). Furthermore, because the language by which one articulates one’s world (one’s 
                                                 
13 For more on Foucault’s concept of the archive, see The Archaeology of Knowledge (126-131). 
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“archive” or “memory”) is contingent and changeable, this entails that who one is as a 
subject is contingent and changeable, and that one can transform one’s image of oneself 
by encountering new language. Moreover, Foucault’s position entails that there is no 
underlying essential “self” without its prior production in language. So who one is 
(becoming) is never static, never an unchanging substance or soul, but instead is the 
function of an ever-shifting series of discourses.14 
Furthermore, the discourse productive of memory is inescapably shared/sharable, 
which means that one cannot think/invent or “communicate” in isolation. Discursive 
memory is non-declinably interlinked to and dependent upon others, caught up in an 
endless process of transmission/repetition, subject to subject, generation to generation. So 
in order to think, invent, and “communicate,” subjects must participate in an expansive 
game of Telephone where they first archive, and by doing so become, what is transmitted 
by others, and where productive differences creep in as one repeats the game. This is 
perhaps one reason Bradford Vivian argues that “[m]emories subsist in a state of 
dispersion but do not exist in the form of unified or stable presence” (126). For the shared 
                                                 
14 For an argument related to Foucault’s regarding how the production of memory occurs through 
discursive means, one can turn to Jacques Derrida’s essay “Plato’s Pharmacy” (Dissemination). Therein, he 
argues that “[t]he outside is already within the work of memory,” meaning that memory’s production 
inescapably occurs through (in relation to) discursive marks. This is the case because, as Derrida notes, 
memory requires signs in order to recall anything that is not already “present,” and because there is no pure 
presence of any phenomenon, this implies that all recognition and remembrance require signs or discourse 
(109). In other words, there is no “raw” experience or memory of events without their prior articulation in 
language (or more expansively, rhetorics). 
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discursive “archive” or “memory” that partially constitutes subjectivity is in flux without 
possessing an original form, being reproduced differently every time one subject 
addresses (or shares discourse with) another. Moreover, if the discursiveness of memory 
is the result of an endless process of productive and shared transmission, it is always the 
language of others that one remembers, and therefore one’s “own” memory not only 
contains an entirely im-personal element, it is in principle impossible for one to 
accomplish anything regarding language (invention, “communication,” and so on) in 
isolation. Indeed, one cannot escape employing something akin to what Karl Marx calls 
the “general intellect”—those shared capacities that set the conditions for one’s thought, 
and that one must exhibit tremendous audacity to ignore when claiming one’s intellectual 
accomplishments bear no relation to (or dependency upon) a multitude of others and their 
intense cognitive labors. 
The Occupy Movement’s practice of the “human microphone” or “mic-check” 
provides a concrete image with which to think or imagine the production of discursive 
memory and its inherently shared quality. The function of the human microphone is to 
amplify the words of a single speaker (or small number of speakers) by having an 
assembly or crowd repeat the first speaker’s words in unison and/or in sequential waves. 
This way, an assembly can magnify a speaker’s voice without the use of electronic 
amplification, a technique similar to that employed by orators from the ancient world or 
cheerleaders at contemporary sporting events. The initial speaker signals that the process 
is ready to begin by shouting “Mic-check!” until the audience responds in unison, and 
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then they speak slowly, one sentence, or even one sentence fragment15 at a time while the 
audience repeats their words (and where small changes quite often sneak in). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Occupy Wall Street Mic-Check. 
 
Activists not only use this practice for the purpose of relaying information during General 
Assembly meetings, but also for “disrupting”16 events where speakers are conveying 
                                                 
15 I find it interesting that when an Occupy mic-check is taking place that the short, often 
fragmented bursts of speech that one speaks or hears often resemble the form of rapid-fire microblogging 
that one finds on Twitter. 
16 Regarding the “disruptive” practice of mic-checking speakers in public venues, PJ Rey argues 
that: 
Occupiers are trying to demonstrate—through the very performance of this act—that 
‘free speech’ is not evenly distributed. The point is that only the 1 percent ever find 
themselves at the podium. The 99 percent are left to fill the seats in the audience, and, if 
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messages contrary to the “platform” of the Occupy Movement—that is, advocating 
policies that benefit the financial and political elite (“the 1%”) as opposed to the general 
population (“the 99%”). President Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, and 
numerous others have all had speeches suddenly interrupted by an Occupy mic-check, 
and as a testament to the rhetorical force of this practice, recent legislation has been 
passed/updated that makes this act of dissent a potential federal offense under certain 
circumstances.17 
 However, how does this activist strategy supply an image with which to think the 
discursive production and/or shared quality of memory? Imagine someone curious about 
the Occupy Movement deciding to participate in a bank march. Perhaps they have only a 
vague sense of indignation regarding the financial practices of Bank of America, Chase 
Bank, or Wells Fargo, but they decide to tag along and see what all the fuss is about. 
Regardless of his or her degree of knowledge, though, the burgeoning activist comes into 
                                                                                                                                                 
they are lucky, they may have a chance to . . . line up behind the mic for a few brief 
seconds in the spotlight. This is, of course, because the opportunity to speak and be heard 
is inextricable from issues of wealth and power . . . [Therefore] [t]he primary purpose of 
Occupy’s use of the human microphone at public speaking events is not to disrupt, but to 
be heard. It is not an assault on free speech but a tactic for obtaining it. (N.p.) 
17 The “Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of 2011” or H.R. 347 
(recently updated in 2012) effectively states, for example, that mic-checking an event where someone 
under Secret Service protection is in attendance, or disrupting a building where federal government 
business is taking place, is potentially a federal offense. See the ACLU website for more details 
(www.aclu.org). 
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the Occupied territory (or “re-territory”18) of the bank’s exterior grounds with a pre-
existing archive of language, and thus is already framing the world according to specific 
discourses and truths. As the activist in question shuffles around the picket line, however, 
suddenly a shout goes up and a mic-check begins. The newly-minted activist repeats the 
words and finds him- or herself uttering statements about CEO bonuses, problematic 
foreclosures, the funding of immigrant detention centers, bail-outs with taxpayer money, 
Occupy slogans, and so on. The activist perhaps now no longer has only an ambiguous 
sense of outrage but an increasingly concrete one—being subjectivated by and beginning 
to assimilate new rhetorics, the content of his or her discursive archive has the possibility 
of being rewritten. He or she began the bank march with an archival “memory” and 
potentially ended it with what Foucault calls counter-memory, a new mode of framing the 
truths of the world, not only those from the past but those of the “present” as well. 
 
                                                 
18 In contrast to occupied “territories,” which are sites claimed and demarcated in order to be 
controlled (say, for military purposes), for Deleuze and Guattari, “deterritorialization”/“reterritorialization” 
indicates when a site, event, or concept has its demarcations and property-lines broken down/redrawn. 
Thus, given the way that the Occupy Movement re-claims space, attempts to break up regimes of control, 
and institutes modes of thought, it seems appropriate to call Occupied zones “(re)territories.” 
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Fig. 2. Occupy Wall Street Mic-Check (2). 
 
Moreover, when participating in the mic-check, the burgeoning activist explicitly 
repeated the words of an other, a simple gesture that reveals something profound about 
memory as a shared, discursively-constituted archive. Granted, educators have long 
employed repetition as a strategy for getting memories to stick, as when someone wants 
to “learn something by heart” in order to take a test or play an instrument. But reflection 
upon the repetition involved in a mic-check or similar practices like school-lesson 
recitation or prayer-repetition can reveal how language-use itself (which includes thought 
and invention) is dependent upon linguistic repetition. For in contemplating how the 
activist in the example above perhaps came to concretize her or his indignation, one can 
see how this event came about through repeating the words of others. But rather than 
suggesting that the activist above is merely “unoriginal” or incapable of thinking on his 
or her own, what this example more profoundly suggests is that all words and all 
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thoughts, and in turn, all inventive intellectual endeavors, are the result of sharing and 
repeating language. In other words, one’s discursive memory is the result of iterability, as 
Jacques Derrida would say, and the practice of the mic-check and related strategies 
provides an image with which to think this complex thought, revealing the fundamental 
dependency that thinking, “communicating,” and inventing subjects have on one another. 
As Diane Davis points out, “[a]ll signifying utterances are defined . . . by their 
capacity to be ripped from one context and remixed or repurposed in another: a sign that 
could only be used once would not be a sign” (Inessential 160). What Davis’ observation 
here entails, therefore, is that even the most seemingly “original” thoughts require 
repeating thoughts that came before them, and moreover, that “even what is said only 
once, only here and only now, is made possible by its repeatability, which is to say by its 
impurity” (160). In other words, not only is language inescapably shared and 
repeated/repeatable, but this entails that “[t]he speaking subject is already an effect of 
iterability and repeatability—that is, a kind of imitation or simulation” (160). So 
whenever a subject speaks, writes, or types, that subject is inescapably repeating (and is 
dependent upon, is recalling) the words and thoughts of others; even when one produces 
a linguistic neologism or innovative description, others can only celebrate its novel 
quality because it involves the repetition of something recognizable, and is itself 
repeatable and/or shareable. Thus, the human microphone is not simply an isolated 
activist practice, but an image for thinking the inescapable repeatability and share-ability 
of language and thought, especially because when enough subjects repeat a thought, the 
“louder” (the more influential) that it becomes. And perhaps most significantly, if 
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language is repeatable and shareable at its core, then no individual is the absolute creative 
origin of his or her thoughts, nor can s/he justifiably lay claim to them as property.19 
Indeed, as Derrida argues, “every discourse is bricoleur” (“Structure” 285), 
meaning that no matter what vocabularies or discourses one employs, one must 
inescapably borrow from and “communicate” in relation to others (through a series of 
recollections). This notion stands in stark contrast to what Derrida, following Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, calls an “engineer,” or what I would call an “entrepreneur.” As Derrida 
explains, “[t]he engineer . . . should be the one to construct the totality of his language, 
syntax, and lexicon. In this sense the engineer is a myth. A subject who supposedly 
would be the absolute origin of his own discourse and supposedly would construct it ‘out 
of nothing’” (285). Derrida thus disparages the notion of a self-sufficient “engineer” or 
“entrepreneur” that supposedly creates from nothing without regard for the discursive 
archive/memory upon which he or she is dependent (or the practice of human 
microphone in which he or she is engaged). And yet this “theological” illusion that one is 
                                                 
19 In The Methodical Memory, Sharon Crowley argues that the Modernist notion that self-
sufficient “individuals” are the unique origins of their thoughts and that “knowledge [is] a commodity that 
[can] be borrowed or stolen” (164), is a problematic assumption that underlies the pedagogical strategies of 
Current-Traditional Rhetoric as well as serves to reinforce “the professional hierarchy that currently obtains 
in the American academy” (139). 
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the absolute origin of one’s thoughts and innovations remains the basis for much of 
contemporary political and socio-economic rhetoric.20 
By contrast, if one rejects the notion of “an origin, . . . an absolute archia” (286), 
recognizing the fundamental dependency or “relationality” among subjects, and 
humanity’s shared discursive archive, the door is opened to radically rethinking ethics, 
politics, and economics. For the inherent interdependency of language-users on one 
another, the notion that subjectivity is in part an effect of the archive of human discourse, 
stands in stark contrast to the Enlightenment or neoliberal notion that subjects are 
“individuals” who create spontaneously and free from the influence of others. And yet it 
is precisely this phantasy that allows one to ignore one’s dependency upon the sharing of 
discursive memory and its inventive force, allowing one in turn to justify accumulating 
and retaining vast amounts of Capital and property without acknowledging the productive 
contributions of those who have labored (intellectually and communicatively) on one’s 
behalf. 
THE MASK AND THE FIST: IMAGES FOR PRODUCING MEMORY 
               Alongside discourse, another critical component in the rhetorical production of 
memory—and thus partially constitutive of subjectivity—is the image, and one can 
conceive of images not only in relation to specific media (for instance, posters and 
                                                 
20 One outstanding rhetorical example where human subjectivity is posited as an absolute origin is 
the contemporary political topos “We Built This,” a slogan that although containing the collective pronoun 
“we” evinces a staunch individualism and the contention that the “self” is a source of creative genesis. 
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Internet memes), but as shorthand for the sensory manifold of perception-recollection 
itself. Henri Bergson argues that perception-recollection is composed of a flowing 
assemblage (or “duration”) of images, and that these images are always-already 
“memory” (Matter viii; xii). In support of his contention that perception-recollection is 
“imagistic,” Bergson states: “we imagine perception to be a kind of photographic view of 
things . . . [b]ut is it not obvious that the photograph, if photograph there be, is already 
taken, already developed in the very heart of things and at all points of space?” (31). 
What Bergson means here by saying that perception-recollection is “photographic,” is 
that the subject’s perception/recollection is produced through sequentially “capturing” or 
“contracting” slices of the ceaseless unfolding of material reality, and by integrating 
those sliced images into itself. Thus, the “photo-image” in perception-recollection does 
not represent a more fundamental reality—it is reality, the world of a given subject. And 
yet, perception-recollection’s integrative movement lags behind the becoming of 
materiality (what Deleuze calls “pure immanence”), and there is thus an interval 
“between matter itself and our conscious perception of matter” (27)—which entails that 
even the most “immediate” of experiences are already memory. Hence, Bergson contends 
that “in truth every perception is already memory. Practically we perceive only the past, 
the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future” (194). 
And likewise, by setting his sights on how perception-recollection is rhetorically 
produced “from behind” (temporally speaking), Bergson points out that, “there is no 
perception which is not full of memories. With the immediate and present data of our 
senses we mingle a thousand details out of our past experience” (24). So not only is the 
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“pure present” contaminated by being a memory-image (one compressed/integrated into a 
subjectivity that lags behind materiality’s unfolding), but what is taken as the “present” is 
not even possible without its combination with past images. 
          Though challenging, I outline Bergson’s theories of memory here for a couple of 
reasons. The first is that they provide perspicacious insight into the inherently rhetorical 
nature of perception and recollection, for if not only the subject’s past, but its “present” 
are composed of memory-images, this means that both modes of time are rhetorically 
circumscribed (as images). I bring up Bergson’s theories of memory as well because as 
“general” theories of memory linked to images, they can aid one in closely analyzing 
some very specific images in their capacity to produce memory (or politically charged 
“counter-memory”)—and these theories in turn guide one toward understanding why 
W.J.T. Mitchell maintains that “the human subject [is] a being constituted by both 
language and imaging” (Picture 24). 
          Following Bergson’s more general theories of the imagistic nature of perception-
recollection, I will demonstrate how specific images produce memory by analyzing some 
cases from recent occupation movements where images work to cultivate “counter-
memory” (or productions of subjectivity that induce politically-charged action). The first 
image that I will employ as a springboard for investigating memory’s imagistic 
constitution is the most famous connected to the Occupy Movement, the Guy Fawkes 
mask. Many are familiar with the Guy Fawkes mask due to the film V for Vendetta 
(2005), where the protagonist “V” fights the totalitarian forces of a dystopian, 
corporation-dominated world with the help of Evey Hammond (Natalie Portman). 
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Viewers who remember the film and its anti-corporate message therefore perhaps 
imagine themselves becoming “V” when donning the Fawkes mask, snuggling up to 
Portman, and saving the world from capitalist excesses.21 Moreover, given Fawkes’ 
desire to destroy the existing social order within the film, along with his abusive 
treatment of Hammond, the mask likewise carries a series of negative connotations and 
recalls for many the existence of those who would deign to threaten free markets, 
national security, and “freedom” as such. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Slavoj Žižek argues that the mask “confronts us directly with the abyss of the Other-Thing, with 
the Neighbor in its uncanny dimension. The very covering-up of the face obliterates a protective shield, so 
that the Other-Thing stares at us directly” (Living 2). In other words, by covering one’s face, one harnesses 
the rhetorical force inherent in highlighting one’s status as an object, as an unknowable and unpredictable 
Other, and as a Thing with which others cannot empathize. Hence, in making one’s face “forgotten,” one 
becomes increasingly unsettling to others and simultaneously becomes-legion by becoming part of an 
“anonymous” swarm. 
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Fig. 3. Hacker Group “Anonymous” sporting Guy Fawkes masks. 
 
However, there exists a less familiar genealogy of Guy Fawkes’ image that 
involves opposition to “tyranny” and is implicated in the production of counter-memory. 
In 1605, Guy Fawkes, a Catholic (along with thirteen co-conspirators), plotted to blow up 
the English House of Lords because he considered it a stronghold of Protestant 
oppression, and although the attempt was unsuccessful, authorities tortured Fawkes and 
sentenced him to hanging, drawing, and quartering in retribution (though Fawkes 
committed suicide before authorities carried out the sentence) (“Guy” N.p.). Many 
commemorate the “Gunpowder Plot” to this day, often with fireworks and the burning of 
effigies (typically of figures that have drawn the English citizenry’s ire such as the Pope). 
But perhaps most significantly, many recall the Gunpowder Plot through a simple rhyme 
directly connected to the themes of memory and forgetting: “Remember, remember, the 
fifth of November / Gunpowder, treason, and plot / I see no reason why gunpowder, 
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treason / Should ever be forgot” (N.p.). The great irony in this particular poetic rhyme, 
however, is that “forgetting,” or what Vivian describes as the overcoming of “our own 
invented or received perceptions of former times, people, and events” (54), is precisely 
what has happened in the case of Guy Fawkes. For whereas many remembered Fawkes as 
a treasonous monster for generations, his memory has metamorphosed, transforming him 
into the quintessential anti-totalitarian hero. This is despite Fawkes’ desire to employ 
violence and his support for the authoritarianism of the Catholic Church—which is 
precisely why Mitchell calls “the grinning visage of Guy Fawkes” “a singularly awkward 
and inappropriate icon of a nonviolent revolution” (“Image” 9). However, regardless of 
its “inappropriateness,” by wearing or deploying the Guy Fawkes mask/image with its 
(for many) now positive connotations, subjects unknowingly engage in an act of protest 
against the traditional version of Fawkes’ legacy. The mask and its contemporary 
meaning have therefore produced a counter-memory, which is especially significant 
given that social movements, rebellions, and revolutions are often closely bound to 
“forgetting,” or even to rewriting, the past. Yet, on the other hand, for those who view the 
Fawkes mask and recall instead a threat, for instance, to the “American Way of Life,” one 
can likewise say that the image possesses the power to reify the negative memory 
associatively bound to Fawkes’ legacy. 
 Another way by which one can provide evidence for the imagistic production of 
memory via Guy Fawkes’ visage appears when looking at artist Shepard Fairey’s reprise 
of his famous Barack Obama “Hope” poster. For although Fairey conceived the image as 
an appeal to President Obama, implicitly calling on him to support the Occupy 
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Movement and its values, the image appears to deconstruct, particularly in relation to its 
later versions, producing counter-memory in the process. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Shepard Fairey’s Occupy “Hope” Poster22 
                                                 
22 As one can see from the Fairey poster, Occupy activists often wear “hoodie” sweatshirts in 
tandem with Guy Fawkes masks. Initially, this helped them to achieve greater anonymity, but the hoodie 
soon took on a counter-memorial role in the wake of the Trayvon Martin shooting on February 26
th
, 2012, 
in Sanford, Florida. In order to express their disdain at the fact that the immediate arrest of Martin’s killer, 
George Zimmerman, did not take place (due to so-called “Stand Your Ground” legislation) after what many 
considered a racially-motivated shooting, thousands donned hoodies like the one worn by Martin the night 
he was slain, and marched and rallied across the country. Thereafter, Martin’s death counter-memorialized 
the image of the hoodie into one of mourning and racial struggle. That is, just as images can produce 
memory, memory in turn can rhetorically reproduce images. 
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To begin (again), consider Bergson’s supposition that “[p]erception is never a mere 
contact of the mind with the object present; it is impregnated with memory-images which 
complete it as they interpret it” (170). So as one views the Occupy “Hope” poster, one 
likely recalls the Obama “Hope” poster as well, and in fact, one could not even perceive 
the full rhetorical force of the Occupy poster as one does without “completing” it with 
one’s memories of the Obama poster. That is, memory-images of the Obama poster work 
to enthymemically produce/“complete” the image of the Occupy poster; a memory from 
the past thereby produces memory in the “present.” However, in the current case, this 
memory-production has an interesting effect. For in reminding viewers of the Obama 
poster, re-deploying its rhetoric, one perhaps arrives at the question: Has the Guy Fawkes 
image supplanted the Obama image as the image of “Hope,” and if so, what productions 
of counter-memory does this event entail? 
Not surprisingly, many participants in the Occupy Movement report being 
disenchanted with President Obama, for example, due to his approval of drone strikes in 
Pakistan and Yemen and for his support of the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA), which many contend opens the door to the indefinite penal detention of 
American citizens. By contrast, Occupiers almost universally consider themselves as anti-
war and pro-civil liberties, so it is little surprise that some asked Fairey to remove any 
reference to the President from his poster, leaving only the Guy Fawkes mask as the 
image of hope. Thus it seems that through expunging the President, there is a production 
of counter-memory through the resulting image, for it reifies the sentiment that in 
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contrast to the excitement (and hope) regarding the Obama presidency in 2008, many 
progressives are now left with the impression that not only has the President come up 
short of his expectations, but any hope left in elected officials (or representative 
government itself) has almost completely vanished. In other words, through images like 
the revised Occupy “Hope” poster, fuel is provided for a counter-memorial narrative with 
significant political force, just so long as it is viewed by those who ascribe the Fawkes 
mask a series of positive connotations. 
 With regard to political force specifically, before proceeding to another case study 
for memory’s production via an image, I want to reframe the discussion by considering 
more closely the relationship between the production of memory via images and 
politically-charged activity (or how the incitement to act by images is evidence of a 
rhetorical production of memory). Bergson argues that memory is a (conscious and 
unconscious) vehicle for mobilization, and that the images of perception-recollection are 
always framed in order to induce movement. Along these lines, Bergson maintains that 
“we must never forget the utilitarian character of our mental functions, which are 
essentially turned toward action” (Matter xvii), and he asserts that memory-images only 
“survive” if one can utilize them in this particular way (70). In fact, he claims that 
memory “no longer represents our past to us, it acts it; and if it still deserves the name of 
memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their 
useful effect into the present moment” (93). In other words, rather than “subjectively” 
representing a more fundamental reality, for Bergson, memory suspends non-
representational perception-recollections from the past and interjects them into one’s 
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movements and “present” perceptions (which is comprised of memory-images). Thus, 
images not only have the power to produce memory by stitching themselves to 
recollections or by rhetorically producing “present” perceptions, the influence of images 
persuasively compels one’s bodily movement like “a hypnotizer who makes a 
suggestion” (174). 
 In order to continue showing how images have the power to rhetorically produce 
memory, and can in turn induce action/movement, I want to look now at the International 
Solidarity Fist. Like the Guy Fawkes mask, the Solidarity Fist has a rich genealogy, 
which is not surprising given the prominent role that hands play in the history of human 
art. One can trace Solidarity Fist imagery back to at least 1917 (appearing during 
industrial worker struggles), but it was not until 1968 that the Fist became an icon used in 
isolation, appearing on posters to oppose the arrest of the “Oakland Seven” 
(conscientious objectors to the Vietnam War draft) (Cushing N.p.). More recently, the 
International Solidarity Fist reappeared and circulated widely during labor protests in 
Wisconsin (2011), where thousands of angry public employees such as teachers and fire 
fighters occupied the state capitol to oppose Governor Scott Walker’s efforts to strip 
union workers of their rights to collectively bargain. 
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Fig. 5. Wisconsin Solidarity Fist. 
 
 How is it, though, that an image like the Wisconsin Fist produces memory (or 
counter-memory) and how does that production incite action? For one, the Fist image 
aids in producing a counter-memorial “narrative” regarding the situation of organized 
labor in Wisconsin. That is, contrary to narratives that proclaim workers are being greedy 
and should take individual responsibility for their welfare rather than collectively 
bargaining for state funds, the Fist image calls on workers to unite in solidarity across the 
state (consider here the symmetry between the respective shapes of the Solidarity Fist and 
the state of Wisconsin). Moreover, even though recent workers’ struggles in Wisconsin 
have fared poorly, resulting in a loss of collective bargaining rights while Governor 
Walker remains in office following a recall election, the memory of these struggles 
remains encapsulated (latent) within the Fist image. Thus, when potential future struggles 
erupt, the Fist image perhaps has the power to productively re-infuse subjects with 
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memory of the 2011 state-house occupation, inserting them into what Bergson might call 
the “memory of the present” in order to incite action. 
By contrast, it is also worth mentioning how Fist imagery has long been 
associated with Left-leaning causes, and therefore negative depictions of said causes as 
well. Indeed, for many the Fist recalls little more than the specters of 
socialism/communism and the cry of lazy unemployed rabble-rousers, so in cases such as 
these, the image serves to recall the justice inherent in preventing the success of those 
with the audacity to raise the Fist in defiance. But regardless, whether one considers how 
the Fist image transformed perception-recollections of the “present” during the 
Wisconsin occupation via counter-memorial “narrative,” how the image contains a 
memory of state-house struggle that might induce movement in the future, or merely 
serves as a reminder of Leftist causes that need continually squashed, it reveals how 
images like the Solidarity Fist have the power to produce memory and memory-as-action. 
 Furthermore, images not only have the power to produce memory, but the power 
to produce forgetting, which is just as vital. This is not only because every production of 
memory requires forgetting in order for it to take the rhetorical form it has, but because, 
as Nietzsche reminds his readers, “[f]orgetting is essential to action of any kind” 
(Untimely 62). Unfortunately, quite often images induce an “unproblematic forgetting” in 
the form of obliviousness (Breaking 184-185), such as is the case with scores of 
propaganda posters that, for instance, cloak the economic/political motives for war 
behind patriotism and nationalism. In cases such as these, powers employ images so as to 
produce a subject complicit with imperial violence and unchecked accumulation. But on 
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the other hand, an image’s productive forgetting might also strive to serve the ends of 
peace and economic justice. With regard to such possible forgettings, consider the 
following example of the International Solidarity Fist as deployed by Occupy Oakland 
prior to a General Strike, more specifically, an attempt to disrupt activity at Oakland’s 
various ports. Here, the Solidarity Fist(s) framed in striking blood-red and jet black 
attempt to persuade one to resist and “break free,” particularly with regard to the bonds of 
debt and Capital. One might therefore aver that this image of “breaking free” or 
“shattering” bears a significant relation to “forgetting” as a productive jettisoning of the 
past, in this case, one dominated by the financial elite as encapsulated in the phrase “Shut 
Down the 1%.” But likewise, especially provided the negative associations that many 
ascribe to the Solidarity Fist, one might also contend that the “forgetting” at issue is 
dangerous, as the image’s color-scheme and Fists arguably efface a history of ethically 
abhorrent actions undertaken by certain nominally Left-leaning (though ultimately 
fascist) governments. 
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Fig. 5. Occupy Oakland Calls for a General Strike. 
 Indeed, on the one hand, the Occupy Oakland poster might involve mere amnesia 
toward the past, as it deploys images and colors that, for many, recall the violent attempt 
by certain fascist governments to forcibly install communitarianism. But on the other 
hand, perhaps those who designed the poster are fully aware of these events, and if this is 
so, another (Third) reading presents itself linked to what Nietzsche calls affirmative 
forgetting. Davis describes said forgetting as “the dis/covering and radical shedding . . . 
of past/present foundations that leaves one wide open to previously unthought 
potentialities” (Breaking 166), so perhaps the foundation that the image attempts to shed 
is the history of fascist attempts to install “communitarian” political economies. 
However, if an affirmative forgetting is truly at work here, this would not at all mean 
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relegating such histories to oblivion,23 because affirmative forgetting involves 
recognizing the existence of a troubling event or state of affairs, while performatively 
resisting its continued influence in the “present” or future (whether by rhetorical 
“excision” or related means).24 Or as Nietzsche so elegantly puts it, “[by] confront[ing] 
our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge, and through a new, stern 
discipline combat[ing] our inborn heritage and implant[ing] in ourselves a new habit, a 
new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers away” (76). Thus, maybe the 
Occupy Oakland image demands a confrontation with those radically problematic forms 
of “communitarianism” that today’s society has inherited from the past, demands a new 
understanding of them, and expresses the “instinct” toward new communitarian modes of 
existence such that the old forms wither and fall away. Such is perhaps the incredible 
power of “forgetting” contained in this specific image, and within the image as such. 
                                                 
23 In the case of the Occupy Oakland image, it is worth mentioning that in contrast to 
obliviousness, the image actually evokes an intriguing genealogy of historical events, such as those “great 
General Strikes in the Russian Empire that began in 1896 and ended in the tremendous General Strike of 
1905” (Spivak 9). 
24 If one reads images like the General Strike poster as productive of “forgetting,” one reason why 
this is significant is that it may signal an attempted reversal. Participants in Occupy and other class-oriented 
movements often espouse the idea that they have been forgotten by the financial and political elites, and 
that these elites operate by the Nineteenth-century slogan: “Gain wealth, forgetting all but self.” Thus, the 
productive forgetting and reversal at issue in the Strike poster perhaps involves a desire to “forget” those 
elites, to not recognize their power, just as the “1%” are purported to have forgotten the “99%.” 
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SINGULAR RHETORICITY: THE FORGOTTEN POWER OF AFFECT 
 Subjectivity is to a significant degree not only an effect of memory but also of 
forgetting. Moreover, forgetting and memory are, in the words of Michael Bernard-
Donals, “not opposites but counterparts . . . forgetfulness is not the absence of, but rather 
an integral element of memory; and all memory is shot through with moments of 
forgetfulness” (41). Thus, forgetting and memory are inexorably bound up with one 
another even as they remain discernible, which is in turn why Vivian critically observes: 
“forgetting comprises an essentially productive aspect of memory rather than its 
unfortunate repression or erosion” (126). For instance, this is to say that subjectivities are 
partially the effect of “forgotten” and irretrievable affects as well as memorable rhetorical 
appeals, and this is important because as Pruchnic and Lacey point out, “one of the most 
important aspects of rhetorical memory” that has disappeared throughout history is a 
“focus on the affective capacities of humans” (482). Moreover, as Pruchnic and Lacey’s 
own analysis links rhetorical memory to the social and political nature of affects, I will 
argue that an attunement to “forgotten” affective sociality reveals that persuasion—along 
with the identifications upon which it is supposedly based—is preceded and exceeded by 
a more fundamental singular or “rhetorical” relation between existents (one with 
significant political ramifications). 
 Indeed, typically, or at least traditionally, in rhetorical studies many consider 
persuasion/subjectivity’s production as necessarily dependent upon identification, or the 
memory of shared properties and projects. This position achieves its most famous 
formulation in the work of Kenneth Burke, who contends that “[y]ou persuade a man 
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only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, 
attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” (55). In other words, it is only by showing 
someone that you are like them, getting them to recognize/remember something familiar 
about you, that you can convince them to do anything. This supposition suggests, for 
example, that for activists or whomever to convince others of the legitimacy of their 
socio-political perspectives or to engage in collective actions, they must first convince 
others that they share a common cause, background, or values. 
The reason Burke contends that identification is necessary for persuasion is that 
he argues for the distinctiveness of bodies/nervous systems, and for him because 
bodies/nervous systems are distinctive or ontologically “individuated,” they require 
rhetoric to bridge the gap between them, thereby aligning their movements. Along these 
lines, Burke writes: “[i]dentification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there 
is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one 
another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity” (22). For 
Burke, then, living beings are always-already fundamentally separated from one another, 
moving to the beat of different drummers, so they need rhetorics to symbolically 
syncopate them so that they can move in tandem—which requires that they share the 
memory of a common property or project with others. In what follows, though, I want to 
challenge (or rather, supplement) the Burkean model by asking whether identification as 
the memory of shared projects and properties is necessary for persuasion and rhetorically 
spurring subjects to action. For what if “forgotten” affective/rhetorical relations are just 
as capable? 
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 Imagine marching in a protest rally with hundreds, even thousands, of activists 
around you (whether they are civil rights advocates, Tea Partiers, indignatios, etc., makes 
no difference here). By identifying them as compatriots and recalling the cause one 
shares with them, it seems Burke’s observation stands regarding the need for 
identification due to the primacy of division. Then, suddenly, the movement of the crowd 
lurches and you find your body changing course as well, before you are even aware, 
before you remember being asked to do so. The crowd rolls diagonally like a storm, and 
you are but one particle. Imagine a group of police or military personnel in riot gear 
appearing on the scene. You abruptly find yourself running with a small band of activists 
before anyone says a word, and you leap to protect another protester (or perhaps even a 
police or military officer) from a projectile or tear gas cloud. Amid the blinding chaos, is 
one’s “selfless” activity and the partial production of one’s subjectivity that it implies 
based upon identification as the recollection of commonality, or is something radically 
different going on here (especially when one moves to protect someone with whom one is 
not identified)? 
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Fig. 7. – Occupy Wall Street Activists Struggle Against Police. 
 
 Following the lead of Diane Davis, I argue that persuasion (and the partial 
productions of subjectivity it entails) does not of necessity require identification as the 
memory of shared properties or projects. For what is at stake in the examples above are 
instances of a more fundamental affective or “rhetorical” relation that precedes and 
exceeds a memory of similitude. Indeed, in such cases, one finds oneself responding, 
whether moving with the crowd, fleeing, protecting others, and so on, “before” memory. 
And if this is the case, these events deal a serious blow to any contention regarding the 
necessity of Burkean identification or the memory of shared goals in persuasion, and as 
Davis shows, they challenge Burke’s argument regarding the ontological or primary 
“division” that supposedly exists between (singular) bodies. 
 As Davis notes, “persuasion frequently succeeds without presenting itself to 
cognitive scrutiny” (Inessential 2), and this occurrence has everything to do with affect or 
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“the affective dimension of memory,” which as Pruchnic and Lacey note, is a “pivotal 
component of subjectivity” to accompany those of discourse and images (486). Affects 
are chemical, behavioral, and other empirical forces transmitted and shared between 
(singular) bodies in instances where an other compels a subject’s activity (before any 
subject/other split), but where no memorable trace of explicit persuasion remains. Affects 
are therefore a characteristic variety of what Bernard-Donals calls “forgetful memory.” 
 But how is it that affects operate so stealthily, without producing any memory of 
the initially persuasive event? As Davis explains, this is so because before there is 
identification and persuasion in the Burkean sense, based on recollection of shared 
projects and properties through rhetorical means, there is first “a more radically 
generalized rhetoricity, an affectability or persuadability that precedes and exceeds 
symbolic intervention” (19). In other words, before there are memorable rhetorical 
exchanges, one is always-already open/exposed to persuasion and affection. One’s 
(singular) bodily existence is characterized by an inherent suggestibility, and this 
suggestibility entails an “identification” with “others” prior to any subject/object split, 
undermining the Burkean need for symbolic rhetorics to bridge the chasm between 
existents. For indeed, if “identification” as a non-declinable affective tie to others is 
always-already in operation, and one must therefore dis-identify from the network of 
(singular) life in order to exist as a subject, one must entirely reverse the Burkean 
schema. For here “identification” and the affective, “rhetorical,” production of 
subjectivity would not only precede and exceed memory, but any identification of shared 
goals or properties enabled through symbolic appeal. 
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Thus, it is appropriate that Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen calls the event wherein 
persuasion by an/other takes place before any subject/object split, before any traction by 
memory, “persuasion without a rhetorician” (71), since it occurs via affects that an 
“other” transmits non-consciously, and likewise, that “one” receives non-consciously 
(before there is an “other” or a “one”). For instance, there is often no single rhetorician-
subject who appeals to activists to tell them to change course along a march, to huddle up 
as a team, to flee or face police, but rather, a shared production of subjectivity and 
movement that simultaneously belongs to everyone/no one (Heidegger’s Das Man). This 
is why Borch-Jacobsen argues that affection entails “a radical forgetting of the other” 
(50), because when suggestion takes place via the non-declinable rhetoricity that 
structures one’s existence, it appears as though one’s movements originate from within 
oneself, even though they were transmitted by an/other and have no ultimate origin. One 
thus wipes the other out without realizing as much, and is thereby able to preserve the 
phantasy of “self”-mastery and sovereignty. And it is likewise this “forgetting” of the 
other that blinds one to the existence of singularity. 
 In physics, Davis notes, the concept of singularity describes the region of a black 
hole where gravitational forces become so great as to perplex scientific/mathematical 
description. What is important here, though, is that singularities can provide one an image 
to think about bodies without reducing them to the notion of a distinct, isolated, or 
atomized unit. For just as (naked) black hole singularities exert a pull on everything 
around them, and constitute themselves as masses by everything they have taken in, 
singular bodies draw in their surroundings and are constituted by them such that “a rather 
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astonishing condition of indistinction announces itself” between any singular body and 
another (Inessential 24). So whereas “individuals” are discrete, atomized entities that are 
wholly “self”-motivated and uniquely responsible for their own activities, singularities 
are open to the outside and to others, and their “becomings” are inexorably bound up with 
(and produced through) the movements of others. In fact, singularities are the others with 
whom they exist in proximity and are responsible to others for their very being. What this 
means, then, is that there are no “individuals” living completely detached from one 
another, for instance, accumulating wealth and power wholly on their own, working or 
producing or inventing wholly on their own. Instead, there exist singularities networked 
together such that they produce wealth together, think and create together (“in common”), 
without ever existing in isolation. Singular existence is therefore constituted by a 
ceaselessly “forgotten,” yet inescapable, “persuadability,” which entails that no one is 
capable of anything alone—and the material existence of life is networked.25 
 
                                                 
25 Hardt and Negri’s remarks on the two types of “multitude” are quite instructive here: 
The first multitude is ontological and we could not conceive our social being without it. . 
. . The second multitude is political, and it will require a political project to bring it into 
being on the basis of these emerging conditions. These two multitudes, however, 
although conceptually distinct, are not really separable. If the multitude were not already 
latent and implicit in our social being, we could not even imagine it as a political project; 
and, similarly, we can only hope to realize it today because it already exists as a real 
potential. The multitude, then, when we put the two together, has a strange, double 
temporality: always-already and not-yet. (221-222) 
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Fig 8. Occupy Wall Street as Singular Network. 
 
In espousing the concept of singularity in contrast to that of the atomized 
“individual,” one therefore accomplishes two significant feats: first, one supports the idea 
that one can persuade others, (partially) produce subjectivity and movement, 
“forgetfully,” without conscious awareness, and second, singularity challenges what 
Davis calls the “phantasm of the free and willing agent” (128), that is, the “self”-
sufficient individual who can act without any prior affection by others as a “divine” self-
causing cause (a creator). Hence, as in my earlier analysis of the discursive production 
and sharing of memory, the concept of singularity opens the door to a new ethics, 
politics, and economics by enacting a challenge to the Modernist/neoliberal ideal of a 
sovereign subject who can get rich on their own or accomplish anything in total isolation. 
Indeed, singularity entails that individual (“moral”) responsibility is a myth, such that no 
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one can achieve what they have without existing within the vast network of singularities 
that affectively/“rhetorically” produce them, constantly remaking their subjectivities, and 
from which they are drawing their productive powers. Hence, the critical importance of 
recalling the “forgotten” power of affect within today’s society, for it is a question of how 
one can cultivate the ground for new socio-economic and political relations that posit that 
the production of material wealth and knowledge requires networks of inescapably 
interrelated movement. 
“SOLIDARITY OF THE SHAKEN”: FORGETTING AND REMEMBERING TRAUMA 
 As a final entrée into investigating the rhetorical production of memory and 
forgetting as constitutive components of subjectivity, I turn now to trauma. For although 
trauma does not involve “obviously” rhetorical forces like discourse or images, it 
implicates these forces in tandem, which is one of the reasons why Vivian writes that: 
[e]ven the visceral transparency of memories related to personal trauma 
(which ostensibly preserve raw, unmediated experience) occludes the fact 
that such memories may well exist in a state of translation, migration, or 
even comprehensive reconstruction from one locus of memory to another. 
(125) 
In other words, because traumatic “experiences” are constantly de-territorialized and re-
translated, that is, “reconstructed” via discourse, images, and so on, trauma is an event 
tightly bound to rhetorical productions of memory and forgetting. Slovoj Žižek writes 
that “[t]he essence of trauma is precisely that it is too horrible to be remembered, to be 
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integrated into our symbolic universe. All we have to do is to mark repeatedly the trauma 
as such” (For They 272-273). Indeed, when trauma strikes, the subject records the event, 
and yet cannot consciously recall it; it therefore disrupts the subject’s behavior and 
psychical processes, but in a way that is inaccessible. This is why one can only “mark” 
the trauma, taking note of its occurrence without any access to its specifics. Thus it is 
becoming clearer why Jenny Edkins contends that “traumatic memory is not the same as 
everyday memory” (xiii). 
 Traumatic memory has its own unique characteristics, especially given its relation 
to “forgetting.” Edkins begins by pointing out that “[e]vents that give rise to what we 
categorize today as symptoms of trauma generally involve force and violence” (3); that 
is, in some sense what constitutes trauma’s “rhetorical” power is the “persuasiveness” of 
material impact. Moreover, “[w]itnessing violence done to others and surviving can seem 
to be as traumatic as suffering brutality oneself” (4). So the memory (and “forgetting”) of 
trauma haunt not only the sufferer but the witness, reproducing the subjectivities of both 
as marked. As Žižek suggests above, when trauma makes its mark it can profoundly alter 
a subject’s life, but without this persuasive/productive spur initially arising in conscious 
experience. Psychoanalysts call this haunting return of “forgotten” trauma 
Nachträglichkeit, and as Thomas Rickert explains: 
Nachträglichkeit describes a structure whereby an event occurs, is 
forgotten or remembered in a particularly benign manner, and remains as 
such until a later time, when, through the accumulation of new memories 
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and understandings that reach a tipping point, the earlier memory 
resurfaces. (23) 
Though the earlier experience may not resurface at all, it continues to affect the subject’s 
life in an unfortunate way. Traumas may be “forgotten” temporarily or permanently, but 
they have a profound power to produce the subjectivity of the subject. 
 The (often hidden) markings of traumatic violence and its admixture of 
memorable and “forgotten” effects are quite varied, and can affect a wide range of 
subjects engaged in a number of different activities. For example, after brutalization by 
police/military personnel, seeing fellow activists arrested and thrown in jail, or verbal 
excoriation by family and “friends,” many Occupiers decided to hang up their bullhorns, 
signs, and Guy Fawkes masks. This is not surprising, though, because as Occupy 
Chicago’s “Trauma and Healing” pamphlet explains, although “[i]n comparison to rape, 
[witnessing] mass murder, or other terrible things, street demonstration is relatively less 
traumatic . . . people can be severely [a]ffected by imprisonment, gassing, beatings by 
police, betrayal, or even unexpected behavior by comrades or the state” (N.p.). 
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Fig. 9. Dorli Rainey Pepper-Sprayed at Occupy Seattle.26 
 
Indeed, in keeping with the image of Occupy protesters as a “non-violent army,” many 
who participated in the movement reported having the symptoms of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD), a psychological condition commonly experienced by combatants 
during times of war. In fact, even this writer can admit to having nightmares and 
flashbacks, along with waking up in cold sweats during the most intense periods of the 
movement, unable to forget (or initially process) some of the most troubling things he 
experienced (See Edkins 1-2). 
                                                 
26 Although it is difficult to say whether or not Rainey herself underwent a trauma in the wake of 
her pepper-spraying, her case serves as an exemplar of the kinds of experiences (or “non-experiences”) 
undergone by activists that often did have traumatic effects. Moreover, while being interviewed by Keith 
Olbermann, Rainey remarks that seeing the picture of her being pepper-sprayed “is really not a good 
picture to think about” (N.p.), and in multiple interviews, she palpably changes the subject again and again 
when questioned about how the pepper-spraying continues to affect her. 
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 Along with the characteristic occurrence of events involving force and violence, 
as well as the psychological struggle to remember them, Edkins contends that a primary 
feature of trauma is betrayal (4). As she explains: 
[w]hat we call trauma takes place when the very powers that we are 
convinced will protect us and give us security become our tormentors: 
when the community of which we considered ourselves members turns 
against us or when our family is no longer a source of refuge but a site of 
danger. (4) 
As an example of this kind of traumatic betrayal alongside those heart-breaking instances 
of abuse by parents, caretakers, or spouses, consider that after being set on by riot police, 
many Occupy activists reported feeling violated, as though their country had betrayed 
them. The reproduction of their subjectivities occurred through the traumatic 
realization/recollection that the freedoms of speech and assembly supposedly enshrined 
in the US Constitution rang achingly hollow. They therefore suddenly found themselves 
living in a country they once believed safe for free expression, but that now resorted to 
proto-fascist tactics to subjugate and silence them (a realization about which many 
marginalized subjects have long been aware). And moreover, in instances such as these 
where one experiences a breaking down of (contingency within) the social order, Edkins 
suggests that this occurrence is traumatic because one can no longer “forget” the fact that 
one has been living a fantasy, that an inherently stable social system is a phantasm (5;12). 
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Fig. 10. An Occupy Activist Weeps as Others Comfort Him. 
 
 However, following in the footsteps of Jacques Lacan, Edkins reminds readers of 
the betrayal that the production of subjectivity itself requires (14). That is, to become a 
recognizable/memorable subject at all, to belong to discernible categories of identity, one 
must always-already “betray” one’s singular existence by employing categories that 
exceed or fall short of it; in other words, one’s existence can never become isomorphic 
with rhetorical attempts to articulate it. This is something that subjects would also prefer 
not to acknowledge due its traumatic nature, since a brush with that for which no 
category will suffice is radically unsettling, especially if it is one’s “own” being that is 
depropriating. For instance, Edkins points out that: 
If someone is, say, a political activist, there is always the immediate 
question of whether they are sufficiently involved to count as an activist: 
don’t activists have to be more committed, to take part in more than just 
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demonstrations, should they stand for office? On the other hand, are they 
perhaps more than an activist – does that description do justice to what 
they are, to their role in the party? There is always a surplus in one 
direction or the other. However, we choose on the whole to ignore this – to 
forget the impossibility, and to act as if completeness and closure were 
possible. We hide the traumatic real and stick with the fantasy we call 
social reality. (12) 
Thus, as rhetorical reproduction transforms the subject throughout its existence, in order 
to become/remain who it is and to hold that identity in memory, the same subject must 
“forget” how it exceeds or comes up short of those same categories because one cannot 
make singular existence commensurate with language/rhetorics—to acknowledge 
otherwise is traumatic for the subject’s sense of “self.” Indeed, this is why the fantasy of 
a “self” who fits discernible categories is employed (and singular existence is betrayed)—
it protects the subject from a traumatic brush with the ungraspable/a-signifying 
“structure” of its being. 
Finally, just as subjects anxiously cover over the inappropriable structure of their 
existences with conceptual categories, they approach traumatic events in a similar way; 
for although one cannot consciously remember such events, the “void” of forgetting is 
evidence of their occurrence. But this void-presence is unnerving, so subjects scramble to 
cover it over via a narrative account, or with what Bernard-Donals describes as a 
“profusion of language” (13). And it is this rhetorical incitement to write in the face of 
“forgetting” that leads Bernard-Donals to agree with Blanchot that “it is at this point—
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‘upon losing what we have to say’, the point of forgetfulness—that writing begins. 
Forgetfulness is the source of memory” (13). That is, the “forgetting” of trauma is the 
source of “memory” as narrativization (or the discursive production of subjectivity by the 
subject). 
 However, to rhetorically record an encounter that one has always-already 
“forgotten” is an impossible task, and so it is a task that one can never adequately 
complete. One is struck with the disturbing sense that no words will ever do, and this is 
made all the more troubling because even though there is no repressed image to resurface 
in the case where one has “experienced” world-loss, one’s singular body often 
ceaselessly undergoes the “forgotten” event’s painful return (thus it constitutes Bernard-
Donals’ paradigmatic example of “forgetful memory”). This is also why Deleuze argues 
that “[w]e do not repeat because we repress, we repress because we repeat” (Difference 
105). That is, the subject unwittingly attempts to reenact its trauma first, and then must 
immediately attempt to stifle this painful undertaking. And yet, it is an undertaking that 
one must take up if one is to heal and “live on,” and so perhaps the attempt to cope with 
world-loss and “forgetting” in narrative language, to in turn refashion one’s subjectivity, 
is part of trauma’s “cure” (so long as one recognizes it is a cure that one can never have 
done with). Indeed, because one is attempting to write an event that one has “forgotten,” 
and that is of overwhelming magnitude, one will likely have the sense that the event is 
de-scribing itself, as Blanchot puts it (Writing 7), that the event is un-writing itself as one 
attempts to write it. Hence, perhaps the best one can do to cope with traumas of this 
magnitude and the reproductions of subjectivity that they entail is to, as Edkins explains, 
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engage both memory and forgetting “by encircling the trauma rather than attempting to 
gentrify it” (15), thereby keeping the event’s truths forever on-the-way. 
Examples of this conception of traumatic world-loss that leap to mind first, of 
course, involve genocides, wars, famines, and so on. However, there are many examples 
one could draw from the history of American and global activism, such as civil rights 
struggles where activists occupied segregated buses and lunch-counters, thereby putting 
their lives at stake (and for which many gave their lives). And in connection with the 
contemporary Occupy Movement, allow me to offer up a brief, somewhat indirect 
example, an image/persona that may help one to imagine the difficulty inherent in writing 
about trauma and productively narrativizing subjectivity in its wake. Consider Iraq War 
Veteran and Occupy activist Scott Olsen, who, if anyone deserves the title, one can call a 
survivor of the Occupy Movement. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Scott Olsen Recovering from Head Trauma. 
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On October 25
th
, 2011, during an Occupy event in Oakland, California, as police 
descended upon protesters, Olsen was shot in the forehead with a tear gas canister (some 
accounts say a weapons-grade “bean bag” round) which left a nearly three-inch fracture 
in his skull. Although Olsen has now recovered, ironically27 (and significantly), he was 
left without the ability to speak for some time, and in interviews after the incident, his 
ability to speak was obviously labored. As he explained, “[m]y brain was mostly working 
okay, but I couldn’t get these words out of my mouth, and I had a head-full of words that 
I wanted to say but I couldn’t make them come out” (“Olsen” N.p.). And when Olsen’s 
words did come out, he could not help but stutter, stammer, and repeat things. So 
although it appears Olsen did not experience a trauma that entailed world-loss,28 his 
“word-loss” functioned as an image for one who had, that is, for one who, in attempting 
to “encircle” their trauma in writing, senses language’s inadequacy and feels rhetorically 
compelled to start again and again. But as Bernard-Donals notes, although “[a]ny 
                                                 
27 “Ironic” because Olsen’s loss of speech performatively enacted the loss of his First Amendment 
right to freedom of speech. 
28 Olsen claims to remember the night of his incident quite well, which is surprising given the 
head trauma he received. For example, in a recent interview with Rachel Maddow, he said: 
I remember the whole night. I remember getting to [the protest]. I remember standing 
with the other veteran, Josh, in navy blues. Even after I got hit, I remember people 
carrying me away and driving me to the hospital. I remember just about everything. 
(N.p.) 
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testimony designed to reflect the [traumatic] event will inevitably fail, . . . testimony is 
ironically (and troublingly) the only vehicle in which that moment can be conveyed” 
(31). Thus, although the subject who narrativizes their trauma (or its “forgetting”) and 
thereby reproduces a sense of “self” in its wake may “stutter” (Deleuze), repeat, and so 
on, there is no other option. For as Rickert remarks, “as subjects, who we are is but the 
continual and anticipatory process of recalling and narrativizing the past” (24). 
BIO-POLITICAL MEMORY: THE FORWARD-LOOKING GAZE 
 I will conclude this chapter by returning to the question of biopolitics, or the lived 
struggle to determine an alternative mode of existence in the face of strategies for 
domination and control. Throughout my analysis of memory’s rhetorical production by 
discourse, images, affects, and trauma, I employed examples from the Occupy Movement 
and other activist struggles that evince such an attempt to invent alternative forms of life 
and to reveal how the rhetorical production of memory can have “enabling” effects. For 
Hardt and Negri, as for Foucault, biopolitics “is best defined as an alternative production 
of subjectivity, which not only resists power but also seeks autonomy from it” (56). This 
entails that biopolitical subjectivity, and what I in turn like to describe as “biopolitical 
memory and forgetting,”29 involve/s the making of someone new—someone who has 
come to perceive-recall life in an alternative way to those “frames” that facilitate 
obedience in the face of power. Or in Lynn Worsham’s words, they involve producing “a 
                                                 
29 In order to provide another way of thinking the concepts of biopolitical memory and forgetting, 
it is tempting to claim that they are roughly equivalent to counter-memory and affirmative forgetting. 
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revolutionary subject capable of transforming the world” (217) through socio-political 
resistance or political exodus (flight). 
Thus, in its resistance to (or flight from) power and its capacity to transform the 
world, the biopolitical subject reveals the “minor” power of subjectivity itself, and 
reveals that power can come from anywhere, resist from anywhere, and that it does not 
belong solely to the oppressor. As Hardt and Negri note as well, this “power” entailed in 
biopolitics is tantamount to “the power of life by which we defend and seek our freedom” 
(57). However, such a freedom is not equivalent to “emancipation”30 because, for 
example, even “becoming-activist” entails the production of a subject. So although one 
might justifiably argue that the production of activist subjectivities (at least in certain 
specific cases) leads to a more affirmative, “liberatory” form of life, this mode of 
existence is still the result of subjection and is therefore not “emancipatory.” This is 
precisely why Judith Butler contends that “the subject emerges as the effect of a prior 
power and as the condition of possibility for a radically conditioned form of agency” (14-
15). Indeed, subjects cannot actively transform themselves without the prior production 
of their subjectivities, but it is this subjectivating movement that sometimes produces a 
subject that resists. And this observation holds in the case of activist subjectivity, too, 
because the power that produces a subject might involve, for example, the rhetorics of 
                                                 
30 In Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri designate between emancipation and liberation in the 
following way: “whereas emancipation strives for the freedom of identity, the freedom to be who you really 
are, liberation aims at the freedom of self-determination and self-transformation, the freedom to determine 
what you can become” (331). 
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Occupy, and yet the subject who assimilates them into memory may one day eventually 
resist Occupy as a politics or strategy. 
 Moreover, since the biopolitical production of subjectivity and/or biopolitical 
memory and forgetting involves a subject who resists domination and control, and often 
does so because they have simultaneously been “de-subjectified,” perhaps affirmatively 
shedding their callous, individualist lens on life in favor of a counter-memorial vision of 
interrelationality and shared responsibility, what it seems is at stake in biopolitical 
production is nothing less than the future. This is precisely why Hardt and Negri note that 
the biopolitical subject and event are “forward-looking” (60); they involve tomorrow as it 
is already contained in today, and involve the opportunity to make life anew such that 
“[biopolitical] [e]vents of resistance have the power not only to escape control but also to 
create a new world” (61). 
This is worth repeating: the biopolitical production of memory/forgetting (and the 
resisting subjectivities that it contributes to effectuating) involves nothing less than the 
prospect of building a new world. What sort of world this might entail is certainly open to 
question, but perhaps some of the most appropriate questions to ask here are: what sort of 
world might come into being if language and affects are acknowledged as inescapably 
shared, that no one owns them, caught up as they are in an endless sequential 
transmission and archiving? Or: what sort of world might actualize if thought and 
movement are understood as inexorably bound to others, so that it is inexcusable that 
many should suffer so that so few become “immortal?” And finally: what sort of world 
becomes possible when subjects seize their power to employ images to imagine new 
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histories and new narratives, and where the traumatic devastation of bodies is not an 
excuse to cower and demure, but an impetus to fight back (with others) against betrayal 
and fear?  Indeed, perhaps such is the only “other world” for which one can 
justifiably/affirmatively hope, and thus striving for its actualization is what it means to 
believe in the world.31 
  
                                                 
31 Regarding belief in the world, Deleuze poetically muses that: 
What we most lack is a belief in the world, we’ve quite lost the world, it’s been taken 
from us. If you believe in the world you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that 
elude control, you engender new space-times, however small their surface or volume. It’s 
what you call pietas. Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be 
assessed at the level of our every move. (Negotiations 176) 
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Chapter #2 -- Giving an Account of One’s Wealth: Percentile Narratives 
and Memory Analysis in Contemporary Composition 
We are getting kicked out of our homes. We are forced to choose between 
groceries and rent. We are denied quality medical care. We are suffering from 
environmental pollution. We are working long hours for little pay and no rights, if 
we’re working at all. We are getting nothing while the other 1 percent is getting 
everything. We are the 99 percent. 
-- We are the 99 Percent tumblr. Archive 
 
Those of us who pay for those of you who whine about all of that . . . or that . . . 
or whatever. 
-- We are the 53 Percent tumblr. Archive 
 
When the ‘I’ [or ‘We’] seeks to give an account of itself, an account that must 
include the conditions of its own emergence, it must, as a matter of necessity, 
become a social theorist. 
-- Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself 
 
Over the past couple decades the role of memory in composition studies has been 
subjected to great scrutiny. This may come as a surprising claim, however, since 
discussions surrounding memory in the field are rarely as explicit as when Victor 
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Villanueva exclaims that “Memoria calls and pushes us forward. Memoria is a friend of 
ours. We must invite her into our classrooms and into our scholarship” (“Memoria” 19). 
Rather, scholarly debate regarding memory in composition has focused more on so-called 
“personal writing,” specifically, on the ethical question of asking for disclosure of a 
student writer’s past and whether one can deem any such disclosure as “authentic.” In 
response to whether teachers can judge student memories as authentic expressions of 
their lives, the discipline’s answer has been a resounding “No.” Regarding the reasons for 
this response, Lester Faigley, for example, explains how “[t]o ask students to write 
authentically about the self assumes that a unified consciousness can be laid out on the 
page” (127), and that “teachers of writing who define good writing as truth-telling 
assume that truth comes from within and can be conveyed transparently through 
language” (131). But although fewer teachers today expect students to express their true 
selves or to find their true voices, the jury is out as to whether or not students should 
write about themselves in composition classrooms. Scholars such as Villanueva contend 
that having students write about their memories is an activity with great socio-political 
promise, one that leads to the development of critical consciousness as well as 
realizations regarding how “we are—all of us—subject to the systemic” (Bootstraps 
xviii). By contrast, scholars such as Michelle Ballif argue that personal writing demands 
the production of a meaningful, cohesive subject-narrative (that ignores what it cannot 
account for), and calls students into an exposed, confessional stance with regard to the 
instructor, thus rendering it an activity “complicit with systems of oppression” 
(“Seducing” 78). 
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In the wake of this impasse regarding the place of “personal writing” in college 
classrooms, I will formulate a resolution called im-personal writing. This strategy has 
students write about their memories, but it critically tempers the activity in multiple 
ways, most importantly, by shifting emphasis away from having students “express” 
themselves while conveying memories to having them investigate how their memories 
have been rhetorically produced. I therefore dub this pedagogical strategy “im-personal,” 
because as Butler notes, “to the extent that the ‘I’ agrees, from the start, to narrate itself . . 
. , it agrees to circuit its narration through an externality, and so to disorient itself in the 
telling through modes of speech that have an impersonal nature” (52 emphasis mine). In 
other words, to convey one’s memories is not merely to relate one’s singular story, but to 
implicitly reveal the series of impersonal forces through which one has been produced as 
a subject. As an example of this strategy, I discuss how an instructor might assign 
“Percentile Narratives,” accounts of one’s socio-economic status like those employed by 
the Occupy Movement and its detractors. Using these narratives as a point of departure, I 
introduce a series of critical frameworks through which instructors can teach students to 
analyze the im-personal, rhetorical production of their memories, for instance, in relation 
to Bergson’s method of intuition, Foucault’s theory of discourse, and Freud’s theory of 
affect. I employ these perspectives not only because they reveal the ways in which 
memory is a multifaceted assemblage comprised of sensory data, language, and emotions, 
but because they simultaneously show how memories are produced primarily by forces 
outside one’s control. Investigations into memory are not emancipatory, then, if this term 
indicates an escape from the processes of subjectivity-production or the discovery of an 
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essential identity. Rather, following a distinction made by Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri (Commonwealth 331),32 one can only say that such memory examination is 
liberatory in that it reveals the forces to which one is subject, and facilitates an 
experiment within those modes of subjectivation. For as Victor Vitanza explains, “to be a 
subject in our society is inevitably to be subjected, individually and collectively” (156). 
Moreover, the im-personal approach to student writing accommodates worries 
regarding narrative cohesion and excess, as well as confession. For starters, rather than 
demand students provide accounts of themselves that are “authentic,” im-personal writing 
aims to demystify the ideal of authenticity, asking instead for a kind of critically aware 
“mythology.” For as Judith Butler explains, “the history of [one’s] body is not fully 
narratable. To be a body is, in some sense, to be deprived of having a full recollection of 
one’s life” (Giving 38). That is, any attempt to give an account of oneself is constrained 
by non-knowledge (“opacity”) regarding one’s formation, so providing a cohesive self-
narrative is impossible, and adding “fictional” elements, inescapable (39). Im-personal 
writing recognizes that narrative always leaves over something “seductively” un-
produced, and attempting to cover over such an excess leads to fabrication. In other 
words, im-personal writing views student narrative not as the forcible extraction or 
confession of putative inner truth, but instead as the inventive production (“publication”) 
                                                 
32 In Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri designate between emancipation and liberation in the 
following way: “whereas emancipation strives for the freedom of identity, the freedom to be who you really 
are, liberation aims at the freedom of self-determination and self-transformation, the freedom to determine 
what you can become” (331). 
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of subjectivity. The approach therefore marks a shift from the work of the early to the late 
Foucault, and emphasizes the “biopolitical” force that the publication of subjectivities 
resistant to power and control entails. And given that, as Sharon Crowley argues, 
“students’ subjectivities are the material of contemporary writing instruction” 
(Composition 221), this seems an appropriate plateau towards which to aim. 
(A) IS FOR ARCHIVES (OF ECONOMIC STRUGGLE) 
 
As best you can, give an account of your current economic situation as 
well as you and your family’s economic history—focusing on specific 
memories. Your account might include things like: “I am a student with 
$40,000 in debt,” “I remember my parents choosing between groceries 
and rent,” or “I remember my grandma telling me about the value of 
college.” You can also add rhetorical flourishes like: “Occupy Wall 
Street!” or “I refuse to take a hand-out!” Finally, take a partial photo of 
yourself holding your account in hand, and post it to one of the following 
blog-sites: “We are the 99 Percent,” “We are the 53 Percent,” or “We 
are the 1 Percent.” You should visit these three sites for examples. 
 
 These instructions, which constitute a sample first prompt for im-personal writing, 
are inspired by the three tumblr. blog sites mentioned above, online spaces where one can 
give a narrative account of one’s wealth as well as critical commentary regarding it. 
Thus, Percentile Narratives, together with striking images, combine to produce archives 
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of economic struggle with the persuasive force to raise awareness regarding the 
inequalities/injustices of the global socio-economic system or to challenge the existence 
of such inequalities/injustices. Here, for example, is the narrative of a young immigrant 
woman frightened of taking out student loans and whose family has lost their home to 
foreclosure: 
 
 
 
I’m 17 years old. My parents originally came to America so I could be 
born in a country where you could be anyone you wanted to be. They 
came here legally and my mother even worked for the state government 
for over 8 years helping other people. We bought our first house in 2004. 
It was our home. The 2008 crash made it impossible for us to sell it when 
we had to move to my dad’s country for a J-1 visa requirement. We spent 
years paying for it (the mortgage) because no one would even rent it and 
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we didn’t want the bank to take it. Last year, because my mom had no job 
and we were in thousands of dollars in debt, we had them take it. We are 
still in thousands of dollars in debt. I am graduating from high school this 
year. I am scared of student loans, but I am lucky. A lot of people have it 
worse. I want to go to law school so that one day I can prosecute the 
people who led this country into a crisis. I want to make my parents proud. 
We are the 99%. (99 Percent N.p.) 
 
As evidenced from the above example, Percentile Narratives are often full of memories, 
especially when coming from families with a history of marked poverty or wealth, which 
makes them an excellent candidate for the prompts of im-personal writing. Indeed, given 
that im-personal writing concerns itself with exposing the forces by which memory is 
produced, while taking into account Marx’s and Engels’ observation that “consciousness 
changes with every change in the conditions of  . . . material existence” (52), it seems that 
recalling their socio-economic situations is an especially fruitful place for students to take 
up their investigations. Moreover, the “intrusion” or “disruption” involved in this prompt 
seems of the sort necessary for any instructor who hopes to challenge what bell hooks 
describes as the suffocating and “intense silence about the reality of class differences . . .  
in educational settings” (177). And challenging this silence provides students a rare 
opportunity to discuss the existence of socio-economic class in American life and 
educational dynamics, and to have a constructive space for doing so, whether one simply 
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has students share memories or delves into rigorous discussions of, for instance, 
alienation, neoliberal capitalism, or cultural hegemony. 
Furthermore, writing Percentile Narratives encourages students to educate one 
another, as well as instructors, about the experiences and attitudes produced by various 
material (class) conditions, and shatters “the assumption that [students and instructors] 
share a common class background and perspective” (hooks 186). The activity therefore 
aides as well in resisting the problematic “banking model” of education so fiercely 
denounced by Paulo Freire (Pedagogy 71-86), shifting the classroom from being a space 
where “knowledge deposits” are unilaterally made only by the teacher into the 
intellectually “impoverished” and “sold out” students, to one of mutual respect and 
experiential exchange. In this type of environment, the student becomes a “student-
teacher,” the teacher a “teacher-student” (72), and the writing classroom itself perhaps 
increasingly approaches a “horizontal” as well as democratic egalitarianism.33 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 No matter how egalitarian one wishes one’s classroom to become, it is problematic to pretend 
as though the university-level instructor does not maintain a position of power with relation to students. 
Indeed, as hooks forcefully explains, to pretend that no power difference exists between students and 
instructors is “a mistake” (187). This is not to say that pedagogical experiments in horizontalism are 
forlorn, only that one should be honest about existing power-relations between teachers and students. 
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(L) IS FOR LIVED EXPERIENCE (AND ITS REAL CONDITIONS) 
 
Refer to the event (or series of events) described in your Percentile 
Narrative. What stands out in this memory? Given the specifics of what 
you remember, what actions do you think it has led you to take? What 
features of the event(s) held your attention at the time so that you 
remembered them in this way? In contrast to the focus of your memory, 
what might you have forgotten about the event(s) in question? As you 
remember, how does your accumulated experience since the event change 
how you think about it? How might your memory be combined or blurred 
with other related memories? Lastly, what do you use to remember: 
writing, audio or video recording, rituals or practices, smells, photos, 
artifacts, or something else altogether? 
 
 Once a student has produced a series of memories via a Percentile (or other) 
Narrative to analyze, the next activity of im-personal writing involves responding to a 
series of questions regarding the “transcendental” formation of these memories derived 
from Henri Bergson’s method of intuition, a strategy regarding those preconscious factors 
that determine how recollections-perceptions are shaped “prior to” or at the advent of 
remembering and experiencing in order to “rhetorically” compel the behavior of subjects. 
In other words, these Bergsonian observations reveal the im-personal nature of memory 
because they show how memories are typically produced without the conscious guidance 
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of an intending subject. Moreover, these strategic questions help students to understand 
how their memories are produced so as to promote action, especially through their 
combination with other memories, and they involve an emphasis on the manifold of 
sensation (which in rhetorical studies is all-too-often relegated a role secondary to that of 
discourse). Indeed, in contrast to other approaches for rhetorical analysis, through 
focusing on sensation (and its conditions) students are prompted to consider how their 
memories are, in Bergson’s words, “imagistic,” and shaped with regard to their material 
interests and needs as well as their sensory recollection-perceptions of the world. 
Provided his focus on sensation and movement in relation to memory, it is little 
surprise that Bergson states “we must never forget the utilitarian character of our mental 
functions, which are essentially turned towards action” (xvii). What he has in mind here 
is that the sensory assemblage of perception-recollection is pre-consciously produced 
with attention to life, such that it is always-already shaped with a view to responding to 
one’s world. In fact, for Bergson, perception-recollections are latent actions, and thus 
have “rhetorical” power. To clarify these complex ideas, consider the Percentile 
Narrative of a young African-American woman who appears to have grown up on the 
streets of Chicago: 
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I grew up in a single parent home in a basement apartment. The 
government has refused to give my family any type of financial help since 
’95. My playgrounds were surrounded by rapists. My schools were filled 
with drug dealers. My apartment building was taken over by gang-
bangers. And many of my friends have been shot/murdered. I am an 
African-American female. I have been told that I am at ‘the bottom of the 
list’ . . . . as in the government’s list of concerns. My family has never 
been on vacation and we still can not afford a car. BUT THAT HAS NOT 
STOPPED US! My mother has been ill for almost 10 years, but that has 
not stopped her. My brother and I have made it to college because they 
can’t stop us. Even now, my mother is unemployed and can’t afford our 
education. . . . but guess what? THAT WILL NOT STOP US! I am 19 and 
have been denied jobs because my name is Akuabba. I am the 99% looking 
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for change. Until I am able to pay off my mother’s piling medical bills, 
take care of my tuition bills and take my mother on a two week vacation, I 
will not stop occupying Chicago. (99 Percent N.p.) 
 
In-line with the Bergsonian method, a teacher would likely have a student like Akuabba, 
who is recalling places such as playgrounds, apartment buildings, and other physical 
sites, consider these place-based memories with regard to action. For instance, what did 
she experience or hear about that led her to remember places “surrounded by rapists” and 
“filled with drug dealers?” What precautions did these perceptions lead Akuabba to take 
at the time? Do they continue to affect her choices and perceptions today (and perhaps 
later in life)? Thus, the Bergsonian approach to memory-analysis involves urging 
students to gauge the rhetorical force of their memories and their functional importance, 
investigating how those memories have compelled/compel action in one way or another. 
Another way that a Bergsonian approach urges students to consider the rhetorical 
structuration of their memories pertains to how they were produced. According to 
Bergson, just as memories are “contracted” so as to promote action, they are also 
“rotated” in terms of how they interest and produce the subject who remembers. As he 
explains, “[t]he images [of perception-recollection] will appear to turn towards our body 
the side emphasized by the light upon it, which interests our body” (29). What this 
entails, then, is that whether one is recollecting or perceiving (a distinction that Bergson 
often problematizes), such experiences are pre-structured with regard to “interest.” For 
instance, a Bergsonian might encourage Akuabba to consider which interests led to her 
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recall that she has been “at the bottom of the list. . . . as in the government’s list of 
concerns.” Does she have an interest in being placed higher on this list? What about her 
family members? And conversely, an instructor might ask her to consider what she has 
“forgotten” about her past, that is, what she may have experienced but that remains on the 
margins of memory given that she had no interest in it or could not act upon it—which is 
a “speculative” consideration that may invite creative fabrication.34 For as Bergson 
explains, “[o]ur representation of matter is the measure of our possible action upon 
bodies: it results from the discarding of what has no interest for our needs, or more 
generally for our functions” (30 emphasis mine). For example, Akuabba might consider 
certain details of her inner-city neighborhood and its inhabitants that she is capable of 
recalling dimly, but that she typically overlooks (and why). Students may need an 
instructor (or another student) to aid them in such considerations by refocusing their 
attention on something else, but such prompting will help them to better understand just 
how much memory has to hold away from immediate attention in order for a subject to 
function. So although it is tempting to gloss over what students may have “forgotten” 
because these details are “uninteresting,” or because trying to account for them may lead 
                                                 
34 Concerning the prevalence of narrative fabrication, Butler explains how “I cannot explain 
exactly why I have emerged in this way, and [thus] my efforts at narrative reconstruction are always 
undergoing revision” (40). For Butler, giving an account of oneself is always an on-going process and 
inevitably involves myth-making, so truth-telling cannot be a viable criterion for student “personal 
writing.” 
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to mythologizing, it is worth attending to these processes of “forgetting” and myth-
making in order to provide a more intricate picture of how memory functions. 
 Another way Bergson guides one through the analysis of memories is with regard 
to how they contaminate one another. He argues that every experience is already 
produced in conjunction with one’s past memories, and likewise, that any memory is 
contaminated by a host of previous experiences. As Bergson himself puts it, “[o]ur 
perceptions are undoubtedly interlaced with memories, and inversely, a memory . . . only 
becomes actual by borrowing the body of some perception into which it slips” (72). 
Along these lines, students can employ Bergson’s insights to consider how the memories 
from their narratives, Percentile or otherwise, are potentially combined and/or confused 
with other memories. For example, Akuabba could start with her observation about being 
denied jobs, something that she implies has happened multiple times but that has been 
generalized in her narrative. She could then attempt to analyze specific instances of when 
this happened, considering how her memory might have blurred them together. 
Finally, Bergson joins several other philosophers in arguing that memory is 
produced wholly “on the outside,” in other words, that it does not activate spontaneously 
from some interior “self” but must be stimulated environmentally. For him, memories 
come from the world, are “stored in” the world, and the world calls them forth (30). For 
the purposes of im-personal writing, what Bergson’s insight suggests is that one prompt 
students to focus what “artifacts” or environments they employ to remember what they 
remember. For instance, subjects often remember with the aid of photos, videos, audio, 
texts, rituals, places, smells, and more. Along these lines, one can urge students to 
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consider the forces that rhetorically compel the activation of their memories. Perhaps 
Akuabba remembers the basement apartment of her childhood whenever she smells the 
pungent odor of mold, or recalls a deceased friend whenever she hears the melody of a 
certain sad song. In each case, Bergson would argue, her memory derives “from the 
outside.” 
(I) IS FOR INSTITUTIONS AND IDEAS (THAT PRODUCE MEMORY DISCURSIVELY) 
 
Carefully analyze the way you described the memories in your Percentile 
Narrative. What institutions, rituals, or events have you described, for 
example, such as took place at your school or church? What concepts or 
ideas are most prevalent like economic justice or personal responsibility? 
Now choose one or two of these entities and research their history as 
thoroughly as you can. What, if anything, about this history is 
controversial or involves conflicting accounts? What about it runs 
contrary to what you previously thought? Lastly, revisit how you 
described the memories in your Percentile Narrative. What might you now 
describe differently? Who might potentially benefit or suffer depending 
upon which description you employ or convey to others? For example, 
who might gain or lose power, wealth, knowledge, and so on? 
 
 At this point, im-personal writing shifts emphasis from the transcendental 
conditions of memory-production outlined by Bergson to the discursive-historical ones 
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developed by Michel Foucault. And although many in the field of composition studies 
have turned to Foucault for inspiration, his “principle of externality” is especially 
relevant to the project of im-personal writing because, as Bruce Herzberg explains, it 
“opposes the interpretation of the text and looks instead for the external conditions of its 
existence” (73). This analysis of “external conditions” entails prompting students to 
genealogically trace out why their memories are conceptualized or framed in the way that 
they are rather than interpreting what they mean, linking these conceptions to discursive 
rhetorics with distinct histories. In order to outline what this discursive-historical analysis 
looks like in more detail, consider the following Percentile Narrative from a young man 
who emphasizes his work ethic and sizable college debt: 
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My parents did not graduate from college. My father was drafted and 
SERVED in the United States Marine Corp during the Vietnam War. I 
PUT MYSELF THROUGH COLLEGE BY WORKING full time, 40-50 
hours per week, and attending college at night. I ACCRUED $48,000 in 
student debt, and I agreed to pay the lender back for my education. The 
debt that I accrued has been on my own account, and I AM SOLELY 
RESPONSIBLE for paying it back; not the government! I WORK very 
hard to provide for my family, no matter what the cost. My wife and I 
teach our children Godly principles, and try to lead by example along with 
a STRONG WORK ETHIC. The Constitution of the United States of 
America DOESN’T say that every individual will be financially provided 
for and that every citizens’ debt will be abolished by the government. I 
believe in paying taxes to be able to have a SAFE AND BEAUTIFUL 
AMERICA. I AM THE 53%. (53 Percent N.p.) 
 
Responding to this or a similar narrative, an instructor employing the Foucauldian 
“mode” of im-personal writing might encourage the student to research the history and 
controversies surrounding the Vietnam War, the history of public funding and student 
debt in post-secondary education, or the conceptual development of the Protestant-
Capitalist work ethic. While conducting this type of historical research, the Foucauldian 
approach also invites students to consider what practices, relations of power, or types of 
production they promote and sustain by remembering in a certain way. For instance, how 
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do US military branches, major banking institutions, or multinational corporations benefit 
when one holds certain attitudes towards war, student loans, or the amount of labor it is 
acceptable for someone to do throughout their lifetime? Conversely, who suffers? 
Through questions such as these, students can begin to undergo a rhetorical shift, slowly 
coming to recognize that the way their memories are framed is not simply the way things 
are, but is the result of historically-determined concepts or discourses inextricably 
entangled in relations of power. 
 Unsurprisingly, then, the Foucauldian strategies of im-personal writing involve an 
attunement to the production of remembering subjects by discourses implicated in a 
number of power-relations. For as Foucault infamously argues, “the subject (and its 
substitutes) must be . . . analyzed as a complex and variable function of discourse” 
(Language 138). This attunement to the discursive production of subjectivities does not 
carry one away from the question of memory, however, but draws one deeper into it. For 
Foucault, every experience is produced and articulated by a discursive “memory” that 
makes it possible. Or as Gilles Deleuze puts it, “[for Foucault], time as subject, or rather 
subjectivation, is called memory” (Foucault 107). What this means is that, rather than 
perceive-recall the world in some pure/unmediated fashion, the truths of one’s world are 
“framed” by the archive of language that one has been subjected to throughout one’s 
lifetime. This characterization of “subjectivation” (the discursive processes of 
subjectivity-production) as memory thus goes hand in hand with Foucault’s concept of 
“counter-memory,” because in order for someone to remember in a way that is “counter” 
to their previous modes of remembering, they must have already been subjectivated to 
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remember a particular way. In other words, in order to “disrupt” the archive of discourse 
framing one’s world and thought, one must have already been subject to (“be”) that 
archive. 
The Foucauldian mode of im-personal writing thus compels students to consider 
the archives of discourse that frame their “own” memories, and to examine the effects of 
these frames. For example, consider the difference between perceiving pro-Occupy 
narratives as “whining for a government handout” and perceiving them as “crying out for 
economic justice.” Different archives of discourse produce not only different perceptions 
but different perceivers, different subjects of perception-recollection. But this does not 
mean, as Foucault puts it, “that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, 
repressed, [or] altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully 
fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies” (Discipline 217). 
For a subject to remember at all, to have the discursive “frame” necessary for 
remembering, it must have been produced by specific rhetorics and practices. 
However, as Foucault makes clear, subjects have the capacity to resist one mode 
of subjectivation (or to “counter-remember”) when they are exposed to competing modes, 
and that is one motivation for assigning im-personal writing. Indeed, liberation might be 
considered the recognition of one’s modes of subjectivation via exposure to other modes, 
and freedom, the capacity to experiment within those different modes. The aim of im-
personal writing assignments is thus to provide students the opportunity to consider how 
the articulations of their memories compare to how others describe the same events, and 
to conceptually experiment with what is at stake in articulating memories in one way or 
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another; in Herzberg’s terms, it invites students to “combin[e] critical reflection with 
writing practice” (81). 
(F) IS FOR FAMILY AND FRIENDS (AND THEIR UNCONSCIOUS AFFECTIONS) 
 
Return to the event(s) of your Percentile Narrative. This time, consider 
your memories with special attention on how you were affected by others. 
How did your family, friends, or social groups influence you to behave the 
way you did, or to remember the way you remembered? Were there social 
expectations or consequences for doing or not doing what you did? What 
emotions were you experiencing at the time, and how did others perhaps 
influence you to feel this way? Is it possible that what you remember 
regarding an event did not actually happen, but was suggested to you by 
someone? How might you have been affected by others in ways you cannot 
remember, either in terms of your behavior during the event or regarding 
how you remembered it? Finally, how much do you trust your memory of 
the event(s) in question and why? (Consider interviewing someone who 
might have affected you to get their side of the story). 
 
 Having outlined the Bergsonian and Foucauldian modes of im-personal writing, I 
want now to offer up a distinctly Freudian way to approach having students analyze their 
memories. However, the Freudian prompts of im-personal writing are not designed to 
have students analyze their memories in classic psychoanalytic terms, that is, regarding 
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defense mechanisms and productive of “Daddy-Mommy-Me” narratives. Rather, they are 
designed to get students to reflect on the ways in which they have been unconsciously 
persuaded and affected by others, and on the inevitable myth-making that giving an 
account of these encounters entails. 
Freud’s connection to memory is a complex one, and recalls the familiar 
psychoanalytic topology regarding the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious 
composition of the subject. And as Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen notes, “[t]he unconscious, for 
Freud, is memory, a storehouse of traces, inscriptions, remembrances, [and] fantasies” 
(20), which implies that memory is primarily unavailable for conscious presentation. 
Moreover, the unconscious is an entirely im-personal form of memory, because it 
“belongs” not to the subject, but to others; that is, to the ways that others have 
affected/produced the subject in question. According to Freud, unconscious “memory,” 
those deep psychical inscriptions that guide one’s behavior and emotional responses, is 
produced through “forgotten” social relations to others. 
 For Freud, then, the production of memory is a social event. As he explains, “[i]n 
the individual’s mental life someone else is invariably involved, as a model, as an object, 
as a helper, as an opponent; and so from the very first[,] psychology, in this extended but 
entirely justifiable sense of the words, is at the same time social psychology as well” 
(Group 3). Freud’s observation suggests that whenever one remembers or behaves in any 
way, others such as one’s parents, siblings, lovers, friends, teachers, or leaders are 
“already there,” so to speak, affecting one in ways that are irretrievable to recollection. 
Or as Borch-Jacobsen puts it, “the Freudian subject is the other, is the same as the other” 
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(16). That is, who one is involves a non-declinable relation to others that is, primarily, 
irretrievable and non-narratable. So when students recall and write about events in terms 
of how they were affected and persuaded by others, they are encouraged to grapple with 
an excess that narrative cannot capture. 
 In order to clarify im-personal writing’s deployment of the Freudian model, 
consider the following Percentile Narrative composed by a young woman who grew up in 
a wealthy family, but now lives a very different life from her parents: 
 
 
 
I was born into a wealthy family. I am 27 and I have never had to be 
financially independent. I have more money and assets than I will ever 
know what to do with. I love my family and am grateful for the life their 
wealth has afforded me, but I hate how they have so much money they 
have to hire people to figure out what to do with it. They hire people to 
create tax shelters, get around estate laws, and turn money into more 
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money. It is so complicated that I have stopped trying to understand it all. 
I quit a coveted corporate job 2 ½ years ago. Since then I have been a full 
time volunteer at a homeless shelter, advocated for victims of domestic 
violence who were stuck with their abusers for financial reasons, and 
spent my time traveling internationally and ‘following my dreams.’ 
Meanwhile, my friends and all the amazing people I have met on my 
journey struggle with student loan debt, not having a place to live, food to 
eat, access to health care, or a way out. TAX ME MORE. I can afford it. I 
am the 1% and I stand with the 99%. (1 Percent N.p.) 
 
Provided this particular narrative or one akin to it, several opportunities arise for taking 
up the question of memory and affective social relations. For example, the young woman 
above could consider the ways in which her family’s wealth has affected her emotionally 
as well as her attitude towards wealth in general. An instructor might also invite her to 
consider her decision to quit her corporate job and become a volunteer, focusing on how 
her relationship to her family might have persuaded her to do so. Thus, by writing about 
memories with an attunement to affectability, students not only see how their behavior is 
overtly influenced by others, but begin to sense the unconscious, irretrievable, ways in 
which others affect and persuade them. 
 To further relate the notion of affect to rhetoric, consider Borch-Jacobsen’s 
remark that it is characterized by “persuasion without a rhetorician” (71), or persuasion 
without the acknowledgement of subjects. This type of influence is especially prevalent 
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in large groups, and “Freud recognized the fundamental fact that all subjectivity and all 
individual desire vanish in crowds” (25). So as students analyze their memories, they can 
consider not only how, as in the example above, a group of family members or the 
homeless might have affected them, but they can consider what social consequences 
might have ensued had they not behaved or remembered in accordance with group norms. 
 Moreover, because affection is unconscious, or as Diane Davis puts it, 
“‘persuasion’ frequently succeeds without presenting itself to cognitive scrutiny” 
(Inessential 2), this entails an obstacle for “truthful” narrative. But this is no obstacle for 
im-personal writing, because as Borch-Jacobsen explains, “self”-narration implicitly 
relies upon the poetic capacity of myth-making, and the explicitly forlorn attempt to 
“represent the unrepresentable” (35). Indeed, as students consider their memories, 
analyzing why they behaved as they did or remembered as they remembered, when they 
are asked to consider the affections of others, this is an un(re)presentable event. In order 
to give an account of oneself, though, one has no choice but to mythologize (or simply to 
remain silent). Yet myths/silences are no less powerful for being myths/silences, even as 
they reveal the subject’s incapacity to master her or his own story. In fact, this incapacity 
is precisely why Butler argues that “any effort ‘to give an account of oneself’ will have to 
fail in order to approach being true” (42). Thus, if “authenticity” is to retain any meaning 
in regard to student writing, perhaps it is found in the struggle to affirm one’s “self”-
blindness, and the inevitable myths and silences born of this struggle. 
 Before closing out this section, I should also note another type of persuasion 
closely linked to affect, namely, suggestion. Suggestion involves memories that, rather 
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than actually having been experienced by a subject, are “suggested” to the subject by 
another, and they have distinct rhetorical force because, as Freud notes: 
[w]hat distinguishes a suggestion from other kinds of psychical influence, 
. . . is that in the case of a suggestion an idea is aroused in another person’s 
brain which is not examined in regard to its origin but is accepted just as 
though it had arisen spontaneously in that brain. (Affective 67) 
Freud argues that suggestion has such significant persuasive power because, when it 
takes place, the influence of others is “forgotten,” and so one takes their ideas as one’s 
own. Thus, when students are analyzing and writing about their memories, they can 
consider which of them are actually “theirs,” or whether something may have been 
suggested to them. For example, the woman above might speculate on who gave her the 
idea to leave her corporate job, or on who might have suggested that she become a 
volunteer, all while acknowledging the potentially “mythic” quality of this account. 
Furthermore, students can consider not only the suggestions of other subjects, but 
purveyors of cultural and economic suggestion such as television and Internet feeds. 
Considerations such as these are important because they call the veracity of memory into 
question, encouraging students to view their recollections as something besides pristine, 
reliable, and self-generated (as in Current-Traditional Rhetoric) (Methodical 12), and 
help students to recognize the power of media on memory.35 
                                                 
35 In The Methodical Memory, Sharon Crowley explains how the dominant form of teaching 
writing in the US, Current-Traditional Rhetoric, operates according to three faulty assumptions about 
memory: “first, that [memory] could reliably investigate its own workings; second . . . [memory] work[s] in 
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(E) IS FOR ETHICAL STRATEGIES (FOR PUTTING MEMORY INTO THE SERVICE OF LIFE) 
 
Now that you have thoroughly analyzed the memories in your Percentile 
Narrative, it is time to put them to work. Considering everything that you 
have written and learned thus far, what is the most important thing that 
you’ve realized about (your) life? More importantly, what does your 
analysis inspire you to do, or to convince others to do? What will you 
argue (or do) in order to convince them? In other words, how will the 
analysis of your memories change your life and lead you to change the 
lives of others? Finally, is there some memory from your Percentile 
Narrative that you would like to “forget?” That is, something that you can 
recognize has happened but that you no longer want to be influenced by? 
What will you do to ensure that this “forgetting” is successful? 
 
 Thus far, the im-personal approach to writing has encouraged students to 
investigate how their memories are produced by socio-economic and transcendental 
conditions, discourses with specific histories and relations to power, and by unconscious 
affects. That memory is approached in this manner derives from the notion that, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
an organized linear sequence . . . and third, that the mind’s sequential workings [are] accurately inscribed in 
memory and could be accurately reproduced upon demand” (12). Im-personal writing therefore attempts to 
dynamite such suppositions about memory in writing by attuning to the unconscious, affect, and 
suggestion. 
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Deleuze puts it, “[t]here’s no subject, but a production of subjectivity: subjectivity has to 
be produced, when its time arrives, precisely because there is no subject” (Negotiations 
114). Following Deleuze, the argument that subjectivities are produced entails that 
memories (and the truths that articulate them) do not originate from the depths of an 
interior “self” and are thus waiting for expression in writing, but rather, that memories are 
produced “on the outside” by a multiplicity of forces. One must therefore have students 
follow memory outside to its sites of production in order for them to effectively analyze 
it. 
 However, it will not suffice to have students merely investigate the rhetorical 
production of their memories without these investigations leading anywhere, and so the 
prompts of im-personal writing conclude with a shift to activity, resistance, and 
invention. For after students give an account of themselves, it is time to experiment with 
what their memories can do. Or, provided a little Nietzschean flair, one might exclaim: 
“Let us at least learn better how to employ [memory] for the purpose of life” (66)! 
Responding to this Nietzschean call, however, is not as simple as asking students to 
advocate for something in writing. The traditional “mode” of argumentation surely has a 
place here, but it does not fully encompass the Nietzschean vision. For if someone 
advocates something in the name of invigorating life, it is the invigoration itself that most 
concerns im-personal writing—for it is attuned to the project of living differently 
(“counter-living”), and thus relates not only to remembering in particular ways, but to the 
potential need for affirmative forgetting(s). 
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 Having recalled and thoroughly analyzed a particular event (or events), students 
are now prepared to ask a series of questions about living on and letting go. For as 
Nietzsche explains: 
[c]heerfulness, the good conscience, the joyful deed, confidence in the 
future – all of them depend . . . on one’s being just as able to forget at the 
right time as to remember at the right time . . . (63) 
According to Nietzsche, living joyfully and confidently entails knowing when to 
remember and when to forget, knowing when to draw from (one’s) history and when to 
leave the past behind. In order to link up these insights to im-personal writing, take for 
example the narrative of an angry young man that has emigrated to Canada and refuses to 
repay his student loans: 
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I am a grad student. I am on my way to obtaining 3 degrees and more than 
$30,000 in student debt. I will never get a university job. I have 3 kids and 
a wife with a good paying job, with benefits. We left the U.S. for Canada 
so our kids could have health care. I refuse to pay back my student loans. I 
refuse to support political parties or organizations that maintain 
capitalism’s domination of my fellow human beings. I refuse to be silent. I 
refuse to make concessions. I refuse to be bullied. I am the 99%, and I’ve 
had it. (99 Percent N.p.) 
 
For Nietzsche, memory has value only insofar as it is put into the service of (one’s) life, 
or insofar as it invigorates action. In the example at hand, one can see the young man 
hinting at memories regarding his education, his family and their emigration, and so on. 
But the crucial aspect of his Percentile Narrative is that after alluding to these memories, 
he explains how he is invigorated to take action: “I refuse to support,” “I refuse to be 
silent,” “I refuse to make concessions,” “I refuse to be bullied.” Nietzsche would likely 
say that these refusals (or “No’s!”) are simultaneously a critical affirmation (a “Yes!”) 
regarding the young man’s future courses of action. And critical affirmations and calls to 
action such as these are what the final prompt of im-personal writing aims for, whether 
articulated in ferocious bursts or intricate arguments. The key is transmuting memory into 
activity, for as Bergson points out, all memories are latent actions. 
 Furthermore, the Nietzschean deployment of memory for life involves an 
attunement to forgetting. As John Poulakos explains, “if we are to place [memory] in the 
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service of our life, we must rid ourselves of the burdens of the past and strive to create 
from them materials that are useful, that augment our capacity to live joyfully” (90 
emphasis mine). What Poulakos is alluding to here is Nietzsche’s concept of “affirmative 
forgetting,” a notion that has nothing to do with being unable to remember something or 
obliviousness. Rather, affirmative forgetting concerns the desire to accept that an event 
has happened, but to no longer draw from it as one charts the course of one’s life. As 
Bradford Vivian explains, 
[affirmative] forgetting is an exercise of self-discipline rather than 
delusion, a form of judgment in which we overcome our own invented or 
received perceptions of former times, people, and events as a mechanism 
for overcoming whatever self-defining flaws we have inherited from them. 
(54) 
Following Vivian’s outline, an instructor might encourage the young man above to 
elaborate on his life as a student, focusing specifically on the observations that he has 
multiple degrees and significant debt but “will never get a university job.” Then one 
might ask the young man if he intends to “forget” his life as a student after he graduates, 
that is, whether he will acknowledge his past as a student, but “refuse” to allow that past 
to haunt his future. 
 However, it is important to remain honest about the possibility of affirmative 
forgetting in relation to “self”-mastery. For although “forgetting” can certainly enhance 
the beauty and dynamism of one’s life, it is not as simple as flipping a light-switch. 
Subjectivities can become incredibly calcified, especially regarding 
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affections/subjectivations that took place early in life. This is no small point, for as the 
late James Berlin related to me through Lester Faigley, it is this difficulty inherent in the 
project of student forgetting that lies at the heart of all collegiate education, and is what I 
think Hardt and Negri imply when in Declaration they contend that “[t]he greatest gift a 
teacher can give is the recognition that each student has the power to think” (27). But 
although the critical thought entailed by “forgetting” is often difficult and painfully slow, 
as Davis explains, “[t]here is something about the dis/covering and radical shedding 
(affirmative forgetting) of past/present foundations that leaves one wide open to 
previously unthought potentialities” (Breaking 166). Of course, it is up to students to 
decide what part of their pasts they deem worth shedding or striving to overcome, but as 
Poulakos deftly summarizes, “because no choice is in and of itself necessary, what is 
chosen and what is not depends on the [rhetorician’s] purpose. But if this is so, every 
rhetorical purpose can be viewed as an amalgam of remembrance and forgetfulness” (96). 
CONFESSION OF SINS, PUBLICATION OF SUBJECTS 
 
Although it is tempting to wrap up and get out after outlining the prompts and 
theoretical rationales behind im-personal writing, in closing, a critical concern still 
requires attention, namely, the relationship between student narrative and confession. As 
mentioned at the outset of the chapter, although many in composition studies view 
“personal writing” as valuable and transformative, others (justifiably) view this activity 
with suspicion. More specifically, some see having students write about their memories 
as exposing them to teacher surveillance, and thus becoming more susceptible to 
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pedagogical abuses of power. In this light, student narrative is viewed as akin to a 
religious confession that does not liberate subjects, but leaves them open to greater 
monitoring and control. Faigely, for example, explicitly takes this position when he says 
that “[t]he practice of writing about the self in college composition might be viewed as 
part of a much larger technology of confession for the production of truth in Western 
societies” (23). 
The worry that writing about the “self” is a confessional practice derives from the 
work of Foucault, specifically his History of Sexuality Vol. 1. Therein, he explains how, 
although it may seem liberatory to talk or write about one’s sexuality ad nauseum, the 
proliferation of discourses on sexuality actually opens one to increased monitoring and 
norming by power. Michelle Ballif presciently summarizes this view when she states: 
Thus, as Foucault argues, we must not think that by saying ‘yes’ to the 
liberation of discourses, the disclosure of silences and secrets, that we are 
saying ‘no’ to power. In fact, Foucault contends, we are already in a 
constant state of disclosure, that the imperative to confess meets us at 
every corner. (80) 
Provided this observation, it would seem that writing about one’s memories is a 
confessional practice that leaves one naked before the leering eyes of the teacher, 
increasingly subjectivated rather than liberated. In order to evaluate this claim, though, a 
look at one last Percentile Narrative is instructive, this time, one coming from a young 
veteran of the Iraq War: 
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I am a 27 year old Iraq war veteran. I volunteered to go to Iraq because 
the mainstream media led me to believe the US was building schools and 
hospitals. Shortly after entering the military despite my extensive 
construction experience I was trained how to shoot[,] to kill[,] and blow 
up buildings using minimal amounts of explosives. Around my 7
th
 month in 
Iraq I realized we were not building schools and hospitals but instead 
enforcing laws the general public were uninformed of. It was at this time I 
began to internally side with the [I]raqi people and ever since have been 
afraid to speak up for the people around the world the USA oppresses for 
the sake of cheap oil and profits for banks and department stores[,] for 
fear of being branded a traitor and terrorist. I have attempted suicide out 
of shame for being a part of a world war/domination in which there is no 
end in sight. (99 Percent N.p.) 
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If one understands memory-conveyance as a form of confession, this example is certainly 
edifying. Looking through this lens, here one finds a subject “confessing” to being 
misled, engaging in violent activity, exhibiting complicity with problematic institutions, 
siding with “the enemy,” and so on. Moreover, one finds an admission of shame and a 
palpable sense of guilt, feelings often associated with confession, not to mention an 
explicit recognition that the narrative will open the subject in question to greater 
surveillance and control. Moreover, one can imagine (unsympathetic) military personnel 
viewing this narrative as a confession of weakness, traitorousness, and cowardice. When 
the narrative is read in this way, it is thus hard not to agree with Ballif when she argues 
that writing about oneself “in no way liberates the subject from the process of 
subjectification, the process of becoming subject[,]” produced before the watchful eyes of 
power (83). For as I have argued throughout, not only is there no subject without a 
production of subjectivity, in the example above, the subject seems to have been coerced 
into confession for the purposes of control—a far cry from liberation. However, is there 
another way of viewing the narrative that might lead one to reframe its functioning and 
effects? 
 In order to produce a counter-reading (or a “parallel” reading) of the Iraq Vet 
narrative, one can turn, appropriately enough, to Foucault. For although Foucault is 
highly critical of confession in the History of Sexuality Vol. 1, he later re-thinks this 
critique and transforms it. As Butler explains: 
  122 
In the last years of his life, Foucault returned to the question of confession, 
reversing his earlier critique in the first volume of the History of Sexuality, 
where he indicts confession as a forcible extraction of sexual truth, a 
practice in the service of a regulatory power that produces the subject as 
one who is obligated to tell the truth about his or her desire. (112) 
Following Butler’s introduction, what Foucault eventually decides (following a crisis in 
his thought) is that confession is a productive rhetorical event whereby the subject 
affirmatively “publishes” her- or himself, rather than merely an extraction of truth before 
power.36 This publication of oneself, Butler explains, does not “correspond to some 
putative inner truth, and [its] constitutive appearance is not to be construed as mere 
illusion” (112). In other words, when someone “publishes” their memories, they do not 
express a self from the depths of their innermost being, but rather, they produce a “self” 
contingently. This production is not an illusion, Butler explains, because the subject 
“speaks itself, but in the speaking it becomes what it is” (113). So in relation to the Iraq 
Vet narrative above, one can alternatively read it as the publication of a subject in 
resistance to power (via a “minor” form of power), that is, as exemplifying what Hardt 
and Negri call biopolitics—“the power of life by which we defend and seek our freedom” 
(Commonwealth 57). So even if “publication” exposes one to a controlling power, the act 
can simultaneously designate resistance to power (“counter-power”) as well. 
                                                 
36 For more on Foucault and confession, see “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the 
Self.” 
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What the above observations on subjectivity imply, however, is that “publication” 
requires a sacrifice, and not just in relation to exposure. For there is a mechanism in 
operation whereby the instant one “speaks oneself” through the available modes of 
persuasion, that is, the rhetorics of one’s surrounding truth-regimes, one forsakes 
articulating whatever is in-appropriable by those regimes. Or as Butler explains, the 
published “manifestation” of one’s subjectivity becomes who one is, and this production 
leaves over an excess that discourse cannot account for (114). For instance, as the Iraq 
Vet above gives an account of himself, he is bound within specific rhetorical parameters, 
and so does not employ terms such as “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder victim.” Yet even 
if terms such as these were employed, they too would leave over an excess. So as Butler 
summarizes, “any discourse, any regime of intelligibility, constitutes us at a cost. Our 
capacity to reflect upon ourselves, to tell the truth about ourselves, is correspondingly 
limited by what the discourse, the regime, cannot allow into speakability” (121). Thus, as 
teachers of writing, it is crucial to attend to this observation regarding what is 
“speakable” in relation to rhetorical truth-regimes, and to talk to students about the 
limitations and dangers of publicizing their memories. In doing so, perhaps one also 
attends to the call for “seduction” of which Ballif speaks, by recognizing that the “refusal 
to be produced by meaning, interpretation, and understanding” (88) is a form of 
resistance in which one (as a singular body) is always-already engaged, but that one must 
jettison one’s totalizing narrative impulses to realize. 
As this investigation draws to a close, then, one is left with the sense that any 
conclusions regarding the question of “personal writing” will have to remain provisional, 
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as is any attempt to “give an account of one’s self.” For now, I have offered up a strategy 
in the form of im-personal writing, whereby one guides students through the process of 
exploring how their memories, their subjectivities, have been produced by material, 
transcendental, discursive, and affective forces.37 It is a strategy that attunes itself to the 
“seductive” opacity of subjectivities as well as the limitations of narrative, and recognizes 
that any attempt to “publish oneself” will come at a cost. However, such a cost is often 
worth it, as it provides students the opportunity to put their memories to work in an 
affirmative, biopolitical act of “resistance, innovation, and freedom” (Commonwealth 
61). And although the freedom traversed through the activity of im-personal writing is 
not that of emancipation, for one cannot evade the production of one’s subjectivity to 
establish an essential identity, it is born of liberation, in that it exposes one to the modes 
by which one has been produced, and in so doing, opens not only the kairotic aperture of 
resistance, but the doorway to inventing an alternative and affirmative form of life. 
  
                                                 
37 Readers may notice that the prompts of im-personal writing spell A LIFE. For Deleuze, A LIFE 
is the name for Being itself (as in Nietzsche and Spinoza). What I am contending, therefore, is that lived 
experience, discourse, affect, and so on, partly comprise this im-personal (immanent) LIFE that produces 
one as a lived subject. 
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Chapter #3 – The Infinite Archive: Social Media and the Revolutionary 
Extension of Memory 
But what are the premises of electronic memory? What will motivate a passage 
through an infinite archive? 
-- Gregory Ulmer, Heuretics: The Logic of Invention 
 
[R]ecent changes in the externalization of memory . . . find their most intense 
forms in contemporary social media. 
-- Jeff Pruchnic and Kim Lacey, “The Future of Forgetting” 
 
Could it be that memory has always been prosthetic, so that its extension 
into the networked cybernetics of mediatic communication was actually 
invented during the genesis of culture? 
-- Steve Goodman and Luciana Parisi, “Machines of Memory” 
 
[N]o fundamental distance establishes itself between the technical, natural, 
human, or existential worlds, no purity or absolute exteriority of one of 
these to the other. 
-- Avital Ronell, The Telephone Book 
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Looking back to the beginnings of rhetoric as a discipline, one finds a tension 
between this bourgeoning field and that of philosophy, centered in particular on the 
question of memory and what happens when it is “technologically” assisted/articulated. 
This question regards whether memory is ever “pure” or “immediate,” that is, whether or 
not memory can articulate an event without the assistance of discursive rhetorics or other 
broadly “technological” marks. Yet both historically, as well as today, when someone 
posits that a “pure” and “immediate,” or “organic” and “live” memory exists (that non-
rhetorical memory exists), they typically also contend that when memory is assisted 
technologically or rhetorically, problematic results inevitably follow.38 For example, 
today some writers claim that the subject who employs technological writing or digital 
media to assist his or her memory becomes more “forgetful,” such as when Nicholas Carr 
avers that “[t]he Web is a technology of forgetfulness” (193), one that supposedly 
involves swapping “live” or “organic” memory for seemingly “dead” or “machinic” 
marks. Moreover, even when scholars today claim that technologically-aided memory is 
not inherently pernicious, they often still describe the technological inscription of 
memory as an “externalization” (maintaining a binary opposition between inside/outside 
the psyche), and so in turn they are compelled to describe this “externalization” as a 
forgetting. For instance, consider Jeff Pruchnic and Kim Lacey’s remark that “the future 
of rhetorical memory will be inextricably bound to our ability to ‘forget’ the content of 
                                                 
38 The paradigmatic instance of this position, historically, is usually attributed to Plato’s 
Phaedrus, wherein Socrates avers that the one who employs writing will introduce forgetfulness into his or 
her soul. 
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experiential memory as it becomes stored in information networks” (475). What such 
descriptions regarding “externalization” suggest as well, is that the digital archivization 
of memory is not productive of memory’s structure, that is, the memory of the subject 
primarily remains self-same as it is “externalized.” 
By contrast, in the following chapter I argue that memory is always-already 
technological such that oppositions between memory’s internalization/externalization 
deconstruct, that memory’s structure is radically reproduced through its digitization, and 
subjectivity is thereby an effect of digital archivization (and an-archivization). Thus, it is 
more appropriate to describe the subject’s recourse to digital memory as an archival 
“hyper-extension” rather than merely “externalization.” Moreover, because I agree 
whole-heartedly with Michelle Ballif when she claims that contemporary subjects are 
“constituted by and through . . . social and information networks” (63), I turn to social 
media applications such as Twitter, Facebook, live streaming video, and remixed memes 
in order to make my central contentions.  Hence, this chapter reveals how subjectivities 
are produced through their archival relation to social media applications, the structure of 
memory is significantly reproduced through social mediation, and that archivization on 
social media entails the “hyper-extension” of an always-already technologized (or 
rhetorical) memory rather than its mere “externalization.”39 
                                                 
39 Although it is not something I take up in this chapter, the question of whether digital memory 
involves “forgetting” or “hyper-extension” appears to depend upon recourse to a specific binary—
presence/absence. If one thinks of digital memory as human “forgetting,” this is likely because one 
conceives of memory that was once “present in the head” as now “absent” from it and instead present 
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ARCHIVE AND OUTSIDE 
 
I want to begin by arguing that memory is always-already “technological,” which 
is to say, rhetorical, or that the binary between “living” and “technological” memory 
deconstructs (which is not to say it collapses). Thus, I argue social media involves 
instances of subjects being produced through “hyper-extending” memory and not merely 
“externalizing” it. Jacques Derrida supports this contention in his essay “Plato’s 
Pharmacy,” wherein he offers up an elegant and iconoclastic reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, 
challenging the ancient contention that writing leads one to become more forgetful by 
substituting “dead” marks for “live” memory. Derrida’s argument opens by highlighting 
an intellectual trepidation concerning “the substitution of the mnemonic device [such as 
written reminders] for live memory, of the prosthesis for the organ; the perversion that 
consists of replacing a limb by a thing” (108). That is, the “perversion” entailed in relying 
upon and thereby strengthening not the supposedly spontaneous powers of the human 
                                                                                                                                                 
online (See Lingua 147-149). By contrast, when one understands digital memory as “hyper-extension,” this 
suggests that the presence/absence binary is blurred because memory is neither neatly “here in the head” or 
“there on the network,” but exists somewhere in their relation to one another. This idea is closely connected 
to Ulmer’s observation that: 
Opposed to the classical concept of memory as storing information in some specific 
locale from which it may be retrieved, connectionist designs of computer memory are 
based on a different characterization: ‘Information is not stored anywhere in particular. 
Rather it is stored everywhere. Information is better thought of as ‘evoked’ than ‘found’. 
(Heuretics 36) 
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intellect, but the mechanical force of writing (or “rhetorics” broadly construed). 
Significantly, Nicholas Carr provides a contemporary version of this worry when he 
writes that “[o]f all the sacrifices we make when we devote ourselves to the Internet as 
our universal medium, the greatest is likely to be the wealth of connections within our 
minds” (195), that is, the wealth of so-called “organic” memory (190). 
It is easy to sympathize with Carr regarding certain adverse effects of employing 
digitized memory, in particular, productions of subjectivity that lead to a sped-up, absent-
minded, or “buzzing” experience of the world (123). However, his suggestion that 
digitized forms of memory are somehow unnatural (or “artificial”), and that by contrast, 
“the mind of the experienced book reader” employs a non-artificial form of memory 
(123, 181), is problematic from a Derridian point of view. Derrida contends that memory 
is inescapably related to “artificiality”/rhetoricity, and he argues that attempts to sharply 
dichotomize “natural” and “artificial” memory ultimately deconstruct. This is because 
“writing,” or inscriptions of language/rhetorics broadly understood, are necessary for 
memory’s very production. Derrida avers that “[t]he outside is already within the work of 
memory,” that is, the so-called “artificial” inscriptions of the rhetorical mark are 
necessary for the constitution of memory as such. This is the case because “[m]emory 
always therefore already needs signs in order to recall the non-present, with which it is 
necessarily in relation . . . [so m]emory is contaminated by its first substitute” (109). In 
other words, for memory to operate at all, regardless of whether it is what Carr calls 
“biological memory,” memory requires an “artificial,” broadly-rhetorical mark/record in 
order to recall anything; so even the most seemingly “natural” memory is contaminated 
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by so-called “artificial” or archival inscriptions. Memory as such is a technological 
recording apparatus (machine). 
Thus, Derrida maintains, problematizing the distinction between “inside” and 
“outside” the psyche, that: 
[t]he ‘outside’ does not begin at the point where what we now call the 
psychic and the physical meet, but at the point where the mneme, instead 
of being present to itself in its life as movement of truth, is supplanted by 
the archive, evicted by a sign of re-memoration or of com-memoration. 
(109) 
In other words, the “outside” of written/machinic traces always-already breach the 
psyche’s seemingly pure “inside.” So-called “live” memory is never unmediated by 
rhetorics and never fully present to itself; it is always-already occupied and/or 
contaminated by “written” marks or mere reminders—by technological inscriptions or 
recordings. Hence, in Archive Fever Derrida points out that “the archive . . . will never be 
either memory or anamesis as spontaneous, alive and internal experience . . . the archive 
takes place at the place of originary and structural breakdown of said memory” (11). 
Indeed, the “archival” marks/recordings of writing have always-already produced 
memory in its seeming purity and so-called “interiority.” Memory is prosthetic and 
dependent upon technological (broadly-rhetorical) articulation.40 
                                                 
40 In “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” Derrida makes the chilling observation that if memory is 
always-already contaminated and/or produced through its relation to “written” marks, archival marks that 
are not alive, this means that death has infiltrated the psyche from the outset and oppositions between 
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To continue following this labyrinthine Derridian thread regarding memory’s 
inescapable machinic technicity, one can turn to Diane Davis, who queries: 
Would an authentic, which is to say wholly organic memory be possible 
outside of the ‘machine-like exteriority’ of rote memorization? Because if 
memory depends on inscription, if there is no memory that is not already 
an effect of technology, in other words, then there is no ‘authentic’ 
memory (and so no authentic history), no [‘authentic’] recollection or 
remembrance. (N.p.) 
In contrast to Carr, therefore, Davis contends that the notion of “wholly organic” memory 
is a chimera, for if memory requires rhetorical (machinic) “inscription” in order to call it 
forth, that is, memory’s production requires “technical-assistance” online and off, then 
something like a purely organic or purely biological memory is a mystification. Thus, as 
Davis argues elsewhere, it is no longer possible to abide by the framework where 
“technology gets relegated to an outside (Other) that perfects or endangers the inside 
(Self)” (Breaking 115). Perhaps the reason why there is so much unease at the thought of 
“outsourcing” memory in the form of digital media, then, is because digitality reveals the 
“technicity” inherent in memory as such. For as Ekterina Haskins explains, “‘digital 
memory,’ more than any other form of mediation, collapses the assumed distinction 
                                                                                                                                                 
human and machine, life and death, begin to blur. So, indeed, “[f]ar from the machine being a pure absence 
of spontaneity, its resemblance to the psychical apparatus, it existence and its necessity bear witness to the 
finitude of the mnemic spontaneity which is thus supplemented. The machine—and, consequently, 
representation—is death and finitude within the psyche” (228). 
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between modern ‘archival’ memory and traditional ‘lived’ memory by combining the 
function of storage and ordering on the one hand, and of presence and interactivity on the 
other” (401-402). So by operating not only archivally, but as a site for dynamic 
interaction and collaborative participation, digital memory problematizes any insuperable 
line between “living” and “technological” memory. 
Regarding further problematization of the “living”/“technological” binary, Alex 
Reid points out that “it is an error to imagine human thought as purely internal to an 
individual self; … in fact what makes human thought so dynamic and powerful is that it 
is largely external (or more precisely that the internal/external binary is misleading)” 
(22). In other words, although memory seems an “individual” and “internal” affair, this is 
an illusion, for memory could not operate as it does, could not operate at all, without its 
“technical” or “rhetorical” production by an outside (that is therefore also already inside 
of “self”), and by archiving itself in the form of recollected marks, writing on paper, 
encoding in digital environments, and so on.41 Hence, one can predict the answer Reid 
has in mind when he asks: “[c]an one draw a boundary between the self and the text 
somewhere between the fingertips and keyboard, the eye and the screen” (34)? And 
                                                 
41 Although Reid points out convincingly that “it is our ability to store and process information in 
spaces outside our body that allows us to engage in the complex thoughts on which consciousness is 
founded” (25), he also adds (lamentingly) that “our discipline [that is, rhetorical and/or digital studies] has 
never been able to account for the radical exteriorization of the subject” (24). Such is the curious 
“contradiction” that rhetorical/digital studies finds itself mired in, and is arguably one significant factor in 
its current “crisis.” 
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moreover, this query emphasizes that rather than the relationship of the subject to the 
digital being one where the subject becomes “externalized,” substituting a technological 
prosthesis for “organic” memory, as Brian Massumi explains, “[t]he operation in play . . . 
has to do with extension rather than substitution” (126); for example, hyper-extension on 
social media rather than mere externalization.42 So as the chapter shifts focus from the 
archive in general to specific archives in the form of social media, the question will 
become how these forms of media prosthetically extend memory into digital planes and 
thereby not only metamorphose memory’s structure, but reproduce the subjectivities of 
those connected with said extensions. 
 As an initial example of digital memory extension and the inherent “technicity” 
and rhetoricity of memory, consider an event central to sparking the Egyptian Revolution 
of 2011, the violent murder of Khaled Mohamed Said and its subsequent archivization on 
Facebook and Twitter—an event that reveals how “memory need not inhabit the human 
brain but [can] be instantiated in physical objects or recording media, distributing 
memory across cultural networks” (Goodman and Parisi 349). In June of 2010, the 
twenty-six-year-old Said secretly filmed police in Alexandria, Egypt, in the midst of 
making a drug deal (Campbell 29). Soon after, Said posted the video on Facebook, and in 
retribution, members of Hosni Mubarak’s secret police smashed his face in, repeatedly 
slamming him into a metal door and brick walls in and around an Alexandrian café (29). 
                                                 
42 Steve Goodman and Luciana Parisi make a similar point to Massumi by pointing out that 
“[m]emory has become prosthetic, a neuro-extension that can be archived via uploading and readily 
accessed via downloading” (343). 
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The draconian Egyptian regime under Mubarak reported that Said died in custody, 
choking on a packet of drugs as he attempted to hide them, but a secret post-mortem 
photo of Said (along with multiple commentaries) appeared on Twitter that proved 
government reports were erroneous (30): 
@monaeltahawy: Impossible to get picture of Khaled Said’s corpse out of 
my head. What a horrific way to die. #Egypt #humanrights 
 
@abo3atef Mourning Khaled Said. Sad and sick brutality by Egyptian 
police. Where is this country heading to?!!! #Egypt. (Campbell 30) 
Moreover, in the wake of Khaled Said’s murder, young Google executive Wael Ghonim 
created a Facebook memorial page in tribute. Although “only” a Facebook page, it 
prompted an enormous response from activists not only in Egypt, but all over the world, 
and prompted the Mubarak regime to incarcerate Ghonim himself (244, 251). For as 
Campbell notes, “[o]rganizers using Facebook Tribute pages channeled the most 
dangerous of commodities . . . rage” (11). 
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Fig. 1. “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook Memorial Page. 
 
Regardless of whatever affective powers they channeled, however, in the case of 
the Twitter texts and image, as well as the Khaled Said Facebook page, subjects were 
produced via “hyper-extending” (mournful) memory into and across a digital plane. For 
although only a single mortician took a photo of Said’s body and a single software 
executive had initially memorialized Said on social media, the memory of these two 
subjects immediately metamorphosed and viralized, taking on a new structure, 
disseminating in innumerable directions at once. Thus, through events of archivization, 
these subjects did not merely empty their brains of vital riches as Carr might claim. They 
did not “forget” an experience while substituting “dead” or “machinic” memory for so-
called “live” memory. Rather, memory became (re-)produced through the power of 
digital archiving, and in doing so extended memory to thousands of other subjects, 
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thereby (re-)producing the subjectivity of those subjects by infusing them with the 
revolutionary drive to occupy Cairo’s Tahrir Square and overthrow the oppressive 
Mubarak regime. 
MEMORY OF THE SWARM 
 
 Operating from the premise that the archivization of memory on digital planes 
indicates not an “externalization,” but the “hyper-extension” of an always-already 
technologized memory, I want now to analyze some specific cases of such archivizations 
along with how they transform memory’s structure and (re-)produce subjectivity. The 
first instance of memory extension that I will analyze involves the social media 
application Twitter, an archival technology with the power to facilitate “swarm-memory” 
formations based on series of short-term rhizomatic connections, and has the capacity to 
produce revolutionary subjectivity. 
 I will begin by discussing Twitter’s short-term and rhizomatic archival form. For 
unlike many types of archivization online, Twitter is atypical in that it comprises a 
“short-term” archive. Tweets recorded online do not remain visible indefinitely, and even 
during the short time they remain visible, they are often uploaded in such rapid-fire 
succession as to make one “forget” the content of even relatively recent tweets. Thus, 
following Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s analysis of short-memory, one might say 
that tweets possess a certain “splendor,” given that they archive short-term ideas whose 
contents come in explosive flashes of 180 characters or less. Moreover, the archiving of 
tweets “includes forgetting as a process” because they are likewise gone in a flash 
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(Thousand 16). And since one can describe the archiving of tweets as short-term 
memory, according to Deleuze and Guattari, this indicates they are of “the rhizome or 
diagram type” (16). 
As Gregory Ulmer explains, the rhizome, a conceptual image based on the growth 
of a grasses’ roots, is “a model for a new order of memory,” one characterized by 
“connection,” “heterogeneity,” “multiplicity,” and “rupture” (Teletheory 141). This 
means that a rhizome entails memory-formations structured such that any user/node can 
connect with any other user/node, the system draws on multiple different subjectivities to 
function, and there exist communicative lines rather than points,43 except where 
breakages occur and new lines of transmission spring forth (141). The rhizome is thus a 
useful image for thinking how archived entries connect within a networked system such 
as Twitter because anyone with an account can connect to and “retweet” another tweet, 
radically different users can contribute content, there are few centralized hubs within the 
system, and removal of any given user will not destroy the system as a whole. Each of 
these features is important, too, because when a subject is produced through hyper-
extensively archiving an entry on Twitter, this short-term memory assumes a number of 
capabilities and features/forms it did not before possess, and these capabilities and 
                                                 
43 Regarding the “absence” of specific points within a networked system, or the notion that points 
are simply abstracted from lines of communication, Ulmer explains how: 
In memory information is organized associationally, so that the ‘address’ of an item is 
another item related to the first item by its content. Knowledge is not in a place, it is not 
there, except as a ‘ghost’—as the pattern of activity of the whole. (Heuretics 216) 
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features/forms in turn re-produce the subjectivity of the user-subject (for instance, by 
requiring one limit the content of thoughts to 180 characters). So even if the subject 
“forgets” the content of a given tweet (or series of tweets), the subjectivity of the user is 
often reproduced nonetheless. 
As an example of the effects produced by hyper-extending memory via archiving 
(short-term/rhizomatic) content on Twitter, particularly as regards transforming 
subjectivities, one can turn to the event of “swarming.” As an initial observation, Rita 
Raley explains how: 
[Swarming] is a mode of attack, both a military tactic and a practice of 
political resistance. . . . The overall aim is sustainable pulsing–swarm 
networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, then 
dissever and redisperse, immediately ready to recombine for a new pulse. 
(43) 
In relation to Twitter specifically, swarming involves a multitude of users archiving (via 
short-term/rhizomatic memory) their current positions and the dangers or obstacles they 
are facing. Then, as every “extended” subject in the multitude draws from the collective 
archive, their subjectivities are reproduced and they move in accordance with those 
reproductions, often toward the goal of “pulsing” at a target and eventually disappearing. 
Hence, as Joss Hands observes, “[t]hese cases demonstrate what the sheer power of 
cumulative connections can do” (3), and they involve “producing a new kind of collective 
intelligence” (1)—an intelligence that draws upon the power of what I term swarm 
memory. 
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 I derive the concept of “swarm memory” from Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri’s discussion of “swarm intelligence,” based on the inference that in order for a 
collective intellect to function, it must have an archive from it which it draws resources 
for invention and intervention (what Jan Rune Holmevik calls “inter/vention”44). It seems 
clear as well that when Hardt and Negri develop this concept, they have in mind 
examples such as Twitter, especially given its rhizomatic structuration. For instance, in 
Multitude, they write that: “[r]ecent researchers in artificial intelligence and 
computational methods use the term swarm intelligence to name collective and 
distributed techniques of problem solving without centralized control or the provision of 
a global model” (91). So in the case of Twitter’s deployment during the Egyptian 
Revolution, for example, one sees how a multitude solved the problem of reaching and 
occupying (“pulsating into”) Tahrir Square by collectively and rhizomatically extending 
memory online (in short-term bursts), producing a shared archive that in turn 
(simultaneously) reproduced the subjectivities/movements of those who engaged in the 
archivization: 
@Sandmonkey Pudgy plainclothed policemen populating cilantro gam3et 
eldowal. My guess is close upper floor is occupied by them. 
 
                                                 
44 For more on the concept of “inter/vention” (as roughly equaling invention plus intervention), 
see Holmevik’s recently published work on gaming theory by the same title (Inter/vention: Free Play in the 
Age of Electracy). 
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@Sandmonkey @Sarahngb At least 8 CS trucks infront of Mostafa 
Mahmood mosque #Jan25. A LOT of Policemen. (Campbell 50) 
Through the co-archiving of such tweets, in Hardt and Negri’s words, Egyptian 
revolutionaries became “a seemingly amorphous multiplicity that [could] strike at a 
single point from all sides or disperse in the environment so as to become almost 
invisible” (57). And the revolutionaries accomplished this feat without a centralized 
leadership or a preexisting model for accomplishing their goal. Rather, they were simply 
“an irreducible plurality of [archival-]nodes in communication with each other” (83). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Diagram of Tweets/Retweets from the Egyptian Revolution. 
 
Although relatively “simple,” through this radical form of 
communication/intelligence facilitated by short-term rhizomatic archivization, as 
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Campbell notes, “[i]n 18 days, Twitter went from a tool used primarily by and for self-
indulgent techies, to a powerful counter-block to a repressive regime’s attempts to shut 
down all opposition” (14). And moreover, the application showed how the subjectivities 
of thousands might be transformed/reproduced through the digital archival activities of a 
few. 
As for some specifics as to how Egyptian revolutionaries deployed their “hyper-
extended” and archival swarm memory to accomplish their goals, Campbell explains how 
“[m]any times throughout that first day of protest the Tweets indicated the youth were 
moving toward various bridges. It became clear following the timeline that many police 
bought the bait as the bridges were fortified but the youth headed to another location” 
(47). So not only did revolutionaries deploy their archive of rhizomatic short-term 
memory to reach and occupy Tahrir Square, they actively deceived Mubarak regime 
authorities by masking which tweets were legitimate. They were, if one stretches the 
concept a bit, producing a series of what Freud calls “screen memories,” but in a manner 
that deceived others rather than themselves.45 Thus, such a case provides a clear example 
of what Hardt and Negri mean when they say that, although a swarm may look chaotic 
                                                 
45 Campbell provides multiple examples of Egypt’s revolutionaries deceiving authorities through 
the use of technology, but one of the most noteworthy is when he writes that: 
What tipped me off to the elaborateness of their planning were the many tweets that 
[first] evening, especially the picture of the Hawaii 5-0 style speedboat whisking 
@Sandmonkey away along the Nile River. They deliberately wanted the police to think 
they were headed anywhere but towards Tahrir (Liberation) Square. (54) 
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from the outside due to an absence of centralized authority, “[i]f one looks inside a 
network, however, one can see that it is indeed organized, rational, and creative” (91). 
And networks achieve such levels of organization and rational creativity partially through 
inventive recourse to an integral rhizomatic series of short-term archival entries 
dynamically interlinked with one another. 
THE DEAD STREAM: A BOY AND HIS MACHINE 
 
In this section, I investigate how memory’s structure is transformed through the 
hyper-extensive “prosthesis” of live streaming video along with the reproductions of 
subjectivity it entails. In doing so, I strive to provisionally answer Ulmer’s question: 
“[w]hat happens to human memory when, in addition to the prosthesis it already 
possesses (alphabetic writing), it gains the services of electronics (specifically, of video)” 
(Teletheory 133)?46 One question that likely initially arises here, however, is why “live” 
streaming video is indeed an archival prosthesis, for is not “live” video precisely live, and 
therefore exhibits a “presence” with regard to its events/objects that recorded video does 
not? Provided my emphasis on the idea that “live” memory is always-already 
contaminated by its “technological” or “rhetorical” prostheses, and given that live 
streaming video requires a machine to function, one can likely guess how I answer such a 
                                                 
46 For Ulmer, memory is always-already prosthetic, always-already technological/rhetorical. So it 
seems he would agree that the subject who archives its memory is not merely “forgetting,” substituting a 
“dead” apparatus for so-called “live” memory, but rather (metamorphically) hyper-extending its memory 
onto a digital plane. 
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question. But rather than proceed on presumptions, I want to explain why the term “live 
video” is in fact a misnomer, and show why it instead constitutes a form of archive 
through which subjects are produced by hyper-extending memory; and moreover, that 
through this “seamless” integration of “human” and “machinic” memory-forms, subjects 
can reproduce themselves and others. 
 In order to show why the term “live streaming video” is problematic, and that it 
instead indicates an event whereby a subject is produced by archiving/hyper-extending 
memory onto a digital plane, I turn again to that magician of memory, Henri Bergson. For 
one can apply Bergson’s insights regarding the always-already mnesic quality of 
perception to the perception of machines (such as cameras) as well. Recall, Bergson notes 
that there is an interval “between matter itself and our conscious perception of matter” 
(27), that is, there is an imperceptible instant where materiality unfolds or becomes faster 
than the subject can experience it—“perception” is belated. By the time the subject 
“perceives” anything, it is in fact already “remembering” an event that has taken place. 
Hence, Bergson contends “we never perceive anything but our immediate past, . . . 
consciousness of the present is already memory” (195). The perception of a camera is no 
different, for even as the camera rolls, materiality is unrolling an instant ahead of it; 
therefore the camera is “merely” recording whatever occurs. So even in the case of so-
called “live” video, one is still watching a recording, an idea that becomes clearer when 
there is significant distance between the camera and the subject watching its supposedly 
“live” feed. Watching a “live-feed” is not in any way different from watching a recording 
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of the newscast a week later—both are instances of recording or archiving. Differences 
between “live” and “recorded” video are different only in degree and not in kind. 
Thus, regardless of whether one is describing the memory of subjects or cameras, 
Deleuze’s observation in Bergsonism holds that “[t]here are no longer, there can no 
longer be, anything but differences in degree between recollection-images and 
perception-images” (73). In other words, even the most seemingly “immediate” of 
experiences and/or most “immediate” capturing of events by cameras are always-already 
recordings, their structure is always-already “technically” and “rhetorically” inscribed; it 
is only that some perception-recollections are temporally “closer” to the events they 
record. So in response to this observation, the need perhaps becomes apparent for a 
concept of “dead streaming video,” given that video inescapably requires recourse to a 
technical apparatus and is never perfectly present to that which it records—a 
characterization that, rather uncannily, describes human memory as well. 
 For an example of a subject produced through archivally/transformatively hyper-
extending its memory in the form of “dead” streaming video, an event that in turn 
reproduces the subject in question along with the subjectivities of others as they link up 
to the archived flow, one can turn to Occupy Wall Street cameraman Timothy Pool. A 
one-time documentarian of extreme skating competitions, Pool joined the Occupy 
Movement at its inception and thereafter recorded thousands of hours of event footage 
accompanied by his own critical commentary. His feeds of events such as marches on 
Wall Street and the eviction of Occupy from Zuccotti Park have been rebroadcast around 
the world, appearing via numerous news outlets such as NBC, Al Jazeera, and Time. His 
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streams therefore provide an outstanding example of what Raley calls “tactical media,” 
provided that such media “records a memory of performance” (12), in this case, a series 
of activist demonstrations/occupations striving to draw attention to economic inequality 
and social injustice. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Timothy Pool, Occupy Wall Street Cameraman. 
 
 Zeroing in on the complex questions of Pool’s “prosthetic” relationship to his 
camera, its transformation of memory’s structure, and the archival hyper-extension it 
enables, one can begin with Massumi’s intriguing observation that “[the] body and its 
objects [are] prostheses of each other, and . . . matter itself [is] prosthetic” (127). Thus, 
not only is the camera a prosthetic extension of Pool’s memory, but his own memory is a 
prosthetic extension of the camera’s recording capabilities. In support of this uncanny 
observation, Hayles notes that “the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original 
prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other 
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prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born” (3). This 
is not to suggest that the (singular) body is a fleshly prosthesis of some originary “self” or 
“soul,”47 but rather that the body and its functions—like memory—are machinic and can 
only function in relation to other machines that form connections with them (such as 
other bodies, devices, and so on). In other words, a prosthesis does not replace something 
more “original” or “pure,” but is on ontological par with what it replaces or extends, and 
the prosthetic relation is bi-directional in that what the prosthesis connects with becomes 
a prosthesis of the prosthesis. This is why Hayles contends that “the posthuman view 
configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent 
machines” (3), such as when a camera’s recordings and Pool’s memory become 
prostheses of one another. However, one must exercise caution here, because Hayles’ 
idea is not at all tantamount to what Brook describes as “the cyberpunk fantasy that 
suggests we will someday be able to leave our physical selves behind for cyberspace” 
(“Forgetting “781), in other words, that hyper-extension of memory online through 
prosthetic devices presages the futuristic archiving of human existence entirely in digital 
reality. Rather, as Hayles herself notes, “it is not a question of leaving the body behind 
but rather of extending embodied awareness in highly specific, local, and material ways 
that would be impossible without electronic prosthesis” (290-291)—such as when Pool 
                                                 
47 Rather than implying the existence of an enduring “self” or “soul,” Avital Ronell contends that 
“[t]he prosthesis, capable of surviving the body which it in part replaces, acts already as commemorative 
monument to the dissolution of a mortal coil” (89). This is to say that the prosthesis is instead a 
“monumental” indicator of mortality and finitude, the inevitability of death. Itself. 
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extends his perception-recollection of activist events/practices via streaming video to 
thousands of viewers. 
 Beyond the observation that one can hyper-extend memory onto a digital plane 
via relationships to archival machines/prostheses, along with the notion that such 
relations are bi-directional, what does it look like more specifically when streaming video 
extends the memory of subjects beyond their typical parameters? For instance, what does 
the “seamless” integration of a subject’s memory and a camera’s recordings look like? In 
order to answer this question, one can return to Bergson, who writes: “there is no 
perception which is not full of memories. With the immediate and present data of our 
senses we mingle a thousand details out of our past experience” (24). For Bergson, 
whenever one has an experience, this seemingly “live” perception is already saturated 
with myriad recollections that provide the structural conditions of possibility for said 
experience (hence the hyphenated term “perception-recollection”48). This is one reason 
why Bergson contends that memory is produced with a “view to utility” (70), because 
“memory” is constantly interposing itself into “experience” in order to produce it and 
yield certain situational responses. Significantly, one can find an uncanny instance of this 
interpenetration of perception and recollection by looking at Pool’s relationship to his 
camera. For as Pool’s camera rolls, capturing activists in the process of vocalizing dissent 
                                                 
48 Bergson illuminates the concept of “perception-recollection” through his remark that “any 
memory-image that is capable of interpreting our actual perception inserts itself so thoroughly into it that 
we are no long able to discern what is perception and what is memory” (125). So in any “experience,” one 
is never certain what part of the assemblage is memory from the past or a “memory of the ‘present.’” 
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at the hegemony of Capital and Empire, Pool is also typically providing commentary. 
Thus, as the camera’s recordings function as “perceptions” of activist events, ones 
intimately connected to/extending Pool’s own “perceptions,” Pool’s commentary 
interpenetrates the camera’s recordings; his own memory (especially as it is produced by 
discourse) “completes” the camera’s memory as it is broadcast to a multitude of other 
subjects. In other words, by the time one watches streaming video of Pool’s Occupy 
feeds, one is watching a “seamlessly” interwoven assemblage of the camera’s recordings 
(an extension of Pool’s gaze) as it is combined with Pool’s memory of the scene 
articulated in discourse. Pool’s memory and the camera’s recordings become thoroughly 
contaminated with one another as they hyper-extend toward other subjects, and these 
subjects are reproduced by this hybrid memory as they watch the feed. The memory of 
these subjects is thus technologically iterated as well. 
 Before moving forward, I want to say some more about the reconceptualization of 
subjectivity Pool’s prosthetic memory extension entails. For Pool’s feeds not only have 
the power to reproduce subjectivities, mobilizing them by providing audio-visual access 
to harrowing events. The hyper-extension of Pool’s memory implies a 
reconceptualization of the nature of subjectivity as such; it entails the existence of 
cyborg-subjects whose memory, Ronell explains, “recode the philosophical opposition of 
life/death, body/machine” (89). Indeed, that Pool “seamlessly” integrates his memory 
with that of a machine, and that viewers of Pool’s archival stream link up to the flow that 
this integration produces, suggests that memory is deeply machinic and 
technological/rhetorical. At the beginning of the chapter, I discussed this idea from a 
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theoretical angle, but I want now to take it up from another given that it has a distinctly 
ethico-political ramification. 
Initially, I argued that memory is inescapably related to technicity and rhetoricity, 
and that one should critique the notion that memory is an “immediate” encounter with 
events. However, what else does it suggest about subjectivity if memory is machinic, or 
as Colebrook argues, that “[t]here is no aspect of life that is not machinic; all life only 
works and is insofar as it connects with some other machine” (56)? Briefly, what I think 
Colebrook’s point entails is that memory is never spontaneous or self-generating; in order 
for memory to function and guide a subject’s behavior, it must first have a specific 
program. Or as Deleuze and Guattari put it, “every machine has a sort of code built into 
it, stored up inside it” (Anti-Oedipus 38). For instance, in order for a subject to be capable 
of inventing or communicating something of value within the current political economy, 
this subject must first have its memory “programmed” with a certain code (via 
education), and must access specific communicative channels (via analog social 
networks). Indeed, as Derrida explains, “the machine does not run by itself” (Writing 
227), and so without the machinic programming/coding of memory or its linking up with 
specific networks, subjects will never miraculously become “productive members of 
society,” nor become capable of “pulling up their bootstraps.” In other words, to expect a 
machine to suddenly and spontaneously become capable of anything without being given 
the memory-programming and connections to do so first is pure mystification. This is 
why Hayles points out that: 
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[T]he posthuman does not really mean the end of humanity. It signals 
instead the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that 
may have applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who has the wealth, 
power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings 
exercising their will through individual agency and choice. (286) 
In other words, if one takes up the posthuman position that memory is a machine, this 
does not imply some pessimistic or deterministic view of human behavior. Instead, it 
highlights the misguided audacity in claiming that it is through individual “will” and hard 
work that subjects move beyond their socio-economic positions. For without the proper 
“programming” of memory through pedagogical means, or the linking up of memory 
through analog social networks, the cyborg-subject has no hope of ever becoming 
more/other than it is.49 Indeed, it is only through a prior programming that invention and 
innovation are possible; the potential/hope for difference always requires a repetition. 
MEME-ORY: RIP, MIX, BURN (REPEAT) 
 
In this section, I want to look at one final instance of the digital hyper-
extension/restructuration of memory and the re-productions of subjectivity it entails—
archived “viral” memes and the inventive/collaborative processes of “rip-mix-burn” by 
which they come into existence. A “meme” is an image or other media that spreads 
                                                 
49 As Colebrook notes, “[a] machinic becoming makes a connection with what is not itself in order 
to transform and maximize itself” (57). So without its connections (as well as memory “programming”), the 
cyborg-subject has no hope of ever becoming more/other than it is. 
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across the Internet by being repeatedly reposted and archived on sites like Twitter, 
Facebook, tumblr., and so on. During the process of being repeated/reposted, there is 
typically a transformation of the meme as it spreads, for instance, by changing the 
“foreground” texts that accompany a particular “background” image. A meme is 
therefore a ceaselessly evolving digital memory-image that is the result of productive, 
mutative differences. Hence the term “meme” itself, which derives from the ancient 
Greek word mimeme, meaning “something imitated,” a term that inspired evolutionary 
biologist Richard Dawkins to devise the term “meme” in order to conceptualize the 
spread of cultural artifacts (“Internet Meme” N.p.). So just as a gene is a form of 
biological memory that spreads throughout a population, repeated with differences each 
successive generation, a meme operates according to a similar generative principle, 
though online—leading to my development of the neologism “meme-ory.” 
 However, how does a meme indicate an artifact/event where a subject is produced 
by “hyper-extending” memory online, and in doing so transforms memory’s structure 
(and content) along with reproducing the subjectivities of those who view it? In other 
words, why employ the term “meme-ory,” what characterizes “rip-mix-burn” processes, 
and how are these processes persuasive? Reid provides an insightful series of answers to 
such questions, so I will begin with his observation in The Two Virtuals that: “[t]he 
topological unfolding of thought is a . . . process in which cognitive content is ‘ripped’ 
from materiality via sensory organs, ‘mixed’ with other content including memory, and 
‘burned’ into language at the conscious level” (130). What Reid means here is that the 
rip-mix-burn process is a useful image for conceptualizing rhetorical invention as such 
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(especially regarding the necessity of archives/memory), and so is “not simply about new 
media composition” (157). The process begins when subjectivity is produced through 
initially recording an experience, and in Bergsonian fashion, this initial recording gets 
combined with an existing “whole” of memory. In turn, a new memory is formed and 
articulated in language or other rhetorics, and is archived on diverse media both online 
and off. Moreover, when a subject is produced by hyper-extending “burned” memory 
onto a digital plane, say, on social media websites, other subjects can then re-initiate the 
inventional process by “ripping” the burned digital media, combining (“mixing”) it with 
other media/memory, and “burning” once more in the form of media that evinces 
memory’s inherently collaborative and inter-relational structure.50 
 I want now to introduce an example that should help clarify the forces/processes 
at issue, for I am interested in showing how through the archivization of memes (or 
“meme-ory”) that a subject’s memory can be hyper-extended/metamorphosed, and 
radically transform itself and others through the collaborative processes of rip-mix-burn. 
On November 18, 2011, at the University of California, Davis, student Occupy activists 
responded to the destruction of their on-campus encampment and the arrests of protesters 
by sitting in a busy pathway with locked arms so as to hamper police movement through 
the area. Incensed with the blockade, Lieutenant John Pike of the UCD-PD proceeded to 
                                                 
50 Regarding archives, Haskins argues that “[i]t is one thing to collect and digitize large quantities 
of memorial artifacts; it is quite another to display them in ways that stimulate not only spectatorship but 
also meaningful participation” (408). In step, I would argue that collaboratively-produced memes are an 
excellent example of archives that simulate participation. 
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unload a can of military-grade pepper spray directly into the faces of the sitting students 
to shouts of “Shame on you!” The pepper-sprayed students were then torn from the 
ground and arrested (unable to wash their faces), and some were even dragged away 
unconscious. Lawsuits later followed that resulted in students winning a significant 
settlement. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Lieutenant Pike Pepper Sprays UC-Davis Students. 
 
 With regard to the initial scene of the UC-Davis incident, one can see the process 
of “rip-mix-burn” taking place, even prior to the above image becoming part of an 
explicitly machinic/digital online process involving the hyper-extension of memory. 
Concerning the initial “rip,” as Reid notes, “[such] is the act of the sensorium, of 
exposure to an outside” (N.p.), so in the case above, this entails exposure to the pepper-
spraying incident and the subject’s sensory recordings of it. After this initial 
rip/recording, the experience of the event is assembled with affect, discourse, and other 
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forces, such that the ripped image is “opened up,” so to speak, as one considers the nearly 
endless assemblages it might eventually produce. For instance, consider Jeff Rice’s 
observation that “[t]he pepper-spray photograph brings together a present-time image . . . 
with a series of images not present” (367). Finally, a new perception-recollection image 
is born as it “burned” into a fresh assemblage, thus becoming an object “capable of 
establishing [its] own interactions” (Reid N.p.). This newly burned memory 
image/assemblage has the power re-produce subjectivity, whether one considers the force 
of the Pike image to discourage dissent via “burning in” a “mnemotechnical” 
(Nietzschean) regard for pain (See Breaking Up 172, 201), or via the image’s capacity to 
inspire future rebellion and resistance to apparatuses of discipline and control. 
 However, after an initially analog, though still thoroughly 
“technological”/“machinic” process of rip-mix-burn (as the UC-Davis event is 
remembered/recorded by subjects and cameras), what happens once memory of the 
“event” is ultimately hyper-extended via digital archivization? In the case of the UC-
Davis incident specifically, after various subjects uploaded images of Lt. Pike pepper-
spraying the student Occupiers, something intriguing occurred regarding the process of 
rip-mix-burn. In retribution for the flagrant brutality of Pike’s action, subjects 
sympathetic with the Occupy Movement began “ripping” Pike’s image from its original 
context, only to inventively “mix” it with new contexts and “burn”/archive new images to 
significant rhetorical effect. After this occurred dozens of times, the result was a full-
blown archive christened the “Causally Pepper-Spray Everything Cop Meme”—an 
archive that Rice points out, invokes “a collective memory regarding protest, . . . a 
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network—the association and connection of various agents outside of the image itself, 
but present in collective memory so that enthymemic moments occur” (367). For 
example, in one specific case archived on the “Cop Meme,” a subject took a recorded 
image of the Pike event that had been uploaded (“burned”), and then Photoshopped 
(“ripped”) Lt. Pike’s image out of it. The subject then took Pike’s image and via some 
inventive “mixing” placed it directly in the middle of John Trumbull’s famous painting 
The Declaration of Independence (1776). The result is a newly “burned”/archived image, 
where the initially recorded image of the UC-Davis event became metamorphosed and re-
extended, while infused with the power to reproduce subjectivity. And this reproduction 
of subjectivity is a complex one, due not only to its capacity to politically mobilize 
subjects through a visual rhetorical appeal/enthymeme regarding activism and police 
brutality (recalling an extensive collective memory of American and global protest), but 
enacts a cultural “working through” of trauma via a series of humorous repetitions.  
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Fig. 5. Lieutenant Pike Pepper Sprays the US Constitution. 
 
 With regard to subjectivity’s reproduction as evidenced by specific political 
mobilizations, the remixed Pike image shows how, through a subject uploading or hyper-
extending its memory, other subjects can “mix” or “riff on” this memory so as to produce 
a new (counter-) memory that can incite action. As I have suggested, this rip-mix-burn 
process occurs both online and off, scrambling the distinction between “live” and 
“machinic” memory. As per why remixing memory is so rhetorically effective, though, 
Lawrence Lessig argues that: “For anyone who has lived in our era, a mix of images and 
sounds makes its point far more powerfully than any eight-hundred-word essay in the 
New York Times could. . . . It doesn’t assert the truth. It shows it. And once it is shown, 
no one can escape its mimetic effect” (100). In other words, rather than simply state: “Lt. 
Pike stands as a quintessential figure of repression and the horrors of excessive police 
force,” one shows this (or something like it) through a plethora of media until it sticks, 
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and one does so by repeatedly hyper-extending/metamorphosing specific subjects’ 
memories in order to produce multitudes of equally politically-outraged subjects.51 
Remixes/memes thus have significant force when it comes to persuasively transforming 
the subjectivity of subjects and spurring them to adopt specific socio-political views, and 
they attain this force not only through a metamorphic extension and mutation of memory, 
but through the power of repetition itself. 
Indeed, it is worth highlighting that the rhetorical force of remixing hyper-
extended/archived memory, a force that comes especially to the fore in the case of 
memes, accumulates via repetition, and this is significant given that repetition can 
gradually transform subjectivity by easing the sting of trauma. As Deleuze notes, “[a]ll 
cure is a voyage to the bottom of repetition” (Difference 19), and this means repeatedly 
installing oneself in the past through the vehicle of memory in order to confront what has 
occurred. As an instance of this form of therapeutic repetition, consider that through the 
“Cop Meme” repeating Pike’s image in dozens of different contexts (such as in The 
Wizard of Oz, on the cover of Pink Floyd’s Dark Side of the Moon, in the ring with 
Muhammad Ali, and so on), one facilitates repeated exposure to an event that might 
otherwise be too traumatic to face. Thus, the remixing of hyper-extended/archived 
                                                 
51 As Lessig notes, “[r]emix is also and often . . . a strategy to excite ‘interest-based learning’” 
(106), so part of remixing’s value is found in its pedagogical efficacy. For although one could certainly 
discuss with students memes/the UC-Davis event without the “Pepper-Spray Cop Meme,” the meme-
archive and those like it can draw students in more effectively and ignite the reproduction of subjectivity 
that effective learning entails. 
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memory is a potentially therapeutic undertaking, one with the power to heal specific (sub-
)cultures/multitudes. And although one might suggest, following Freud, that such overtly-
humorous undertakings are mere sublimations meant to mask/efface the traumatic event, 
there is also another way to view them, particularly with regard to Nietzsche’s conception 
of affirmative forgetting. 
As Vivian notes, “[r]epetition . . . reveals the pervasive work of communal 
forgetting in producing cultural forms of memory and the material practices that 
perpetuate them” (114). This is to suggest, for instance, that by repeating Pike’s image 
again and again, remixing the hyper-extended, digitized memory of his violence, this 
undertaking opens up the possibility for “forgetting” such violence in the sense of re-
describing it, re-thinking it, and keeping its question open in such a way that might 
produce a healthier attitude toward it. In other words, the digital remixing of memory 
(which includes forgetting as a process) reveals how pliant memory is in general, how 
open it is to processes of revision that allow one to adopt new (perhaps more 
affirmative—that is the hope) attitudes towards events. Or as Vivian puts it, such 
repetition/“forgetting” allows one to “forget the past in order to repeat its mythic 
invention” (117). This does not mean, for example, forgetting the UC-Davis event so as 
to relegate it to oblivion, but rather, that via the repetition of remixed memory one might 
“forget” the event as it was initially “burned,” freeing it up such that it might be “re-
burned” and repurposed. Such is the differential power of “forgetting” entailed in 
repetition, and it is thus to forgetting that I now turn. 
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DIGITAL FORGETTING AND THE RISK/PROMISE OF NETWORKED MULTITUDES 
 
After discussing multiple cases wherein subjects were produced by hyper-
extensively archiving memory on a digital plane, thereby reproducing subjectivities, I 
will conclude the chapter by analyzing what happens when subjects are produced via an-
archivally “retracting”52 memory, that is, what happens when they “delete” or “forget.” 
What I am interested in specifically is an active forgetting, a forgetting that one 
assertively pursues and is not merely a by-product of one’s online undertakings.53 I will 
also show how the need for an-archivization or “forgetting” often comes about due to 
digital memory’s dangers. However, I will conclude by arguing that in the face of danger 
certain forms of digital archival connectivity are worth the risk, as they initiate the 
formation of networked multitudes of subjectivities with the power to achieve significant 
social and political ends. 
 Regarding the need for an-archivization to accompany strategies for remembering 
online, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger points out that, “[t]oday, with the help of widespread 
                                                 
52 By employing/developing the term “retraction,” I mean to introduce a mate for Bergson’s 
concept of “contraction,” the process whereby memory is formed with regard to a subject’s interests. 
53 Another pitfall worth pointing out is the hubris entailed in believing oneself a master of 
technology, that is, that one can simply withdraw from technology through an act of will. As Davis points 
out, this is problematic because “[w]e do not possess technology; on the contrary, it is in modern 
technology that we are dispossessed. Human Being is possessed by technology inasmuch as technology has 
begun to bring the human into Being” (Breaking 120). In other words, techno-resistance requires struggle, 
especially as technology increasingly produces one’s subjectivity and existence. 
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technology, forgetting has become the exception, and remembering the default” (2). 
Unfortunately, this ubiquity of remembering via the power of digital media and other 
technologies is far from wholly benign. For as Mayer-Schönberger explains, memory’s 
pervasiveness unfortunately leads not only to a glut of information where one finds 
oneself lost in a sea of data, but more importantly, it can lead to a frightening degree of 
Orwellian surveillance the likes of which has never been seen before, where a significant 
portion of one’s life is exposed to the eyes of others and held up to scrutiny. 
Although I will focus here primarily on the question of forgetting in relation to 
surveillance, it is worth turning briefly to Brooke’s remarks on memory and the problem 
of information overload. He notes that: “[i]n the face of this immense knowledge, and at 
a time when there is so much we can know, we must begin to ask the question of how 
much we should know. A posthuman rhetoric should prove indispensible to us as we 
form such a question” (“Forgetting” 792). Through his remark, Brooke highlights the 
need for “forgetting” with regard to accessing too much information, and he suggests 
specific transformations in subjectivity that come about when subjects retract memory 
from digital spaces in response to this problem. For example, following Hayles, he 
analyzes the concept of “persistence” (an abbreviation for “the persistence of cognition”), 
and discusses how, instead of trying to take in everything, a subject can actively permit 
itself to “forget” certain portions of what it perceives-recollects online by forming 
patterns or making useful generalizations (Lingua 156-157). Thus, through an-archiving 
practices, that is, “forgetting” or the refusal of memory, a subject is produced via the 
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discerning collection of information, and more adept at getting the gist of an event as it is 
recorded online on numerous sites. 
 Beyond concerns regarding overload, however, an-archivization or “forgetting to 
become posthuman,” as Brooke puts it, has revolutionary implications involving 
resistance to surveillance and control. Indeed, it appears that the subject who retracts 
memory from a digital plane often increasingly has the power to elude punishment and 
coercion by, if one will forgive the Deleuzian pun, “becoming-imperceptible.” According 
to Mayer-Schönberger, such a becoming is important because “[w]ith digital memory, a 
significant part of one’s remaining power over information dissipates and is redistributed 
to the millions with network access” (102). In other words, just as the hyper-extension of 
memory can evoke the production of revolutionary forces like swarms, archives can 
spread one’s information to those who have no desire to see transformations to the 
existing order and may actively resist social reform/resistance. For instance, Mayer-
Schönberger points out that: 
Instead of protecting citizens from overbearing surveillance and memory, 
policy makers are compelling private sector data collectors to perfect the 
digital memory of all of us, and keep it easily accessible for public 
agencies from the intelligence community to law enforcement. (9) 
Indeed, through arrangements between the political sphere and corporate sphere, memory 
has become a commodity given that information on users has significant exchange-value. 
What this means, therefore, is that rather than protecting privacy rights, practically every 
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move a subject makes online is archived,54 and is archived so as to suit the ends of 
Capital and control via law enforcement. What this means in turn, then, is that the subject 
who retracts its memory from digital spaces becomes increasing “imperceptible,” and less 
likely to feel the sting of economic exploitation or the anxiety of being watched. In other 
words, at least in some important sense, an “imperceptible” subject is also a “free” 
subject. This is obviously important, for as Mayer-Schönberger notes, “[i]f we replace the 
trust in our past with the trust in digital memory, dictatorial regimes will no longer have 
to control our minds. Controlling the externalized memory of our collective past will 
suffice” (121). So in this instance, “forgetting” or an-archival processes take on an 
increased exigency, especially since Mayer-Schönberger suggests that only a few isolated 
subjects becoming-imperceptible is not enough; a more over-arching “forgetting” is 
necessary with regard to digital memory in order to elude the horrors of fascism and 
authoritarianism. 
 As an instance of the desire for digital “forgetting” and an-archiving, and as an 
instance of the potential transformations of subjectivity it can bring about, consider the 
                                                 
54  Regarding the archivization of practically every move a subject makes online, Mayer-
Schönberger points out that: “[i]f Foucault were still alive today, he would certainly write about digital 
remembering as an effective mechanism of panoptic control, both supporting the control in hierarchical 
organizations and societies, as well as finding support in them, thus cementing and deepening the existing 
(unequal) distribution of power” (112). In other words, the hyper-extension of memory opens one up to 
increasing surveillance, and this allows draconian mechanisms of control to maintain their grip and 
reinforce existing power-relations. 
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wide-spread outcry on January 18
th
, 2012, against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) 
and the Protect IP Act (PIPA). Many perceived these pieces of legislation as facilitating 
overreaching Web surveillance in the name of catching copyright violators and as having 
the potential to promote the censorship of websites without due process. Thus, actions 
against SOPA and PIPA marked the largest Internet protest in history, and over one 
billion users viewed anti-SOPA messages on January 18
th
, 2012. Over a hundred 
thousand websites supported the protest including Google,55 Craigslist, Wordpress, 
Pintrest, Flickr, and Wikipedia, and over fifty thousand blocked access to their websites 
through content “blackouts.” In other words, the event entailed the most massive desire 
for an-archivization (or “forgetting”) in history, and perhaps the most forceful wish for 
the multitude to become-imperceptible. 
 
                                                 
55 In a sense, it is ironic that sites like Google participated in the SOPA and PIPA protests, given 
that they themselves operate as agents of surveillance. For as Mayer-Schönberger points out, “[i]n the 
spring of 2007, Google conceded that until then it had stored every single search query entered by one of its 
users, and every single search result a user subsequently clicked on to access it” (6). 
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Fig. 6. Wikipedia Protests SOPA and PIPA on its Homepage. 
 
Moreover, it appears that through the desire for an-archivization and/or 
“forgetting” the wide-spread protests of SOPA and PIPA entailed significant 
reproductions of global subjectivity. For as anti-SOPA and anti-PIPA actions spread 
across the Web, this movement seemed to feed (as well as be fed by) the revolutionary 
fire that was spreading not only throughout the US, but around the world, due to global 
protest movements like Occupy and others. In other words, given the act of dissent or 
refusal that so many engaged in during the Internet protests, this collective desire for an-
archivization or “the right to be forgotten” seemed to provide a springboard that 
facilitated subjects across the globe to get increasingly interested/involved in the broader 
protest movements that were already taking place. In short, here the want for “forgetting” 
produced a multitude of subjects with increasingly revolutionary aspirations. 
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 In conclusion, therefore, I want to take up the question of revolutionary 
aspirations, and contend that although the ubiquity of digital memory/archives has left 
subjects increasingly open to surveillance and control, exposing oneself to these forces 
often seems indispensable if one is to enact social and political change. Moreover, 
although this exposure to power is frightening,56 one can rest assured that one will not 
have to endure it alone, for in order to affect widespread transformations, memory will 
have to become increasingly networked in its archival hyper-extensions. What such 
networked archival formations look like, however, how they deploy both 
memory/archiving and forgetting/an-archiving in the service of building a new world, is 
in question. Yet it is a pressing ethico-political question that calls one to take it up, even 
in the face of terrible danger, and thus one hears the faint echo of Martin Heidegger 
whispering: “The closer we come to danger, the more brightly do the ways into the 
saving power [of technology] begin to shine and the more questioning we become” (35). 
 Along these lines, Hardt and Negri’s thoughts on the networked formation of the 
political multitude are instructive. They write that “[t]he multitude . . . might thus be 
conceived as a network: an open and expansive network in which all differences can be 
expressed freely and equally, a network that provides the means of encounter so that we 
                                                 
56 Regarding the frightening power of digital surveillance/memory, Campbell mentions how 
during the Egyptian Revolution “[s]ome commentators wondered if social media, instead of being an 
organizing tool for the youth, was perhaps also tipping off the police” (44). And he adds that at the height 
of the Egyptian Revolution itself, “[t]he level of fear and paranoia was palpable amongst protesters because 
they feared infiltration from Government via social media. They knew they were being tracked” (142). 
  166 
can work and live in common” (Multitude xiv). Although it is unclear here whether Hardt 
and Negri are talking about a network of analog (singular) bodies or how these bodies 
might hyper-extensively interact on a digital plane, what matters is that the image of the 
network as a space for freely expressing difference and producing wealth without 
exploitation is inspirational; it provides a vision of what archival nodes connecting in 
rhizomatic fashion might be capable of becoming. Indeed, as T.V. Reid points out, 
“[s]ome activists suggest that the structure of the network is itself a model of what 
‘globalization from below’ might look like” (271), a model where the archiving of 
memory transforms subjects so as to be capable of new relations of communication and 
production, and where “the external boundaries of the network are open such that new 
nodes and new relationships can always be added” (Multitude xv). Moreover, if the need 
arises in order to confront a particular oppositional power (or powers), portions of the 
network can “become-imperceptible,” that is, become an-archivally “forgotten” so as to 
elude control. For as Hardt and Negri note: 
Since it has no center and almost any portion can operate as an 
autonomous whole, the network can continue to function even when part 
of it has been destroyed. The same design element that ensures survival, 
the decentralization, is also what makes control of the network so difficult. 
(299) 
So whether it is a question of subjectivities linking up through digital archives (via social 
networks) in order to express differences or produce wealth, or regards subjectivities an-
archivally “deleting” themselves in order to elude control, such processes contain more 
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than a grain of revolutionary potential, perhaps even a “saving power,” whatever shape it 
might take. 
 As per what shape(s) a multitudinous archival formation might take, however, this 
question has only been recently raised and so it is important not to foreclose upon it. This 
is especially the case because as Ulmer points out, “[t]here is no inevitability, no 
technological determinism leading to some dystopian (or utopian) future social 
condition” (Heuretics 23).57 That is, there is no guarantee that such networked archival 
formations entail something ultimately desirable. Perhaps all one can do, then, is point 
out how archives/an-archivization, when functioning as “tactical media,” “gestur[e] only 
obliquely toward a better world in the future” (Raley 27), and recall that this “better 
world” will not come about all at once in a grand moment of eschatological spectacle 
(46). So if one desires to keep the question concerning digital archives and the 
revolutionary hyper-extension of memory open, one must expose oneself to a future that 
is radically unforeseeable. For as Derrida notes, “the question of the archive is not, we 
repeat, a question of the past . . . It is a question of the future, the question of the future 
itself, the question of a response, of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow” 
(Archive 36). Thus, I log off with an ear cocked to the future, recalling the promise of its 
                                                 
57 T.V. Reid echoes Ulmer’s ambivalence regarding technological futures when he explains that: 
Activists are not among the naïve utopian technological determinists who see the Internet 
as the world’s savior. Rather, they see it as a site of struggle where with mobility, 
flexibility, imagination, and daring they may actually have some tactical advantage over 
their stodgy, bureaucracy-bound opponents. (277) 
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radical indetermination, and the future of the archive as it is radically to come, 
indeterminate, unknowable (70, 72). For what the networked archive and the 
corresponding archive of subjectivity might event/ually become, it is impossible to say, 
but nevertheless, it will surely become.  
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Chapter #4 – Stiller Than Still: Monumental Bodies and the Challenge 
of Common Memory 
[E]verything must metamorphose into a thing in order to break the catastrophic 
spell of things.  
-- Theodor Adorno, “A Portrait of Walter Benjamin” 
 
All that is general or public must be reappropriated and managed by the multitude 
and thus become common. 
-- Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude 
 
Today, in both rhetorical studies and memory studies, when one sets out to 
investigate memory in its “collective,” “social,” “communal” or generally shared forms, 
one typically encounters two distinct limitations. First, an interest in monuments mostly 
leaves one investigating statues, memorials, and other “permanent” structures made of 
stone, steel, and so on, and second, these studies have little recourse to any other 
discourses besides those of public memory. These methodological/discursive limitations 
are unfortunate because they leave one ill-equipped to consider the “monumental” 
rhetorical effects that (singular) bodies engaged in specific visual, social practices or 
certain temporary structures are capable of producing. Moreover, such limits cloud one’s 
eyes to the possibility that if one is not talking about so-called “private” or “personal” 
remembrance, there may yet exist another option for describing such events beyond the 
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discourses of public memory. The epigraphs above are therefore intended to indicate a 
new way forward—a line of flight—within the rhetoric of memory studies. Adorno 
suggests that not only can a body or temporary structure “become-monumental,” emitting 
the rhetorical effects of a monument (a thing), but he highlights the ethico-political 
exigency for doing so; that is, to protest the “catastrophic” objectification and 
commodification of all life and being. In turn, Hardt and Negri suggest a novel way to 
describe the event of becoming-monumental by deploying the rhetoric of “the common,” 
a complex concept that has nothing to do with sameness or identification, but rather, the 
production of places and spaces, zones or territories, wherein bodies can democratically 
organize and articulate their recollected experiences and differences freed from the fetters 
of political figures or monuments that profess to represent them. Thus, in what follows, I 
contend that one can radicalize/maximize the concept of monumentality to include bodies 
engaged in specific visual, social practices along with the temporary/vernacular structures 
these bodies sometimes produce. And moreover, that in their “monumental” expressions, 
bodies can engage in a democratic, participatory, and difference-based production of 
“common” memory, dramatically contrasting traditional notions of collective memory 
propelled by the “old opposition between the private and the public” (Multitude 205). 
The following analysis is therefore an attempt to ascend at least two plateaus: 
first, to expand and radicalize the discourses surrounding monumentality/ “public-ness” 
for rhetorical and philosophical purposes, and second, to re-deploy such newly 
invigorated discourses for ethico-political reasons concerning social and economic 
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justice. Communications theorist Grant David Bollmer suggests the need for these types 
of inter/ventions when he writes that: 
[q]uite often memory serves as a category of individualistic experience 
unable to articulate a collective politics or social struggle . . . except for 
the ‘authenticity’ of representing the past and the production of revisionist 
histories, the debate over the politics of memory is problematic. (451) 
Thus, Bollmer suggests it is imperative to experiment with the possibilities that might 
open up when one develops or applies memory-oriented concepts apart from a concern 
for historical truth and the authenticity of perception-recollection. And although G. 
Mitchell Reyes justifiably warns that while doing so one should affirm “the becoming of 
memory” rather than “treat mnemonic practice as an object, transforming the action-
oriented practices of remembrance into artifacts” (236), perhaps one can deconstruct the 
opposition at issue here by parsing out the “artifactual” or “monumental” effects that 
action-oriented practices produce, while explaining how every event of “becoming-
monumental” exceeds its monumentality by virtue of its singularity or alterity.58 
Moreover, as I will show, this double-movement of monumentality and becoming comes 
to the fore when contrasting “public” and “common” memory, especially when 
                                                 
58 As Hardt and Negri suggest, one effect of bodies “becoming-monumental” involves the 
“production of subjectivity through the common” (Commonwealth 300), or in my terms, the production of 
subjectivity through “common” memory, which entails that memory is productive of subjectivity rather 
than the converse. 
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highlighting how “common” memory is linked to action in the form of non-
representational democratic practices striving to articulate radically divergent views. 
ON BECOMING-MONUMENTAL (BECOMING-CENTAURIAN) 
 
 In this initial section, I argue one can maximize/radicalize the concept of 
monumentality to include bodies engaged in specific visual, social practices along with 
the vernacular/temporary structures they often produce. This contention is important not 
only because it lays the ground for thinking “common” memory, but entails 
metamorphosing the concept of monumentality by linking it to aesthetic performance 
broadly construed, inverting the traditional relationship between monuments and time (by 
relating them to futures), and reconceiving the destruction or removal of specific 
bodies/structures themselves. Furthermore, I contend that although certain 
bodies/structures performatively function as monuments, these figures are “exceeded” by 
the singularity or alterity of the body/structure itself. So although bodies/structures can 
undergo a “becoming-monumental,” emitting the effects of monuments, one cannot 
reduce them to their monumental (rhetorical-hermeneutic) expressions. 
 The first important contention to support here is how someone or something not 
made of stone, steel, or other “solid” materials (or not displayed upon a pedestal or in a 
space of visio-spatial prominence) can qualify as a monument. Do monuments not 
produce rhetorical effects through maintaining an appearance of permanence, power, and 
prestige? In contrast to this traditional conception of monumentality, philosopher Edward 
Casey remarks that although it seems “[shared] memory requires the density of stone to 
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mark and remark it,” monumental inscriptions do not require “tenacious media such as 
stone or brick” and therefore are “not dependent upon them” (18). This notion becomes 
clearer, for example, when one considers the effects of a performative “happening,” such 
as when artists position bodies in aesthetic configurations or build structures that only 
remain in place for mere hours, days, or weeks. Although they are far from permanent 
installments, these aesthetic forces have the power to produce striking and enduring 
memory. Along these same lines, Mitchell argues the activist practice(s) of demonstration 
and/or occupation “is itself an artistic practice” (23), one that constitutes a kind of “social 
sculpture” or “social architecture” (25). Mitchell’s contention is borne out whether one 
considers the memory produced by viewing the bodies of activists standing on street 
corners or in city parks, or whether one considers the temporary structures they often 
erect such as shanties and tents (or banners and aesthetic media). This idea becomes even 
more apparent when the bodies in question stand relatively still or when temporary living 
structures become an enduring part of cityscapes such that one passes by and views them 
on a daily basis for weeks or months. When this occurs, their visual rhetorical effects 
become comparable to the “official” statues or “permanent” structures that often flank 
them; their temporary nature does not diminish their memorable and “monumental” 
quality. 
 Significantly, if one re-conceptualizes certain bodies and temporary structures as 
emitting monumental effects, for instance, through connections with aesthetic 
performance or activist demonstrations and/or occupations, this entails an inversion of the 
traditional relationship between monuments and time. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, 
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“every work of art is a monument, but here the monument is not something 
commemorating a past, it is a bloc of present sensations that owe their preservation only 
to themselves and that provide the event with the compound that celebrates it” (166-167). 
In other words, not only do monumental bodies function as non-representational figures, 
they co-memorate events as they are taking place and demand attunement to the potential 
futures such events might contain.59 Furthermore, this metamorphosis of the monument 
into something future-oriented is what leads Deleuze and Guattari to connect them to the 
non-representational aesthetic performance entailed in activist practice: 
A monument does not commemorate or celebrate something that 
happened but confides to the ear of the future the persistent sensations that 
embody the event: the constantly renewed suffering of men and women, 
their re-created protestations, their constantly resumed struggle. (176-177) 
For Deleuze and Guattari, monuments are directed toward potential futures rather than 
calcified pasts, and what christens such monuments as monuments is memorialization of 
currently unfolding events that have the capacity (like art) for producing new futures (or, 
as Deleuze and Guattari say, “new peoples” and “new earths”). Such monuments vocalize 
resistance and the struggle against exploitation and control. 
                                                 
59 Observations regarding the commemoration of events as they are taking place support Casey’s 
argument that it is misguided to claim “the present is of no compelling interest in public memory. Often it 
is: the present in the making, the present that is now, is considered to be [of] central significance in the 
future” (18-19). 
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Anthropologist Michael Taussig makes a similar observation concerning the 
monumentalization of the “present”/future through bodies articulating struggles, and he 
does so by linking such memory-practices to the demonstrations/occupations of Occupy 
Movement activists. Taussig states he “was struck by the statuesque quality of many of 
the people holding up their handmade signs, like centaurs, half person, half sign . . . [a] 
stiller-than-still conjunction” (75). And he notes that “this centaurlike quality and stiller-
than-still stillness—this terrible gravitas occurs because the sign holder is posing for 
photographers, or, rather, the sign is being made to pose for photographers” (76). In other 
words, through a “becoming-monumental,” emitting the rhetorical effects of a 
monument, activist bodies metamorphose themselves into objects of spectacle that draw 
the gaze of others, thereby producing memory in the “present.” Moreover, Taussig 
suggests this memory produced in the “present” is closely bound to history, when he 
writes that during the practice(s) of occupation and/or demonstration, “there is a fusion 
between the person and the sign that demands it being held aloft as testimony to history 
finding its articulation in words—words that play with words as much as with history” 
(76). As to what history rhetorically articulated in words might say, Judith Butler 
provides an insightful observation when, regarding the Occupy Movement, she writes 
that: “[t]he bodies assembled ‘say’ we are not disposable, whether or not they are using 
words at the moment. What they say, as it were, is that we are still here, persisting, 
demanding greater justice, a release from precarity, a possibility of a livable life” (12). 
Thus, through their monumental operations, performative aesthetic strategies such as 
demonstration and/or occupation, bodies can rhetorically compel on-lookers to remember 
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the “monument’s” existence and freedom, its value and “presence,” as well as its 
struggles and implicit desire to lessen the weight of that struggle so as to ascertain what 
Butler describes as “a livable life” (12). 
Moreover, the above is a question concerning the reproduction of subjectivity, not 
only for the viewer but the performer as well. For instance, while a body poses for others 
during events of aesthetic performance, demonstration and/or occupation, and so on, the 
mere “look” of others (Sartre) leads the subject to respond differently, adopting, say, an 
attitude of increasing enthusiasm or seriousness. And when on-lookers respond to those 
engaged in the act of becoming-monumental, whether in supportive, derisive, or even 
comedic fashion, when such responses are assimilated by the monumental body, they are 
often incredibly persuasive with regard to its future responses.60 
 
 
                                                 
60 During protest events, it is intriguing to watch how activists behave depending upon how on-
lookers respond to them. For instance, I have watched as activists exuberantly cheered in response to 
honking car horns, or boo/hiss in response to rude gestures by detractors. One can also see how a series of 
“positive” or “negative” responses can lead an activist to return to the picket-line energized or demotivated 
(or not to return!). Hence, each response is indirect evidence of a reproduction of subjectivity. 
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Fig. 1. An Occupy Activist “Becoming” Her Cardboard Sign. 
 
 However, it is important to emphasize that although bodies engaged in specific 
visible, social practices can function as monuments, producing rhetorical effects through 
a performative/aesthetic “stiller-than-still stillness,” one cannot un-problematically 
reduce a singular body to its hermeneutic-rhetorical expressions. For instance, it is 
reductive to take the rhetorical content of an activist’s cardboard sign as an essential 
indication of who they are—just as one cannot reduce a singularity’s existence to the 
form of a commodity. In rhetorical studies, the most perspicacious and exhaustive 
critique of reducing an existent to a hermeneutical figure or “monument” has come from 
Diane Davis, who reminds readers that though one can highlight the rhetorical power 
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inherent in the body “becoming-monumental” through performative practices, one must 
simultaneously “un-say” this gesture. In other words, although one must, as Adorno 
notes, become a thing to resist the thing-ification (objectification/commodification) of 
everything, one must exercise caution when doing so not to reduce the existence of 
singular beings to things. Davis does concede that “knowing depends on figuration” (40), 
that is, on the monumental structuration of perception-recollection, and she likewise 
points out that “all intelligibility, including self-intelligibility, is a tropological product” 
(40). However, she contends there is “an enigmatic surplus that overflows” the figure or 
monument which one cannot think as a singular being appears (55). This surplus of 
alterity or singularity “exceeds vision’s appropriative gaze” and “escapes all 
comprehension and all knowledge” (49); it is always-already “forgotten.” So although 
bodies can in certain cases operate as monuments, producing rhetorical effects through 
hermeneutic figuration, they simultaneously exceed said figuration, issuing a kind of 
“rhetorical” demand61 to not reduce them to that figure. The non-figurable, “forgotten” 
surplus of their being screams that who/what they are (becoming) and what they desire 
are irreducible to, for instance, a series of demands scrawled on cardboard signs. 
 Furthermore, one can highlight the monumentality of the structures these bodies 
erect, such as shanties/tents, artistic works, and so on. For as Mitchell suggests when 
theorizing the monumental quality of aesthetic/activist performance, “one might single 
                                                 
61 For more on the “rhetorical,” though non-hermeneutic, “demand” issued by the singular body 
(alterity) not to reduce it to a figure, see Davis’ Inessential Solidarity, especially Chapter Two on figuration 
(pages 37-65). 
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out the image of the tent and the encampment” as “manifestations of a long term resolve” 
(13-14), as iconic “images that promise to become monuments” (9). However, rather than 
rehearse the way in which temporary living structures operate as monuments due to their 
status as performance art or via rhetorical resonance with other monumental forms, I 
would like to look at how the demolition of certain temporary living structures and spaces 
for bodies reveals these structures or spaces as having a monumental quality. Robert 
Bevan’s discussion of the destruction of architecture during war time is instructive here, 
an event he argues is indicative of “cultural cleansing” (25-60). So although it is tenuous 
to equate the eviction of monumental bodies or the destruction of their living structures 
with the systematic cultural liquidation that occurs in times of war,62 Bevan’s 
observations nonetheless help one draw out the monumental quality of strategically-
placed living structures such as tents/shanties, or certain ephemeral aesthetic forms. For 
instance, Bevan remarks that “[h]ousing . . . especially vernacular housing, can be 
monumental in the sense of acting as a stimulus to memories. . . . The term monument is 
used here in its broadest sense” (14). Viewing specific living structures as monuments 
also gives one a sense of how these dwellings can “[signal] to [their] enemies the 
presence of a community marked for erasure” (8). As monuments, temporary living 
structures take on a broader rhetorical significance—they function as markers of 
something that oppositional forces wish to erase from memory. 
                                                 
62 Regarding cultural cleansing, one might justifiably argue that war-based analogies are highly 
appropriate in the case of specific activist demonstrations/occupations; it is only that the war at issue is a 
class war rather than a militarist or imperial war between nation-states. 
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The “Poor People’s Campaign” (1968), for example, illustrates the ways in which 
viewing specific living structures or spaces as monuments can expose what is at stake in 
their violent demolition. The PPC was an occupation movement organized by Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and others, where upwards of 3,000 economic justice- and human 
rights-advocates built and camped out in a tent city on the Washington Mall for six weeks 
(Zinn 206).63 Eventually, despite its nonviolent tactics, the PPC and its “Resurrection 
City” (zip code 20013) “was broken up by police action” via a thousand Washington, 
D.C., officers in riot gear firing tear gas canisters into the shantytown (206). Shortly 
thereafter, the encampment was demolished. 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 Although the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., took place before the Poor People’s 
Campaign began, it succeeded in ruffling official feathers. The campaign triggered fears of rioting and 
20,000 army soldiers were activated and prepared for a military occupation of the Capitol should the PPC 
pose a threat. Furthermore, the FBI monitored and attempted to disrupt the PPC through operation 
codename PODCAM, and some accused PPC participants of communism in an attempt to discredit their 
demands for socio-economic justice (“Poor” N.p.). 
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Fig. 2. Resurrection City with Washington Monument in Background. 
 
 Indeed, the vernacular housing of Resurrection City functioned as a rhetorical 
spur for producing memory, specifically a counter-memory of class and race struggle, 
which gave the city and its shanties a monumental function (Bevan 24). And when one 
views the shantytown in this light, it simultaneously transforms how one perceives-recalls 
its destruction. As Bevan points out, the “destruction of particular building types or 
architectural traditions,” especially monuments, imply “the erasure of the memories, 
history and identity attached to architecture and place – enforced forgetting – is the goal 
itself” (8). So if one views Resurrection City as a temporary monument to race and class 
struggle, one can understand its demolition as an instance of monumental destruction 
wherein the forgetting of this struggle was an implicit goal. Since the memory of such 
struggles is often a spur to collective action, it is no wonder why “[d]emolition has often 
been deployed to break up concentrations of resistance among the populace” (11). 
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Bevan  also argues that demolitions have significant rhetorical force precisely 
because living structures seem stable and enduring: “[i]t is architecture’s very impression 
of fixity that makes its manipulation such a persuasive tool: selective retention and 
destruction can reconfigure historical record and the façade of fixed meanings brought to 
architecture can be shifted” (12-13 emphasis mine). Even temporary/vernacular living 
structures have the appearance of some degree of fixity, and this renders their 
“obliviation” all the more jarring. And because one can more easily erase temporary 
living structures, one can more easily modify the historical narratives surrounding them 
to suit the interests of those in power. This is why Bevan argues that “[p]rotecting the 
architectural heritage of those targeted for domination or elimination helps ensure that 
such peoples can never be erased entirely from history despite the determined efforts of 
their persecutors and destroyers” (24). 
PUBLIC MEMORY: CONTROL, REPRESENTATION, HOMOGENEITY 
 
 Prevailing discourses on the topic define the type of memory produced by the 
dynamic monuments above as public memory. For instance, Casey states: “by saying 
‘public’ we mean to contrast such memory with anything that takes place privately—that 
is to say, offstage, in the idios cosmos of one’s home or club, or indeed, just by oneself” 
(25). Thus, because temporary aesthetic performances and activist 
demonstrations/occupations do not typically take place in private space, by default this 
must mean—via disjunction—they are public. However, in contrast to this syllogistic 
logic, I argue that bodies engaged in specific visual, social practices along with the 
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structures they construct produce not public but what Hardt and Negri might call common 
memory.64 The need for a third term beyond the private/public dichotomy is evidenced 
when one recognizes that scholars are forced to employ the concept of public memory to 
describe everything from troubling forms of “official” (hegemonic) state remembrance to 
the memory of “counter-publics” that resist official forms of remembrance through 
narrative counter-memory. To make this point, I will therefore focus here primarily on 
public memory’s “poisonous” aspects—in particular, its links to state -property and -
control, the failure of democratic representation, and the elision of difference—but this is 
not to suggest that those who employ/have employed this term are somehow misguided 
or that public memory is a wholly corrupt concept. Rather, I perform this critique to 
highlight the need for an alternative conception, and to harvest the potentially fruitful 
results that may spring from it. 
 The first aspect of public memory I want to discuss regards its relationship to 
state-property/-control. I start here because it seems that without its often over-arching 
“ownership” or management by the state, public memory cannot legitimately claim to 
represent the memory of a populace, nor achieve its often homogenizing effects (whereby 
the plural memory of a Spinozistic multitude becomes the memory of “the nation” or “a 
people”). For instance, Hardt and Negri genealogically chart the history of “the public,” 
                                                 
64 Regarding need for a conception of “the common,” Hardt and Negri point out that “[t]he 
standard view, . . . assumes that the only alternative to the private is the public, that is, what is managed and 
regulated by states and other governmental authorities, as if the common were irrelevant or extinct” 
(Commonwealth viii). 
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and reveal its connections to state-sovereignty, explaining that: “[t]he concepts of public 
goods and services were . . . developed in the light of a legal theory that considered the 
public as patrimony of the state and the principle of general interest as an attribute of 
sovereignty” (Multitude 206). Thus, public memory carries buried inside itself, like a 
worm-infested fruit, the implicit suppositions that the state is its guardian and that state-
power over such memory is in the interest of populations. Moreover, Hardt and Negri 
repeatedly point out that the term “‘public’ too blurs an important distinction between 
state control and what is held and managed in common” (203). I focus more intently on 
this rhetorical slippage when discussing the concept of “the common” later on, but for 
now it is enough to note that one of its results is to blind subjects to the fact that though 
they believe they share control over public memory (because they conceive themselves as 
part of the public), power over said memory actually or primarily resides in state hands. 
Furthermore, when the power to produce and control memory is explicitly handed over to 
the state, since it is seemingly “an authority that transcends the social,” the public can 
“act in a bureaucratic way, often irrational, blind, and suffocating” (Declaration 25). This 
can manifest by preventing forms of remembrance (and forgetting) from being enacted, 
feverishly controlling those that are, or being ignorant of what multitudes actually 
remember,65 in particular, those (“biopolitical”) struggles that the state wishes to preclude 
from entering public memory.  
                                                 
65 Concerning ignorance regarding what populations actually remember, Vivian remarks that, 
quite often, “members of the state assume they are well informed concerning the past because they have 
been indoctrinated in official, exceedingly selective and distorted versions of it ad infinitum” (178). In other 
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Indeed, as Kendall Phillips notes, “publics have the capacity to authorize (or 
reject) certain memories” (5), and this can spell disaster for those that remember 
otherwise than the public. Phillips points out that “other publics” can contest state control 
over memory (6), but the question here is whether one best rhetorically articulates such 
conflicts as struggles between different publics, rather than between the public and “the 
common(ers)”—those who produce the common(s). This is an especially pertinent 
question given that such conflicts quite often exemplify what Bradford Vivian describes 
as the dark underbelly of public forgetting, or when the public “forgets” such that it 
“suppresses the individual or collective capacity to begin anew, [or] when it stifles one’s 
ability to fashion novel sociopolitical relations” (59).66 That is, when the state enacts 
“forgetting” (as obliviation) so as to prevent socio-political transformation, reparation, 
and experimentation with new modes of existence. Moreover, as Mitchell chillingly adds, 
such conflicts highlight precisely why “public space is, in fact, pre-occupied by the state 
and the police, that its pacified and democratic character, apparently open to all, is 
sustained by the ever-present possibility of violent eviction” (10). 
                                                                                                                                                 
words, the specter of state control residing at the heart of public memory not only affects the multitude, but 
those in positions of state authority. 
66 It is important to note that although public forgetting is often a violent affair (such as in the 
case of Resurrection City’s demolition), as Vivian argues at length, forgetting also has an affirmative face. 
In this regard he explains how “[i]n the broadest terms, public forgetting is desirable when it reflects open 
and voluntary procedures of judgment and detestable when it contributes to denying opportunities for 
communal judgment as such” (177). Thus, in a later section I follow Vivian’s lead by developing an 
affirmative conception of “common” forgetting. 
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Along the above lines, consider the “Bonus Army” of 1932, an occupation 
movement for economic justice in the wake of World War I. During this event, angry 
veterans, unemployed and living in poverty, marched on Washington, D.C., to demand 
the government pay out bonus certificates that were due in the future. Eventually, more 
than twenty thousand veterans set up camp near the White House calling for recompense 
(Zinn 116). However, the march of the Bonus Army to Washington, its performative 
“monumental” occupation, and the counter-memorial challenge it signaled to official 
state narratives regarding the treatment of veterans and the memory of WWI, were not 
well-received by those in power. Hence, President Herbert Hoover ordered the army to 
evict them with cavalry, infantry, machine guns, tanks, tear gas, and fire; multiple victims 
perished and thousands were injured by tear gas (117). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The Bonus Army Encampment is Set Ablaze. 
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 Indeed, the Bonus Army disrupted “official” public memory by occupying public 
property, producing a temporary monument to neglect of WWI veterans by the US 
government. And said government responded by demolishing this monument, exposing 
the problematic intervention of state power in both the production and eradication of 
“public” memory. For although the “Bonus”-veterans were once the enforcers of public 
memory as official state remembrance, they found themselves cast off when attempting 
to integrate their own memory of economic struggle—their counter-monument—into 
public narrative. Their dynamic monument to more economically just futures was 
anything but a welcome addition to public remembrance, highlighting the reasons why 
“public” space and “public” memory are not in fact “public,” and not open to those who 
critique official versions of the truth. The public, in other words, is not so public after all. 
And although some may wish to employ the term “counter-public” to describe the 
monumental performance of the Bonus Army, I submit that scholars have backed up 
against the limits of public sphere theory, both Habermasian and post-Habermasian. 
 Beyond control and the reinforcement of official narrative, the second unsettling 
feature of public memory—linking it to the activity of the state—is the notion that public 
monuments and related memorial-forms represent the memory of a citizenry. This is a 
problem because attempts at representation result in the homogenizing effacement or 
elision/exclusion of differences rather than successfully capturing the memory of a 
multitude. For example, Hardt and Negri observe that “public opinion . . . is in fact 
neither representative nor democratic” (Multitude 259), and this is troubling since the 
justification for building monuments is often that they are a response to such supposedly 
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shared opinions. Moreover, during the eighteenth century, when democratic 
representation developed as a concept/practice, the notion of “the public” was also 
transformed into an existing entity for which a representative might stand in—which is 
also why it is believed today that “the public” can have monuments that represent its 
memory (259). However, Hardt and Negri argue that the concept of the/a representable 
public is a chimera: “[w]hen polls and surveys lead us to think of the public as an abstract 
subject—the public thinks or wants x or y—that is pure fiction and mystification” (263). 
Yet it is this prevailing mystification that undergirds the idea one can represent a 
citizenry’s memory in a monument or other forms of public memory. 
 The third troubling effect of public memory regards the effacement of difference, 
or the idea that when attempts at representing a multitude’s memory occur, this involves 
an effacement of different rememberers’ experiences in order to offer an image of 
coherence; that is, the image of a public possessing a unified/homogenous memory. For 
instance, as Reyes points out, there is a wide-spread “propensity of official public 
memory to depoliticize the past so as to present a coherent narrative of U.S. history” 
(228), and much scholarship on public memory exhibits the same characteristic (230).67 
Furthermore, public memory often strives to maintain its authoritativeness through the 
illusion of fixity, as though it can remain self-same throughout history. This is why 
Vivian avers that “[p]ublic memories retain rhetorical influence by appearing essentially 
                                                 
67 In-line with Reyes’ observations on coherence, Vivian argues that “[i]n our society of the 
spectacle, public events . . . increasingly are organized to unite an otherwise fractured citizenry in a 
dynamic affective experience” (81). 
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unchanged, and thus authentic, from their origins to their present incarnation” (130). So 
not only does public memory often cover over differences between rememberers 
spatially, for instance, across various populations, but also temporally, and it does so via 
the illusions of coherence and authenticity (in order to retain its power and influence). 
 As for some concrete examples of public memory/monuments that profess to 
represent a unified populace and thereby result in homogenizing memory across both 
space and time, one can turn to the Washington Monument and the World War II 
Memorial in Washington, D.C. With regard to the Washington Monument, one finds “the 
public” literally depicted as a (mono)lith, which is why Mitchell contends that it 
exemplifies “the most reductive and abstract form of the public literally manifested as 
both sculpture and architecture” (25). And moreover, because the monument attempts to 
conceptually unify the US populace into a single, coherent image, its rhetorical operation 
involves “the incorporation of [all US] citizens into a totality” (25). Moreover, public 
monuments not only can work to “level out” the differences inherent among collections 
of rememberers, but also regularize the way that multitudes recall specific events. For 
example, Barbara Biesecker critically describes the WWII Memorial as a “homogenizing 
force” that responds “to the contemporary crisis of national identity,” and it possesses this 
force by fabricating a shared memory of the war as central to US history, attempting to 
generate veneration toward the war and those who fought in it (I would likewise add that 
it produces a nationalism useful for generating support for future wars). Biesecker also 
argues that the memorial “rearticulate[s] the relation of the citizen to the nation,” by 
fabricating a fictional ideal of US citizens unified by their memory of WWII so as to 
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“resuscitate a waning sense of the ‘People’” (215-216). Thus, the Washington Monument 
and WWII Memorial function as instances of public memory meant to represent a 
“People’s” memory, but in doing so instead fabricate that memory,68 as they elide the 
radically divergent views and attitudes citizens actually hold. Furthermore, as public 
monuments, they likewise produce the illusion of a consenting public that participated in 
their conception and design. However, in contrast to such effacements of difference 
among multitudes of rememberers in the form of public monuments, one can take 
inspiration from Biesecker’s comment that “it is possible to remember otherwise, . . . not 
only what we remember but how we remember it could be different, and . . . collective 
memory could be pressed into the service of a very different politics” (239). 
Pressing memory into the service of a very different politics is precisely what I 
strive for with the concept of “common” memory, and as a transition to begin developing 
this concept, I want to analyze Mitchell’s observation that “[t]he scores of [empty] 
plazas, squares, and open urban spaces around the world, from Tahrir Square to Zuccotti 
Park, are themselves the appropriate monuments to the Occupy movement” (18). 
Mitchell’s observation indicates a challenge to the public memory tradition grounded on 
the ideals of representation and coherence—thereby gesturing toward a conception of 
memory that preserves radical difference. 
                                                 
68 Regarding the fabrication by monuments of a supposedly unified memory, one may find 
instructive Deleuze and Guattari’s comment in What is Philosophy that: “[t]he monument’s action is not 
memory but fabulation” (167-168). 
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Fig. 4. Zuccotti Park After the Eviction of Occupy. 
 
Indeed, Mitchell claims the empty spaces once occupied by social movements such as 
Occupy, the Poor People’s Campaign, and the Bonus Army are “sign[s] of potentiality, 
possibility, and plenitude, a democracy not yet realized” (21), and I would add that empty 
space is an appropriate monument to various social movements because it makes no 
pretense to represent those who mobilized to produce those movements. Any such 
attempts at representation would ultimately fail to rhetorically encapsulate the radical 
plurality of differences in bodies, political philosophies, subject-positions, and so on, that 
characterize not only Occupy, but numerous movements throughout the world and world 
history. Thus, when police surround a park or other once-occupied space such as in the 
image above, they not only paradoxically guard a monument to, for instance, economic 
struggle and social justice, they serve to produce its “frame” so that one can see more 
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clearly the outlines of a monument to that which is un-representable. This is to suggest, 
moreover, that such places/spaces are not empty at all, but “haunted, populated by spirits 
that refuse to rest” as well as the trace of “ghostly memory” that one cannot rhetorically 
confine to the statist figures of governed, representable, and homogenous, that is, public, 
memory (Mitchell 18, 21). 
COMMON MEMORY: DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, DIFFERENCE 
 
 Likely the most prudent place to begin here is by unpacking the somewhat 
misleading concept of “the common” so that one can fruitfully apply it to 
rhetorical/memory studies, with special attention on explaining why the “common” of 
common memory does not entail a sameness of memory. In Commonwealth, Hardt and 
Negri write that they “consider the common . . . those results of social production that are 
necessary for social interaction and further production, such as knowledges, languages, 
codes, information, affects, and so forth” (viii), along with the wealth of the material 
world. Because Hardt and Negri describe the common as the result of production within 
social interactions, I argue that one can understand “common” memory practices as the 
result of social production and interaction as well, especially because memory involves 
an assemblage of knowledges, codes, and so on that promote future production. 
Moreover, just as the wealth of society produced “in common” by the multitude is 
subordinated to private ownership and public control, there is likewise a veritable 
“treasure-house” of “common” memory that society produces, but that is domesticated in 
the form of public monuments, for example, or is understood to have origins in the 
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experiences of “individual”69 subjects. So whereas as Hardt and Negri propose productive 
practices and forms of social interaction that resist appropriation of the commonly-
produced wealth, I wish to pursue memory practices that resist appropriation of the 
“common” memory—a memory whose truths are “constructed from below” through 
democratic participation (121), and that one cannot non-reductively attempt to represent 
or cover over differences circulating within it. 
 Democratic participation is the first key characteristic of “common” memory. So, 
just as Hardt and Negri’s concept of the common envisions a multitude producing wealth 
without recourse to private ownership or public control, I contend that “common” 
memory entails a multitude of singularities collaboratively engaging in memory practices 
without intervention by the state or claims to ownership/genesis by “individuals.” 
Multiple examples of this type of memory-production have already been introduced with 
regard to monumental/singular bodies and the living structures they construct, so with 
these examples in mind, one can more easily understand what “common(er)” memory 
practices look like that “militate against . . . public power in the interests of the common 
and mechanisms of self-management” (Declaration 26). Indeed, within specific social 
movements, for example, one witnesses the co-production of temporary/performative 
monuments that refuse public control or claims to private ownership, and therefore one 
                                                 
69 Resonating with my critique of the “individual” as an atomized, self-sufficient being in 
previous chapters, Hardt and Negri write: “[a]n individual can never produce the common, no more than an 
individual can generate a new idea without relying on the foundation of common ideas and intellectual 
communication with others” (Commonwealth 303). 
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can see how “common” memory practices are “based on the communication among 
singularities and emerge through the collaborative social processes of production” 
(Multitude 204). Rather than being managed by “individual” subjects or constructed by 
state apparatuses for the “public good,” “common” memory is “managed democratically 
by the multitude” (206), and entails the production of subjectivities that recognize their 
inter-relationality with (and dependency upon) others. 
 The second feature of “common” memory is resistance to representation, and this 
Bartlebian “No” not only calls for the democratic participation outlined above, but the 
existence of specific “common places” wherein non-representational participation can 
take place. As Hardt and Negri note, the refusal of representation is so important because 
“representation is not, in fact, a vehicle of democracy but instead an obstacle to its 
realization” (Declaration 9). For although historically, representative governance 
indicated an improvement over the tyranny of monarchical sovereignty, today 
representation primarily blocks the voices of the multitude from being heard and its 
polyvalent desires from being attended and actualized. Due to this break-down or failure 
of representation, those desiring to articulate the “common” memory of the citizenry or 
multitude have no other option but to speak for themselves, which is why, for example, 
Butler writes that: “[i]n demonstrating, in acting, the people come to represent 
themselves, embodying and reanimating the principles of equality that have been 
decimated” (“Demands” 11). And significantly, when one represents oneself, one is not 
actually representing anyone at all, just as in Hardt and Negri’s “commonwealth,” there 
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is a “common” ownership of wealth and therefore no ownership of private property at all 
(regarding the means of production, communication, and exchange). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. The Bonus Army “Represents Itself” in Washington, D.C. 
 
But if it is the case that “the events which comprise [collective memory] resist 
representation,” as Michael Bernard-Donals puts it (174), what does memory do if not 
represent the voices or desires of multitudes? Here the ghost of Bergson whispers that the 
answer resides in action. That is, in “common” memory, memory is en-acted through the 
performances of singularities rather than supposedly static/representational structures. 
This distinction is affirmed by both Reyes and Bollmer, such as when Reyes notes that 
“[t]he language of representation, which makes sense within an intersubjective 
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framework, does not attend to the nonrepresentational, performative modalities of 
memory as a medium” (237). So when artists, activists, and others engage in 
performances with monumental force, these performances do not operate 
representationally, but rather, indicate memory as produced through action, and as 
becoming action. And as Bollmer explains, “it is through memory as action that both 
individuals and collectives come into being as entities capable of political and social 
struggle” (452)—when memory becomes capable of producing a resistant subject, a 
“biopolitical” subject capable of transforming the world through relations with others. 
 However, if “common” memory resists representation by metamorphosing 
memory into action, there must be a place/space wherein said action can manifest. In 
discourses on public memory, such places are public places, such as when Casey explains 
how “[p]ublic discussion always takes place in quite specific locations: the agora, the 
forum, and (still at times) Hyde Park. All three of these are established places for 
promoting speech in common . . . But such common places also spring up spontaneously” 
(33). Notice though, the rhetorical slippage as if the public and common or “common 
places” are equivalent or interchangeable,70 a slippage that may lead projects attempting 
to articulate a “common” memory to find themselves, as Hardt and Negri put it, “back 
under the control of the state” (Declaration 26). Thus, it appears there is need for a 
conception of places/spaces, zones or territories that, in a significant sense, break with the 
public and public memory altogether. Classical rhetorics provide one with such a concept 
                                                 
70 A similar rhetorical slippage occurs when Casey writes that “[place] is integral to public 
memory, which is not merely situated in a public arena or literal ‘common place’ but enacted there” (32). 
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in the form of “common places” (topoi koinoi), which indicate finding-places for 
arguments or memory,71 and today they often take the shape of physical territories 
“opened up” or “re-territorialized” through the performative activities of bodies engaged 
in aesthetic and political practice. Moreover, even when such performative practices 
“happen” in places/spaces deemed private or public, a “common place” is ripped open 
(cleared) in their midst, disrupting/de-territorializing the space’s typical, often-
hegemonic, operations.72 
Paulo Virno indirectly aids one in conceiving such “common places” when he 
writes that “the topoi koinoi are the most generally valid logical and linguistic forms of 
all our discourse (let us even say the skeletal structure of it); they allow for the existence 
of every individual expression because no one can do without them” (34-35). 
Casuistically stretching this Aristotelian idea of a general form supposedly underlying all 
argument and singular expression, one might contend that “common places” (as re-
                                                 
71 In Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times, 
George A. Kennedy outlines the concept of the topos or topoi koinoi as follows: 
Topos in Greek means ‘place,’ and a logical or rhetorical ‘topic’ is thus a finding-place 
for an argument. Aristotle may have borrowed the concept of a topic from the ‘place’ in a 
hand-book where examples of argument from probability or other rhetorical techniques 
were to be found, or the meaning may be derived from the mnemonic system in which 
images of words or ideas to be remembered were imagined against a background of 
places. (95-96) 
72 Along these lines, consider Hakim Bey’s concept of the “Temporary Autonomous Zone” 
(TAZ), where autonomy indicates an operation free from private and public control. 
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territorialized territories) are likewise bases for expression, and no one can do without 
them if one wants one’s voice heard and memory articulated (without being muffled by 
the representative mechanisms of the state). And when such places/spaces open up, 
because they resist public management and statist intervention, Virno describes them as 
constituting “a non-public public sphere, . . . a non-governmental public sphere, far from 
the myths and rituals of sovereignty” (40). This aporetic concept of a “non-public public 
sphere” is precisely what the concept of the “common place” where “common memory” 
is produced strives to indicate. 
 The last feature of “common” memory I want to discuss is the preservation of 
difference, which stands opposed to the tendency of public memory to homogenize the 
memory of multitudes via monumental forms of representation. For when bodies engage 
in aesthetic, socio-political practices/performances not “bottlenecked” through forms of 
representation, and must democratically participate in producing “monuments,” the 
singularity of those bodies is more thoroughly articulated. This explains why Hardt and 
Negri contend that “the common has nothing to do with sameness. Instead, in struggle, 
different social groups interact as singularities and are enlightened, inspired, and 
transformed by their exchange with each other” (Multitude 37). Thus, Hardt and Negri 
turn the standard definition of “common-ness” on its head through a return to the term’s 
conception in political economy, sharply contrasting its use as indicating the presence of 
some essential feature (identity). This is why they in turn argue that “[w]hereas the 
individual dissolves in the unity of the community, singularities are not diminished but 
express themselves freely in the common” (Commonwealth 204, emphasis mine). Indeed, 
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when singularities/monumental bodies open up “common” places, spaces, territories, or 
zones managed neither by the state nor controlled privately, therein they can express 
radical differences, including differences in memory or whatever (for instance, different 
subject-positions with regard to class, race, gender, sexuality, species, and so on). So 
common memory does not relate to sameness, but to producing/articulating memory 
within a “common” territory (a “commons”) wherein singularities can resist being 
“leveled out.”73 And yet, when these radically different singularities with multiplicitous 
memory assemble, they possess the power, for instance, to produce social movements 
and political transformations, and therefore provide a powerful example of what Bollmer 
means when he says “there should also be a theory of how memory creates collective 
political bodies produced in specific relations of power, rather than the suggestion that 
certain groups of people remember the past in similar ways” (451). Likewise, through the 
                                                 
73 One reason why “common” memory does not entail a memory an entire community holds in 
common is because this notion of a universally-shared memory is a chimera. As to why, consider Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s famous argument in Philosophical Investigations regarding “family resemblances,” where 
he explains how just because a collection of entities is called by the same name does not mean that it has 
any one essential feature: 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games’. I mean board-games, chess-
games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don’t 
say: There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’—but look 
and see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not 
see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of 
them at that. (31) 
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preservation of difference, “common” memory introduces into rhetorical/memory studies 
a regard for memory-differences within seemingly unified collectives, and this is 
important because as Reyes notes: 
Scholars consistently acknowledge the differences between identities, 
differences that produce identity politics, but difference and alterity do not 
appear to play a role within identity formations. Instead, collective 
identities depend on what individuals hold in common, and often what 
they hold in common is provided through the semiotics of remembrance. 
(233) 
In other words, in rhetorical/memory studies, “common-ness” is typically linked to 
similitude rather than the expression of difference within “common” places/spaces. 
Hence it is pertinent to demonstrate how difference as singularity/alterity is always-
already at work within memory collectives, and one can do so by exposing how, through 
the production of “common” places/spaces, radical differences in memory are more 
thoroughly preserved. 
One can find evidence of such preservation of difference, for example, in the 
contemporary Occupy Movement, where by refusing to make a series of demands that 
apply to the movement as a “whole,” and by allowing any participant in the movement to 
speak at General Assembly meetings or in the press, the singular desires, struggles, and 
memories of activists are able to achieve rhetorical expression free from the “leveling 
out” of difference (at least in principle). 
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Fig. 6. Occupy Wall Street General Assembly in Washington Park. 
 
 Indeed, because participants in Occupy have such diverse backgrounds and 
subject-positions, no one memory unifies them—there is nothing common to all.74 And 
yet, each of these singularities can participate in the movement, producing “common” 
places/spaces regardless of background, and without the “authenticity” of their 
motivating experiences/memory being called into question (at least in principle). For 
whether one is LGBT, disabled, of-color, destitute, or even wealthy, if one earnestly 
participates in the movement, expressing a desire for economic fairness and social justice, 
one has the power to open a re-territorialized territory with others wherein radical 
differences in memory are expressed with little fear of rejection. Thus, it is apparent that 
                                                 
74 Although it is tempting to claim that a memory of economic struggle unifies participants in 
Occupy, there are in fact many wealthy subjects who express solidarity with the movement’s desires for 
economic equality and social justice. For numerous examples, see: westandwiththe99percent.tumblr.com. 
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“common” memory indicates not similitude of recollected experience, but rather, a 
multiplicity of memory articulated within a “commons” by the “commoners” who 
produce it. And this articulation of memory by so many different singularities possesses a 
significant rhetorical force with regard to the production of subjectivity; for one cannot 
dwell in proximity to so many different subjects without becoming radically 
metamorphosed as a subject oneself. 
COMMON FORGETTING: OBLIVION AND AFFIRMATION 
 
 Before coming to any provisional conclusions about “common” memory—a 
radically differentiated memory democratically produced in a commons by those who 
resist representation and affirm a plurality of voices—it is necessary to take up the 
question of forgetting. For just as public memory has its counterpart in public forgetting, 
so does “common” memory. I say “counterpart” here because rather than being 
memory’s opposite, as Bernard-Donals explains: 
memory and forgetfulness are not opposites but counterparts in the 
historical, and by consequence the narrative, project: forgetfulness is not 
the absence of, but rather an integral element of memory; and all memory 
is shot through with moments of forgetfulness. (41) 
This is an important point because throughout histories of western rhetorics and 
philosophy, to quote Vivian, “[f]orgetting has a bad reputation,” and it has this reputation 
due to “the language that ancients and moderns alike [have] used to describe it” (168). 
Indeed, rather than granting forgetting a conceptual existence of its own, it is typically 
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figured as parasitic upon memory,75 as nothing more than memory’s derivative, rather 
than a force in its own right and as productive of memory. Thus, following the lead of 
Bernard-Donals and Vivian, I want to develop a concept of “common” forgetting, which 
will (in part) require abiding by a “a definition of forgetting categorically distinct from 
far more familiar scenes of historical decay or genocidal destruction” (7). That is, I aim to 
develop a primarily affirmative conception of forgetting in connection with “the 
common,” and in doing so, show how “arguments to communally forget [can] produce 
socially, politically, and ethically attractive outcomes” (10). However, before developing 
this affirmative conception, I want to rigorously hesitate and examine “common” 
forgetting as it has the capacity to manifest unsettlingly. 
 Indeed, although forgetting is potentially an affirmative force, I do not want to 
give the naïve impression that when it is connected with “the common,” it is 
automatically worth celebrating. Certainly, just as public forgetting has its dark side as 
outlined for instance in the evictions/demolitions of the Bonus Army, Poor People’s 
Campaign, and Occupy Movement, “common” forgetting has its own problems as well. 
So although Nietzsche’s in/famous observation stands that “the unhistorical and the 
historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and 
of a culture” (63 emphasis his), sometimes “[i]n its most pernicious forms, forgetting 
resumes its timeworn place among the forces of violence and repression” (Vivian 60). 
                                                 
75 With regard to forgetting’s rhetorical figuration as a parasite, Vivian explains how, 
traditionally, “[f]orgetting is memory’s unshakable other, a ghostly counterpart shadowing luminous 
representations of former experiences” (3). Thus, it is often connected with amnesia, oblivion, and lack. 
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And such violence can include conceptual or rhetorical violence as well as physical 
varieties. 
As an example of “forgetting” as exemplifying rhetorical or conceptual violence, 
consider certain Tea Party demonstrations wherein activists made comparisons between 
the Affordable Health Care Act (aka “Obamacare”) and the horrors of the Holocaust. For 
although one might balk at considering the Tea Party as exemplifying “common” 
memory and/or forgetting, due to its relatively homogenous constitution and ethos of 
radical individualism, the movement/party nevertheless strives to performatively 
“monumentalize” its message through democratic participation and non-representational 
means. And provided its refusal (at least initially) to organize and articulate a memory of 
economic struggle without representation or public control, and because its voices were 
not (at least initially) homogenized by its leaders, it does bear some key markers of 
“common” memory. Thus, regarding “common” forgetting and its capacity to manifest 
problematically, consider the following image from a Tea Party rally: 
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Fig. 7. Tea Party Protesters “Become-Monumental.” 
 
Here one finds an image of President Barack Obama depicted in whiteface (inspired by 
the maniacal Joker from recent Batman films), and the Affordable Care Act described as 
analogous to “The Final Solution” enacted by the Hitlerian regime during World War II, 
a genocidal campaign many consider the most abominable undertaking in recent world 
history. However, even when considered a gift to corporate America, one cannot equate 
mandating the US citizenry to purchase health insurance from private companies with the 
“horrifying extermination of 6 million Jews and millions of non-Jews” (Zinn 147), unless 
one engages in an audacious “forgetting” of world history. Yet, this rather reckless 
“forgetting” is seemingly an instance of “common” forgetting, as it is performed through 
a “becoming-monumental” of singularities that democratically organize, refuse 
representation, and so on. Clearly, then, “common” forgetting is not always an event 
  206 
worth affirming, but the conception aimed for in what follows breaks with traditions of 
forgetting that amount to historical amnesia or obliviousness. 
 In the tradition of forgetting inaugurated by Nietzsche and exemplified by Vivian 
and others, it is “presuppose[d] that acts of willful forgetting can be acts of justice” 
(Vivian 53)—which suggests one cannot express an amnesiac comportment toward the 
past. Rather, one recognizes and affirms the past as it took place, but engages in 
rhetorical re-descriptions and re-imaginings that strive to diminish the damaging effects 
of that past on the “present”/future. Or as Vivian puts it, in such cases, “[f]orgetting 
achieves persuasive effect as a rhetorical form—that is, as a speech or language act 
intended to influence thought, debate, or action in public affairs—not by asking 
audiences to become literally oblivious about segments of their shared past” (47). Thus, 
rather than erasing the past, forgetting justly demands one reconfigure it such that it takes 
on a new significance, and when this happens civic discussion and action are often 
modified for the better. This is why Vivian contends that the goal of forgetting “is not 
amnesia but counter-memory as Michel Foucault describes it” (50), that is, an ethical 
“forgetting” that clears the way for remembering differently/affirmatively. And recall, as 
argued in previous chapters, counter-memory entails a reproduction of subjectivity, more 
specifically, the production of subjects that perceive-recall life in ways resistant to 
official narratives and calcified truths. 
 In order to connect an affirmative conception of forgetting to “the common,” 
however, some examples are necessary. Vivian provides one such example through his 
analysis of Gypsy culture, despite the fact he frames this discussion as exemplifying 
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“public” rather than “common” forgetting. Vivian argues that forgetting “constitutes one 
of the primary formative principles of Gypsy heritage in general” (115), and to these 
formative “principles” one can add a distrust of statist interaction/intervention linked to 
Gypsy persecution, as well as the ceaseless production of “common” places for dwelling, 
building, and interacting, all wherein political representation is unnecessary. Moreover, 
Vivian points out that “Gypsies lack a common sense of identity, and thus of culture and 
memory,” and therefore, “[t]he meaning of being Gypsy resists signification” (119-120). 
In other words, there is no “common” Gypsy memory as similitude of recollection. This 
does not mean that Gypsies have “no sense at all of a defining identity, culture, or 
memory” (119), but it does mean there is no essence or essential memory bound to 
Gypsy-hood. Yet, this openness to difference in memory, one produced through an 
“eternal” return of forgetting as cultural practice, is precisely what “common” 
places/spaces open the potential for actualizing. Hence, due to cultural distrust of public 
intervention and representation, as well as an attunement to difference produced through 
forgetting, I submit that one can view Gypsy culture as exemplifying “common” rather 
than public forgetting. 
 Finally, I want to discuss a case that exemplifies “common” forgetting in relation 
to counter-memory as Vivian describes it. On November 9
th
, 1969, so as to draw attention 
to the socio-political grievances of Native Americans, seventy-eight members of different 
tribes proceeded to performatively occupy Alcatraz Island (Zinn 286). Indeed, by 
“Hold[ing] the Rock” along with the more than six hundred Indians from more than fifty 
tribes that would eventually join them (286), they attempted to draw attention to the 
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plight of Native American reservation life, and the systematic erasure from memory of 
atrocities, land-thefts, and economic injustices perpetuated against Native Americans 
throughout the formation of the US (and into the present). Although the US government 
eventually cut off telephone lines, electricity, and water to Alcatraz, many Native 
Americans stayed, but as Zinn notes, “[s]ix months later, federal forces invaded the island 
and physically removed the Indians living there” (287). 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Native Americans Occupy Alcatraz Island. 
 
 Regardless of their eviction, the Indian tribes opened up a “common place” in the 
middle of Alcatraz Island where they became body-monuments to economic and racial 
struggle. They democratically organized themselves in opposition to private control and 
public representation, encouraged audiences to hear the voices of multiple tribes, and 
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disseminated a counter-memorial narrative regarding the treatment of Indian populations. 
In doing so, they affirmatively shed or “forgot” those white-washed US histories that 
occluded genocide and economic deprivation, and exemplified what a “common” 
forgetting can do; that is, a “forgetting” and counter-remembering that often can only 
take place when a commons is opened up so that singular voices are heard. And it is 
through such events of affirmative forgetting and counter-remembering that, Vivian 
notes, performatively enact “the very deed upon which all of politics depends: the act of 
beginning again” (88)—encouraging hope in new and better futures. 
CONCLUSION: LETTING BE THE STILL 
 
 As this investigation into the monumental quality of specific (singular) 
bodies/structures and the “common” memory they produce comes to close, the question 
that likely arises is what the inquiry directs one toward as a next step. For as Bollmer 
explains, “[c]ollective memory is the conjunction of a human with the technological, and 
perhaps other humans, in order to do something” (461). Perhaps this “doing” resides just 
as much in thinking as it does in acting, and in the critical attitudes and rhetorical 
articulations one develops regarding various events, figures, and practices. For instance, 
if one bears witness to the “becoming-monumental” of a body as it exposes itself to 
scrutiny, regardless of what it “says,” is not this precarious monument worth respecting 
in its fantastic vulnerability even if only by contemplating what it strives to express? 
Moreover, as Bevan points out, “[t]he continuing fragility of civilized society and 
decency is echoed in the fragility of its monuments” (8), and is not the exposed body 
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offering itself up to the penetrating gaze of others the most fragile monument of all, the 
one most worth protecting? Given its tenuousness and fragility, is it not the one most 
worthy of consideration in thought? 
 Likewise, just as the bodies of those who offer themselves up to scrutiny, who 
expose themselves through a “becoming-monumental,” exhibit a fragility calling one to 
carefully attend them, is not “the common(s),” the place/space wherein one can articulate 
a radical diversity of memory, utterly fragile and precarious as well—especially because 
it often opposes itself to private and public, corporate/statist powers, and has no one to 
speak for (or remember) it beyond itself? Thus, when the “commoner” appears and 
produces a “common place,” daring to articulate an often-anguished memory of, for 
instance, economic, racial, gendered, or other forms of struggle, when s/he dares to recall 
that memory and persists in “common space” with others so that they might recall their 
struggles or desires for the future as well, is there not a call to protect such sites of 
articulation? And when such sites have been “erased,” do they not leave behind the trace 
of ghostly memory, “specters of the common” (Commonwealth 153) calling/obligating 
one to protect them in the future? Perhaps if one answers in the affirmative, this signals 
the coming of the commoner as well. For in the promise of protection and speaking out, 
or even adopting a contemplative attitude of “letting be,” one thereby begins to re-
produce “the common” once more, drawing it from the nameless ashes, and begins to 
rebuild the “treasure-house” whereby one’s memory can take its place alongside others—
joining them in the fold. 
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Beginning(s): Memories of the Future 
 
Memory projects itself toward the future, and it constitutes the presence of the 
present. 
-- Jacques Derrida, Memoires for Paul de Man 
 
What’s at stake in breaking out/in . . . is not an/other landing site. . . . What’s at 
stake . . . is nothing short of the future. 
-- Diane Davis, Breaking up [at] Totality: A Rhetoric of Laughter 
 
 Typically, it is academic custom to bookend a text by signaling various 
conclusions along with providing a summary of what the text has covered. However, 
given the respective topics of this investigation, the rhetorics of memory/forgetting and 
the Occupy Movement, such an approach will not suffice. For this is not a text that aims 
at conclusions, but rather, for holding questions open and inviting further thought, for 
resisting “foreclosure” in the sense of “having done” with something. This is especially 
important given that the role of memory in rhetorical studies is only now being revisited 
after centuries of neglect, and the Occupy Movement has perhaps only just now passed 
through its first major cycle. Thus, attempting to reach conclusions about these events 
and their relation to one another would entail restricting their vast possibilities at 
precisely the kairotic moment when they might blossom. Rather than conclusions, 
therefore, here I will instead point to the beginnings of rhetorical memory/forgetting and 
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the Occupy Movement, and call for others to join in the conversation regarding those 
beginnings. This involves challenging the notion that memory is primarily directed 
toward the past by emphasizing instead its vital relationships to the future and hope. And 
in order to invigorate such hope, I offer suggestions as to how social movements can aid 
one in understanding memory’s (/forgetting’s) “futural” attunement. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Hula Hooping Activist at Occupy Austin. 
 
 To begin (again), recall Collin Gifford Brooke’s remark that “memory and 
delivery stand as nearly vestigial canons, little more than reminders of rhetoric in a 
different place and time” (29). Of course, as evidenced throughout this text, I would have 
it otherwise, and so I have developed multiform ways by which one might overcome the 
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seemingly “vestigial” nature of rhetorical memory, fostering for it a new growth and new 
functionality, particularly by putting it into practice and by developing it as a critical 
strategy for analyzing events. However, rather than recount and reminisce about the 
particular ways in which I have attempted to “practice” memory, for instance, in relation 
to the production of subjectivity, student writing, monumentality and “common” places, 
and technological archives, I prefer to ask readers: What other ways are possible? Or 
more importantly, how might one prepare the ground to actualize those unforeseeable 
“virtualities” that the future of memory secretly holds in store, that Jacques Derrida has 
described as always to come?76 Furthermore, what does the role of memory in rhetorical 
studies have the capacity to be-come? For as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari proclaim, 
“[w]herever we used the word ‘memories’ . . . we were wrong to do so; we meant to say 
‘becoming,’ we were saying becoming” (Thousand 294). So in the spirit of their 
observation, what “becoming(s)” of memory are still on the way? How will memory 
make itself heard from the future? 
 The call to promote strategies for bringing forth memory’s unforeseen 
“virtualities” and “becoming(s)” holds for forgetting as well as memory, as they are 
inexorably bound, yet irreducible, forces. Thus the question becomes: How might those 
                                                 
76 Alex Reid describes the virtual as “a realm of potentials that are not actualized,” and where 
“[t]hose potentials exist as an irretrievable past, what we did not come to think, but from which our 
thoughts emerged, like bubbles surfacing on water coming to a boil” (Virtuals 105). Thus, a profound 
relationship exists between the virtual and that which has been so thoroughly “forgotten” that it has never 
entered memory/thought. 
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in rhetorical studies come to agree with Nietzsche when he proclaims that “it is altogether 
impossible to live at all without forgetting” (Untimely 62)? Or to restate the question with 
a twist: How might rhetoricians place forgetting in the service of life, putting it into 
practice alongside memory? This is such a critical idea because as Diane Davis notes, 
forgetting amounts to “a life-affirming shedding in anticipation of a new future,” and if 
one is “to think the unthinkable” by enacting the revaluation of values that new futures 
require, quite often it will have been necessary to let memory go (Breaking 277-278). 
That is, the future itself and the new values that produce/constitute it are opened up only 
through a jettisoning of burdensome past foundations. For indeed, what are social 
movements like Occupy calling for if not an affirmative “letting go” of certain 
problematic values, in Occupy’s particular case, the neo-liberal capitalist values 
connected to an ethos of “accumulate wealth, forgetting all but self?” 
 The question of forgetting is therefore so vital because it aids one in clearing the 
way for new values and radically new socio-political paradigms, or as Bradford Vivian 
puts it, “[f]orgetting eventuates the . . . production of revolutionary futures”77 (“Deletion” 
                                                 
77 Regarding forgetting and prospects for socio-political change, Vivian notes how “the future 
revolutionary rejection of the political, social, and economic past unavoidably calls on those who would 
effect that rejection to heed the calls of the revolutionary dead, of those who were sacrificed so that the 
rupturing future might arrive” (“Deletion” 6). Thus, whenever one engages in a politically productive 
(rhetorically performative) act of affirmative forgetting, one simultaneously engages in an act of mourning 
and remembrance, calling forth the specters of the dead who fought so that a kairotic forgetting/rupture is 
possible. 
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5). Vivian likewise argues that forgetting is “the very deed upon which all of politics 
depends: the act of beginning again” (Public 88). And what he means here, beyond 
warning readers about the dangers involved in trying to inflexibly preserve a particular 
socio-cultural memory, is that if one moralistically clings to dangerous and outmoded 
forms of thought—either by recalling them incessantly, or treating them as having a 
divine, transcendent origin or foundation in an inexorable Human Nature—then there is 
no opportunity for starting over or beginning again. Without forgetting, one is 
condemned to a stultifying repetition of the same. 
 Of course, refusing the inflexibility of memory, the repetition of the same, 
politically, socially, economically, and so on, is the very substance of class-oriented 
movements like Occupy, and other social movements regarding women’s rights, civil 
rights, GLBT rights, and many more. For at their hearts is an attempt to remember 
otherwise and to envision new futures. And yet, the orientation of movements toward the 
future, their strategic deployment of memory in the service of the future, is what makes 
them so difficult to predict and grapple with as events unfold—as one’s expectations are 
constantly thwarted, one is incessantly baffled and surprised, shocked and overjoyed. 
This is what makes thinking and writing about social movements incredibly challenging, 
but this difficulty is precisely what thinking and writing are about—struggling with the 
un-thought, the im-memorial, in short, the future, and so I am comforted by Gilles 
Deleuze’s remark: 
How else can one write but of those things which one doesn’t know, or 
knows badly? It is precisely there that we imagine having something to 
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say. We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which 
separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms one into the 
other. (Difference xxi) 
In other words, when one truly engages in thinking or writing, one will struggle, one will 
become, and one will occupy new territories of life and existence. For just as struggles in 
the streets confront the limits of physical movement, struggles in thought confront the 
limits of what one can conceive, not only regarding what one is or is not allowed to think, 
but also what one can think provided one’s available archives of rhetorics and the truth-
regimes that condition/control them. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Occupy Wall Street Activist Chants while Marching. 
 
 Thus, to take Occupy as an example one last time, when it comes to knowing 
what will have been remembered regarding it (or any movement, for that matter) in the 
future, it is simply impossible to say, and this is a fact worth celebrating because it keeps 
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the “potential” of any such movement forever open, just as the future itself never stops 
unfolding. Perhaps, as Sarah van Gelder explains, “[h]istorians may look back at 
September 2011 as the time when the 99% awoke, named our crisis, and faced the reality 
that none of our leaders are going to solve it. . . . the moment when we realized we would 
have to act for ourselves” (3). Perhaps. For as Howard Zinn once predicted, “[t]here is a 
chance that such a movement could succeed in doing what the system itself has never 
done—bring about great change with little violence” (425). But this, too, remains 
impossible to say, even as one conjectures as to what might bring about such a massive 
transmutation of subjectivity and mobilization of singularities. 
However, although the catalysts for change remain uncertain, I have already 
highlighted the importance of “forgetting” and “beginning again” in connection with 
radical socio-political transformation, and to this one can add the energizing memory of 
specific successes, lessons, and victories—events that give birth to hope. For example, as 
Occupier Kevin Zeese avers regarding the movement: 
We impacted the debate. We impacted policy. We showed people they are 
not alone. We exposed the unfair economy and our dysfunctional 
government. We showed people they could have an impact. We showed 
people they could have power. We let the genie out of the bottle. No one 
will put it back in. (Hedges N.p.) 
Indeed, generalizations like these and the memories they encompass possess an incredible 
rhetorical and mobilizing force, and so they are worth recalling and deploying as a 
movement undulates forward. But on the other hand, there are potential dangers in 
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remembering a movement too well, that is, in “pitching a tent” in celebration of memory. 
For as Žižek points out, it is important that one respond to future socio-economic crises78 
and future instances of state-sanctioned repression with determination, courage, and 
patience rather than nostalgia for what has already been accomplished. Žižek thus 
contends: “[t]he only thing I’m afraid of is that we will someday just go home and then 
we will meet once a year, drinking beer and nostalgically remembering ‘what a nice time 
we had here.’ Promise yourselves that this will not be the case” (Occupy! 69). In order 
that social movements (whether Occupy or others) might continue to “succeed” and 
flourish,79 then, in order to keep hope alive, a specific admixture of memory and 
forgetting will have been necessary, and as I have shown, the tension between these 
forces is not one that can be non-violently foreclosed. 
 Furthermore, just when one thinks it safe to “forget” about a movement (or any 
monumental event), or when one believes one has the memory of a movement/event 
well-established, one should expect to see ghosts, and the reemergence of forces thought 
                                                 
78 Whereas the market crash that produced the Great Depression was swiftly met with some 
beneficial reforms (such as the Glass-Steagall Act), similar measures have, by and large, not been 
successfully enacted in the wake of the current neoliberal-capitalist economic crisis. One need only 
consider the way that the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” or the 
“Affordable Health Care Act” were eviscerated to safely predict that more crises are on their way. 
79 It is worth noting that, historically, class struggles tend to ebb and flow in terms of their size, 
force, and cultural visibility, so one can predict that the “becoming” of Occupy and other movements will 
follow a similar trajectory, exhibiting moments of higher visibility and impact at some times than at others. 
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long dead. For example, just as the “death of Occupy” has been proclaimed in many 
quarters along with any challenge that the movement might issue to hegemonic agendas, 
perhaps corporate and military elites will deem it “safe” to once again enact economic 
austerity measures, or send US troops abroad on another imperial adventure for economic 
and political gain. However, maybe just when US social programs are led to the chopping 
block or the clamor of sabers again becomes a din, those who have been brought together 
by Occupy networks may rise up to resist these forces, standing firm against the 
injustices of austerity and horrors of war as did activists and veterans at Occupy NATO 
protests in Chicago, an event where soldiers tore medals from their chests and announced 
furiously that those who gave them such hollow souvenirs could have them back: 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Former Sergeant Ash Woolsen Tears Military Medals from his Chest. 
 
But regardless of whatever future forms, whatever mode of “being-against,” that 
Occupy and other movements for socio-political change take in the future, given 
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everything they have already brought about through the never-ending cycle of struggle, 
they leave behind the memory, the trace, of battles fought and won. They rhetorically 
inscribe in those who live on in their wake hope in and desire for the future. They remind 
one that the arc of memory bends toward tomorrow, often better tomorrows, curving 
beyond an unforeseeable horizon, so even if one’s palace lies in ruins, the sun will rise 
again, and light the way along a brand new path of life. 
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